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The sovereign debt crises in European Union member states after the year 2010 
saw a number of comprehensive bailout packages of unprecedented size. The 
various fiscal and structural reforms on which the bailouts were conditional 
substantially shaped welfare states and labour markets in the affected 
countries. Discussions about the reform programmes in the political economy 
literature mostly revolve around their effects on economic growth and fiscal 
sustainability. Much less has been written about the distributive effects of these 
reforms. This thesis puts the question of how the burden of the adjustment 
process was distributed among different groups at the centre of the analysis. 
 
Specifically, the thesis focuses on the economic adjustment programmes in 
Greece and Portugal and analyses their distributive effects, both with regard 
to the fiscal consolidation measures and the labour market reforms that went 
along with the austerity programmes. The PhD’s central claim is that the 
distributional consequences of these programmes were crucially determined by 
how much control over the reform process was exercised by the Troika of IMF, 
the European Commission, and the ECB, as their preferences and policy 
objectives differ substantially from those of elected domestic policymakers. 
Throughout the PhD it is shown, through a mix of descriptive statistics and 
microsimulation methods (EUROMOD), that the distributive effects – of both 
fiscal and labour market reforms – vary across and within countries as the 
degree of Troika control shifts. While the impact of the Troika seems to be 
progressive with regard to fiscal reforms, the case is more ambiguous for labour 
market reforms. The tighter the control exercised by the Troika, the more 
redistributive towards lower income groups became fiscal reforms; labour 
market reforms, on the other hand, focused largely on breaking up insider 
privileges when the degree of Troika control was high, but paid little attention 
to the potential compensation of more vulnerable groups of workers. This is in 
line with the policy preferences of the Troika institutions, which have adopted 
a more critical view of excessive levels of income inequality. Importantly, this 
appreciation of excessive inequality as an important issue for the Troika 
institutions stems mainly from the fact that it constitutes an obstacle for 
achieving other policy objectives, such as sustainable economic growth or 
ensuring a minimum degree of political stability in order to successfully 
complete the reform process.  The Troika paradigm seems more agnostic 




economic orthodoxy built on the principle of labour market flexibilization. 
Overall, the actions of unelected technocratic policy makers seem to be 
governed by radically different rules based on ideas while elected policy makers 
seem to be governed by their interest to be re-elected. 
 
The thesis is divided into three stand-alone papers. The contribution of the 
first paper is to establish the distributive effects of the EAPs, measured with 
microsimulations, and the preferences of the Troika policy makers. The second 
paper decomposes the distributive effects of fiscal reforms and identifies the 
shifting degree of control exercised by the Troika as the key variable 
determining the reform design and effects. The third paper analyses the 
consequences of labour market reforms in the context of labour market 
dualisation. The thesis concludes by situating the findings in the current 
debates in political science and comparative political economy. It proposes to 
bridge the gap between the burgeoning electoral turn literature and the new 
institutionalist literature by re-focusing on the role of actors and ideas in 
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––––– Introduction ––––– 
“We all know what to do, we just don't know how to get re-elected after we've 
done it” 
–– Jean-Claude Juncker1 
(then Prime Minister of Luxembourg and President of the Eurogroup) 
 
 
A.1 Setting the Scene 
The global financial crisis of 2008 sent shock waves through the world economy, 
ultimately resulting in the deepest recession since the Great Depression. 
Around the globe, governments launched fiscal stimulus programmes on an 
unprecedented scale in an endeavour to bring back economic growth and shelter 
their electorates from mass unemployment. As a consequence, public debt 
levels skyrocketed. In the European Union, and particularly the Eurozone, 
policy makers reacted to this new challenge by reining in public spending and 
reducing budget deficits, ultimately contributing to a double dip recession 
unique to these countries. The imposition of such pro-cyclical fiscal 
consolidation measures in the midst of a recession was a function of the strict 
rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, and the lack of control over the 
common currency at the national level, both of which placed additional 
restrictions on domestic governments’ spending decisions. This was 
exacerbated further by deeply political considerations leading to the refusal of 
Eurozone creditor countries to expand their fiscal activity and bolster domestic 
demand while simultaneously insisting on austerity in the Eurozone periphery. 
 





The advent of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis finally came with the 
announcement of the newly elected Greek PASOK government in October 2009 
declaring that data on the state of Greek public finances had for years been 
misreported. Rather than the projection of 3.7 per cent of GDP reported by 
the previous government, the Greek budget deficit in 2009 was expected to be 
in excess of a record 12.5 per cent of GDP (a figure that would later be 
corrected upwards twice and ultimately estimated at 15.4 per cent of GDP). 
Subsequently, Greece’s credit rating was downgraded repeatedly causing bond 
spreads to soar. Efforts of the Greek government to consolidate public finances 
ultimately proved futile and by April 2010 Greek Prime Minister Papandreou 
formally requested an international bailout. The European Commission, as an 
agent of the EMU member states that provided bilateral loans to the Greek 
government, together with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and, in an 
advisory role, the European Central Bank (ECB) formed the so-called Troika, 
administering an initial €110 billion bailout programme. In return for the 
financial assistance, the Greek government agreed to a comprehensive 
Economic Adjustment Programme (EAP) aimed at the consolidation of the 
public budget through deep austerity measures and the implementation of far-
reaching structural reforms. 
 
Contagion effects from the Greek crisis and sudden mistrust in the solvency of 
other Eurozone periphery countries ultimately caused a number of countries – 
even with healthy public finances going into the crisis – to follow Greece in 
being forced to request financial assistance from their international partners. 
Aside from Spain, which received a financial sector adjustment programme, 
Portugal and Ireland agreed to comprehensive Troika-administered EAPs in 
2011 followed by Cyprus in 2013. 
 
Almost a decade after the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, 




focused on assessing the success of the reform programmes with regard to 
restoring public finances and achieving growth-enhancing structural reforms. 
Less attention has so far been paid to the question how a prolonged period of 
severe austerity measures, with deep cuts in public and social expenditure, as 
well as substantial transformations of domestic labour markets after years of 
flexibilising reforms, have affected inequality within the EAP-recipient 
countries. This constitutes a significant gap in the literature given the sheer 
scope of the EAPs and their potential to radically alter the programme 
recipient countries’ welfare states. Therefore, this thesis puts the distributive 
consequences of the various reforms centre stage and provides a novel 
comprehensive account of how the burden of the adjustment stemming from 
tax hikes, benefit reductions, and deregulation of labour markets was 
distributed among different social groups. 
 
More specifically, the thesis first asks how the fiscal reforms in the EAP-
recipient countries, particularly with regard to taxes and benefits, affected 
income inequality. Secondly, the thesis asks how changes in labour market 
legislation affected different labour market groups, specifically in the context 
of the highly dualised labour markets of Southern Europe. At the centre of the 
analysis are furthermore the questions of how welfare states have changed 
throughout the adjustment process more generally, and how the involvement 
of the unelected technocrats of the Troika influenced the distributive effects of 
these reforms. The latter question is of particular salience given that unelected 
policy makers are not directly bound by any potential responsiveness to certain 
voter groups or, for that matter, the electorate as a whole. The distributive 
effects of Troika-prescribed reform measures are thus more difficult to predict 
given the fact that much of the political science literature on inequality and 
redistribution revolves around the notion of government responsiveness to 
voters or particular voter groups. At the same time, it was unclear at the onset 




process and how much discretion would be left to the domestic governments in 
designing the exact reform measures. In other words, how much ownership did 
the Troika institutions take of the reforms and how much did the reforms 
ultimately reflect the preferences of the three Troika bodies? In this context, 
the thesis engages with the theoretical question of how institutions change in 
the particular context of international organisations by the example of the 
three Troika bodies. 
 
The second part of this introduction provides a review of the existing literature 
on (1) the origins of the Eurozone crisis and how austerity emerged as the 
dominant policy response, (2) the interplay of austerity and inequality, framing 
the former as an instance of distributional conflict, (3) the issue of inequality 
more generally, including different approaches explaining why and how policy 
makers redistribute incomes, how these dynamics played out specifically in the 
case of the Eurozone, and how inequality beyond disparities in income is 
manifested in the labour market, and (4) finally, what can be expected from 
the involvement of the technocratic policy makers of the Troika with regard to 
the distributive effects of the EAPs. The third part of the introduction outlines 
the research design of the thesis including (1) a justification for the case study 
selection, showing data on the comparability of the selected cases along a 
number of relevant variables, and (2) a presentation of different measurements 
and data used throughout this thesis. The fourth part of the introduction 






A.2 Literature Review 
A.2.1 The Eurozone crisis and austerity  
When the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) unfolded and gradually turned into a 
full-blown global economic crisis, governments around the world uniformly 
reacted with a revival of Keynesian policies characterised by large-scale deficit 
spending, fiscal stimulus programmes, and bailouts of private sector firms on 
an unprecedented scale. In the first place this pertained to the financial sector 
with prominent examples including multi-billion bailouts for Bank of America 
and Citigroup in the United States, Royal Bank of Scotland in the United 
Kingdom or Commerzbank in Germany. When the crisis spread to the real 
economy, governments likewise stepped in and provided large financial 
assistance packages to private firms either directly through subsidised loans 
and credit guarantees or indirectly through various demand-stimulating 
policies such as scrapping premia for the automobile industry. Moreover, a 
combination of tax cuts and cuts in social security contributions, additional 
benefit payments to households, and investments in infrastructure programmes 
aimed at further stimulating domestic demand was implemented with varying 
sizes and policy mixes across the advanced capitalist democracies. 
 
These measures proved largely successful in gradually containing the crisis and 
economic growth returned by 2010. At this point governments of EU and 
particularly Eurozone member states departed in rather spectacular fashion 
from the initial Keynesian response to the crisis and instead turned to severe 





A.2.1.1 Austerity as the dominant policy response 
This turn away from expansionary fiscal policy towards austerity in such an 
abrupt way requires additional explanation for a number of reasons, which will 
be outlined in the following. First, however, it is necessary to identify cases of 
austerity comparing EMU member states and other advanced capitalist 
democracies before the political and economic factors that motivated this 
particular policy choice and foreclosed alternative policy options in the 
particular context of the Eurozone crisis can be explained. 
 
Austerity refers to a set of policies aimed at consolidating government budgets 
by cutting expenditure or raising taxes, in practice usually combining the two. 
Measuring austerity, however, needs to go beyond simply observing changes in 
governments’ balance sheets due to the two-way interaction between fiscal 
policy and economic growth. In other words, government spending invariably 
moves with changes in GDP growth given the importance of automatic 
stabilisers. For instance, government expenditure increases during times of high 
unemployment due to increased spending on unemployment benefits and falls 
in times of high employment even without specific government intervention 
such as changes in tax or benefit policies. To address this measurement 
problem, phases of austerity can be identified in two ways: (1) In order to 
exclude changes in government spending induced by automatic stabilisers, 
austerity can be measured as substantial reductions in the cyclically adjusted 
primary budget balance; (2) more recently, scholars have turned to what has 
been dubbed the “narrative approach”, i.e. identifying austerity policies by 
analysing the published motivations of policy makers for each legislative change 
concerning tax and benefit policies (Romer and Romer 2010; see also Alesina, 
Favero, and Giavazzi 2019). Because of higher ease of interpretation and 
comparability across countries, it is more suitable for the purpose of this work 




The cyclically adjusted budget balance is a measure of government revenues 
minus expenditures adjusted for the fluctuations of the business cycle; in other 
words it refers to the government budget balance at full potential of the 
economy. Furthermore, the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance 
excludes net interest payments. Much of the economic literature analysing 
austerity policies rely on this measure, typically using a particular threshold of 
the annual change in the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance to denote 
phases of fiscal consolidation (Giavazzi and Pagano 1990; McDermott and 
Wescott 1996). Alesina and Ardagna (2009), for instance, argue that an annual 
increase of the figure by 1.5 per cent of GDP constitutes a sufficiently sharp 
and large change in the fiscal stance to be labelled as austerity. 
 
In Figure 1, the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance is mapped, first, 
for three analytical country groups (the Eurozone, non-Eurozone EU member 
states, and other advanced countries), and, second, selected countries that had 
high levels of public debt in the years following the GFC. The data show the 
following: (1) Eurozone member states implemented particularly harsh 
austerity measures from 2010 onwards with the average of the bloc as a whole 
reaching a cyclically adjusted primary budget surplus from 2012 onwards; (2) 
other EU member states outside of the currency union also implemented 
austerity measures, particularly from 2011 onwards, although in a less extreme 
fashion on average running a budget surplus from 2016 onwards; (3) other 
advanced countries outside of the EU followed a path of softer fiscal 
consolidation from 2010 onwards but in absolute terms the country group on 
average never ran a budget surplus thus slowing down but not actually 





Figure 1: Cyclically adjusted primary budget balance 
per year, as % of GDP 
 
 
Source: Fiscal Monitor, International Monetary Fund (2020) 
Notes:  * EU excludes Bulgaria due to gaps in the data 
** Other advanced economies are Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, Republic of 
Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, United States based on the definitions 
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Selected countries with high levels of public debt








2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Eurozone Austria -0.187 -1.457 0.491 0.819 0.652 0.797 -0.577 1.566 -1.046 0.131 0.234 
Belgium -0.853 -3.006 0.406 -0.493 0.273 1.331 -0.146 -0.014 -0.328 0.894 -0.523 
Cyprus -2.395 -4.056 -0.226 -0.612 2.272 2.574 3.962 -0.232 -1.472 0.457 0.391 
Estonia -2.917 5.575 1.275 -0.968 -1.659 0.370 0.662 -0.485 -0.443 -0.822 -0.580 
Finland -0.766 -1.877 -1.157 0.246 0.006 0.495 0.263 0.993 -0.040 -0.361 -0.204 
France -0.064 -2.297 -0.232 1.213 0.462 0.804 0.004 -0.039 -0.173 -0.136 -0.065 
Germany -0.522 0.169 -2.871 2.162 1.283 0.187 0.084 0.217 -0.169 -0.494 0.411 
Greece -2.730 -2.830 6.887 5.426 4.144 1.904 -2.008 -0.178 2.281 -0.840 -0.606 
Ireland -5.958 -0.568 1.380 2.627 1.724 1.145 1.421 0.821 -0.166 0.512 -0.237 
Italy -0.646 -0.667 -0.099 0.557 2.298 0.344 -0.329 -0.359 -0.508 -0.786 -0.098 
Latvia -5.898 4.012 0.542 1.808 2.880 -1.556 -0.289 0.344 0.607 -0.743 -0.130 
Lithuania -2.341 1.758 3.674 -3.815 5.433 -0.050 1.602 0.547 0.375 -0.519 -0.258 
Luxembourg 0.163 -0.749 -1.220 0.861 0.987 0.350 -0.153 -0.201 -0.108 -0.375 1.448 
Malta -2.898 2.786 0.007 0.681 -0.740 1.130 -0.304 -1.067 2.391 2.440 -2.210 
Netherlands -0.236 -2.529 -0.483 0.502 1.572 1.613 0.529 -0.417 1.525 0.394 -0.478 
Portugal -0.340 -4.173 -2.074 5.785 3.943 1.118 -2.442 1.683 1.113 -2.412 1.579 
Slovak Republic -0.697 -1.542 0.142 3.389 0.380 1.785 -0.829 -0.913 0.128 1.231 -0.330 
Slovenia -2.012 -0.129 0.363 -0.794 4.120 -8.529 8.553 2.472 0.135 0.612 -0.212 
Spain -5.846 -3.147 2.326 1.367 4.460 1.323 0.569 -1.173 -0.483 0.010 0.099 
EU excl. 
Eurozone 
Croatia -5.542 2.795 1.778 0.128 0.341 -1.542 3.064 -0.168 1.225 2.460 1.592 
Czech Republic -0.713 0.651 -1.126 0.090 1.323 1.152 -0.056 3.397 -1.351 0.258 1.279 
Hungary -2.719 4.993 1.407 3.108 0.016 -1.118 4.606 -0.312 -1.661 -0.154 -0.164 
Poland -1.162 1.551 -1.224 -2.245 -0.428 1.849 1.854 -0.206 -0.090 0.612 0.168 
Sweden -0.160 0.562 -1.021 -0.060 -0.858 -0.736 -0.503 -0.055 -0.216 0.069 1.113 
United 
Kingdom 




Australia -0.135 -0.376 -2.437 -3.106 -0.358 0.826 1.265 0.829 0.064 0.227 0.240 
Canada -0.376 -0.169 -1.690 -1.407 -1.743 0.611 0.892 0.644 1.071 0.584 -0.125 
Israel 0.371 -0.250 -2.359 -2.132 1.269 0.277 -1.366 0.061 0.688 1.472 -0.558 
Japan 1.387 0.433 -0.283 -2.603 -1.222 0.168 0.445 -0.092 1.839 1.058 0.272 
Republic of 
Korea 
0.195 -1.215 -0.094 -1.032 0.945 0.145 0.412 -0.783 -0.265 0.258 1.111 
New Zealand -0.430 -0.819 -1.642 -2.595 -2.674 0.744 2.650 0.725 0.399 0.322 0.406 
Norway 0.247 -0.817 -0.451 -1.069 0.349 0.696 -0.143 -0.436 -1.248 -1.305 -0.934 
Switzerland 0.839 -0.075 0.206 -0.132 -0.488 0.233 -0.132 -0.991 -0.018 0.796 -0.392 
United States 0.605 -0.783 -1.857 -2.019 -1.488 1.713 1.716 1.609 0.462 -0.099 -0.749 
Source: Fiscal Monitor, International Monetary Fund (2020) 
Colour coding refers to annual change in cyclically adjustment primary budget balance of 
• > 1.5% of GDP (red) 





Table 1 further illustrates these points by providing country-specific data on 
the annual change in the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance. Following 
the Alesina and Ardagna convention, positive changes in this figure of at least 
1.5 per cent of GDP are colour-coded in red denoting severe cases of austerity 
while positive changes of between 0.5 and 1.5 per cent of GDP are colour-coded 
in yellow denoting softer cases of austerity. The data show that the most severe 
cases of austerity are to be found in the Eurozone, often over a multiyear 
period, from 2010 onwards, with the harshest measures in Greece, Portugal, 
Spain and Cyprus, as well as the Baltics. Non-Eurozone member states of the 
EU likewise underwent extended periods of austerity, most notably Hungary. 
Among other advanced countries outside of the EU, only the United States 
had a multiyear phase of severe austerity, although the sum of the fiscal 
consolidation effort between 2013 and 2015 did not exceed the fiscal expansion 
in the preceding three years and in absolute terms the US government did not 
run a cyclically adjusted primary budget surplus. 
 
Next, juxtaposing these findings with data on real GDP growth in the three 
analytical country groups reveals the following: While economic growth 
returned in all three groups by 2010, only the countries outside the EU 
maintained growing economies in the following years. The European bloc, on 
the other hand, was drawn into a double dip recession with negative growth 
rates in 2012 and low growth rates in 2013 (with negative growth rates in eight 
out of the 19 countries forming the currency union in 2013), a trend that was 
slightly more pronounced for the Eurozone than the EU member states outside 
of the currency union (see Figure 2). Of course, assessing the impact of various 
factors on economic growth is a complex task subject to heated disagreements 
among economists. However, given the similarity and particularity of on the 
one hand the European double dip recession, and on the other hand the 
austerity-centred course of policy reforms charted by EU policy makers during 




Figure 2: Average real GDP growth by country groups 
per year, in % of GDP 
 
Source: Fiscal Monitor, International Monetary Fund (2020) 
 
In fact, analysing growth effects of austerity measures at the country-level in 
the Eurozone, IMF economists Olivier Blanchard and Daniel Leigh showed 
prominently that fiscal multipliers had been markedly underestimated in the 
design of the adjustment policies in the Eurozone and were actually 
“substantially above one early in the crisis” (2013, 120). In other words, any 
reduction in government spending during that time would result in a loss of 
economic output greater than the original reduction of government spending. 
De Grauwe (2013) has put forward a similar argument although focusing on 
the growth effects of austerity measures in the bloc as a whole rather than at 
the country level, suggesting that the European double dip recession is a result 
of an asymmetric imposition of the adjustment burden onto Eurozone debtor 
countries. In other words, while harsh austerity measures were implemented in 
the Eurozone periphery, creditor countries, rather than increasing their own 
spending in order to offset the debtor countries’ austerity policies, chose to 
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This asymmetric adjustment characterised by austerity in the periphery 
without fiscal expansion in the creditor countries created a deflationary spiral 
ultimately causing the double dip recession.  
 
The data presented in Figure 2 as well as Table 1 highlight two important 
contradictions in the response of EU and particularly EMU policy makers to 
the crisis and their heavy focus on austerity: (1) They were rather alone in this 
particular policy choice when compared with other advanced capitalist 
democracies, which, despite high levels of public debt in a number of cases, did 
not follow the European austerity example; (2) the pro-cyclical nature of such 
policies could have been expected to induce a palpable risk of stifling the fragile 
economic recovery, which, in fact, ultimately materialised by the year 2012 
causing EU and EMU member states to slide back into a recession while other 
advanced countries continued on their path of economic recovery. This suggests 
that in economic terms austerity was neither necessary nor beneficial, which 
raises the important question why it constituted the cornerstone of the policy 
response to the Eurozone crisis. The following will elaborate on this question 
in more detail. 
 
In order to understand the particular crisis management in the Eurozone one 
must understand three factors and their interplay: First, the ideational and 
institutional foundations of the economic policy consensus that shaped and was 
shaped by the European integration process; second, the economic and political 
realities emerging from the unique intricacies of an incomplete Economic and 
Monetary Union; and third, the politics of the Eurozone crisis revolving around 
a misdiagnosis of the roots of the crisis and perceptions of moral hazard. In 
conjunction, these three factors explain not just why the uniform response to 
the sovereign debt crisis was to implement immediate and severe austerity 
measures, but also why austerity mostly took the form of government 




A.2.1.2 The ideational and institutional basis of European austerity  
Historically, the European project has followed distinctly market-liberal ideas 
of economic policy, which, particularly since the run-up to the Maastricht 
Treaty, were increasingly codified in fixed rules. The ultimate design of the 
Maastricht Treaty, which formed the basis for the creation of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union, marked a political success for a group of 
countries, the most prominent representative of which was Germany, pressing 
for convergence on fiscal conservatism prior to the formation of or entry to the 
euro area. This convergence manifested in rather strict criteria including 
maximum debt, deficit, and inflation levels that national economies would be 
required to meet in order to be allowed to enter the currency union2. These 
convergence criteria were designed on the insistence of mostly hard currency 
countries, again, first and foremost Germany, fearing for the stability of the 
yet to be introduced euro (Dyson and Featherstone 1999). In fact, the design 
of the convergence criteria were not least the result of especially Germany and 
the Netherlands pushing, although ultimately unsuccessfully, to keep countries 
like Italy that were perceived not to follow the path of fiscal conservatism out 
of the currency union (Buiter 2006). 
 
Ideologically, this insistence on fiscal conservatism is deeply rooted in Ordo-
liberalism, the German variant of market liberalism predicated on the notion 
that the state’s prime objective is to establish markets and otherwise ensure 
their functioning free from intervention and under perfect competition 
 
2 The convergence criteria are outlined in Article 109j(1) of the Maastricht Treaty and include: 
(1) high levels of price stability (denoted as being close to the three best-performing member 
states, i.e. those with the lowest inflation rate); (2) a budget deficit not in excess of three per 
cent of GDP and a debt-to-GDP ratio of at most 60 per cent of GDP or if above that threshold 
the ratio shall have "sufficiently diminished and must be approaching the reference value at a 
satisfactory pace" (as per Article 104c(2) and the Excessive Deficit Protocol); (3) exchange 
rate stability, prohibiting the devaluation of their currency for at least two years; (4) long-
term interest rate stability denoted as average yields on ten year government bonds not in 





(Bonefeld 2012). With a powerful grip on the German political elite, this 
ideological approach to economic policy making has shaped European 
integration substantially over the last half century (Howarth and 
Rommerskirchen 2013). In fact, while initially somewhat hesitant in driving 
forward European economic and monetary integration, from the creation of the 
European Monetary System onwards, Germany, at the helm of an ‘ordo-liberal 
coalition’ (Dyson and Featherstone 1999, 261), took on a leading role in the 
realm of monetary cooperation. Importantly, however, this was in recognition 
of the fact that cooperation provided a lever for pushing for convergence by 
imposing conditionality mainly in the form of price stability and fiscal restraint 
(Scharpf 2013), thus enshrining the principles of Ordo-liberalism as rules at the 
European level. 
 
Overall, the emerging policy consensus was in line with the global shift from 
Keynesianism to Monetarism (Hall 1993), and an adherence to policies 
subsumed under the Washington Consensus (Williamson 1990). In fact, the 
contractual framework of the European Union was so close to these principles 
in ideological terms that some commentators coined the terms Brussels-
Frankfurt Consensus (Sapir et al. 2004) and Brussels-Frankfurt-Washington 
Consensus (Fitoussi and Saraceno 2004), highlighting the influence of German 
Ordo-liberalism, Frankfurt being the site of not just the European Central 
Bank but also the German Bundesbank.  
 
The further dissemination and juridification of market-liberal principles, 
especially in the post-Maastricht era, was facilitated through the EU’s 
institutional setup: Scharpf (1999) argues that European integration is 
characterised by a bias towards negative integration, i.e. de-regulation rather 
than re-regulation. This in turn rests on the inherent impediments of positive 
integration in a quasi-federal setting, which Scharpf describes as the ‘joint-




is stipulated by the notion of “integration through law” (Schmidt 2012). As a 
consequence, Scharpf argues that EU member states would converge towards 
an integrated liberal market model (2010; see also Esping-Andersen 1990; Hall 
and Soskice 2001 for competing interpretations regarding the convergence 
hypothesis) with little room for fiscal manoeuvre. 
 
For McNamara (1998), the adherence to market-liberal principles materialises 
first and foremost in the domain of monetary policy. Indeed, the Maastricht 
Treaty, outlining the principles of the Economic and Monetary Union, saw to 
the newly created European Central Bank being tasked with ensuring price 
stability as its prime objective. True to German Ordo-liberalism, and at the 
behest of the ordo-liberal coalition under German stewardship in an attempt 
to enforce monetary prudence in a currency union that included countries with 
soft currencies, the ECB was equipped with unprecedented independence from 
national governments going even beyond that of the Bundesbank as per 
Articles 104(1), 105(1), and 107 of the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European 
Union 1992). 
 
However, there is no doubt that the emerging consensus in the area of monetary 
policy, centred around independent central banks and limited interference of 
governments with markets3, had a profound effect on fiscal policy. This is 
because the prioritisation of price stability over other policy objectives such as 
full employment in turn necessitated the creation of strict fiscal rules so as to 
not jeopardise the overarching aim of price stability. In fact, building on the 
convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty, fiscal rules were ultimately 
enshrined in the Stability and Growth Pact, and more recently the Fiscal 
 
3 Of course, the notion of states intervening in markets is artificial given that markets do not 
exist in a vacuum and do not have a natural state that they can achieve by being liberated 
from state intervention. Instead they are always created and regulated by governments, as 




Compact stipulating not only that member states would have to adhere to 
fiscal prudence but also providing for corrective (and punitive) measures if they 
fail to do so (De Grauwe 2018; Fitoussi and Saraceno 2013). Most importantly, 
member states thereby agreed to adhere to a maximum level of public debt at 
60 per cent of GDP and a budget deficit not in excess of three per cent of GDP. 
In addition, the reforms of the Fiscal Compact stipulate that governments 
balance their budgets over the business cycle regardless of absolute debt levels4 
(European Union 2012). Government expenditure and the room for fiscal 
manoeuvre was thus limited for EMU member states already before the onset 
of the Eurozone crisis and even more so after fiscal rules were tightened in 
reaction to it. 
 
A.2.1.3 Design flaws of EMU foreclosing other policy avenues  
While the policy consensus that was built around the prioritisation of price 
stability and adherence to strict fiscal rules lays the ideational and institutional 
groundwork for general fiscal restraint, it fails to explain the timing of the deep 
austerity measures implemented in the Eurozone crisis. In other words, why 
did policy-makers choose to implement such measures in an already struggling 
economy despite the fact that this could reasonably be expected to further 
stifle economic growth? In this regard, it is necessary to understand the unique 
intricacies stemming from the incomplete design of the Economic and Monetary 
Union. 
Ordinarily, when faced with an economic shock inducing a liquidity or even 
solvency crisis, there are broadly speaking the following strategies amongst 
which policy-makers can choose in order to achieve the necessary adjustment, 
 
4 The Fiscal Compact specifies that a ‘balanced budget’ is achieved when a country’s structural 
deficit, i.e. its general deficit minus the impact of the economic cycle on government spending 




provided that default is not an option5 : (1) stimulating demand through 
expansionary fiscal or monetary policy, (2) currency devaluation, and (3) 
austerity through increasing government revenues or cutting public 
expenditure (Matthijs 2016). However, as outlined above, room for fiscal 
manoeuvre is extremely limited for EMU member states under the restrictions 
of the Stability and Growth Pact and Fiscal Compact, foreclosing the 
possibility for substantive demand stimuli through expansionary fiscal policy 
sustained over a longer period of time. Moreover, since governments of EMU 
member states have no direct control over the common currency or the ECB, 
both currency devaluation and unilateral expansionary monetary policy are 
impossible. 
 
In addition, the pre-OMT6 Eurozone lacked a lender of last resort central bank 
the importance of which during a crisis cannot be overstated. The reason for 
the crucial role of this policy instrument is that it constitutes an implicit 
guarantee of liquidity for governments. In other words, as long as governments 
have control over their own currency and by extension its central bank they 
can force the latter to provide liquidity in times of crisis in order to be able to 
roll over their debt when bonds reach maturity and thus avoid solvency 
problems. With the creation of the common currency governments relinquished 
this power to the ECB, which in turn is prohibited specifically by the 
Maastricht Treaty from financing governments. This becomes problematic for 
a member state of a currency union when during a recession financial markets 
lose confidence in a government’s ability to pay back bondholders in the 
 
5 For the sake of the argument it is assumed that a default of one country was not a realistic 
option for policy-makers in the Eurozone crisis due to the risks of contagion effects in the 
common currency area. 
6 OMT (Outright Monetary Transactions) refers to a programme set up by the ECB following 
Mario Draghi’s 2012 announcement that the ECB would do “whatever it takes” to preserve the 
common currency. Under the programme, which notably was never used, the ECB would, 
under certain conditions, buy government bonds in the secondary market thus effectively being 




absence of a central bank that is able to step in and provide the necessary 
liquidity. Markets would react to this by selling bonds and asking higher risk 
premia of governments thus pushing up bond interest rates, which would 
further complicate a government’s efforts to refinance itself7. In the specific 
case of the Eurozone, this effect was exacerbated further as investors who sold 
bonds of countries they perceived as risky reinvested them in bonds of countries 
elsewhere in the Eurozone that were perceived as safe, which limits the access 
to liquidity for the former countries even more (De Grauwe 2013). 
 
Ultimately, this forces governments to instantaneously impose expenditure cuts 
in order to be able to service their debt and pay for the higher interest rates. 
On the one hand, this shows that for countries of a currency union designed in 
the way the Eurozone was, i.e. without a lender of last resort central bank, 
policy responses aside from austerity measures are effectively foreclosed. On 
the other hand, however, this also illustrates that a negative spiral is set in 
motion: A fast way for governments to cut expenditures is to switch off 
automatic stabilisers. However, by curtailing this important instrument to 
cushion the effects of economic downturns a recession can quickly deepen and 
thus further dry up governments’ tax revenues in the face of lower economic 
activity – which in turn would necessitate further austerity. This bad 
equilibrium gives rise to the threat that even member states with healthy public 
finances may ultimately face a solvency crisis as a result of what was initially 
a simple liquidity shortfall, which is precisely what happened to Portugal, 
 
7 Note that the described scenario does not necessarily require a central bank to actually step 
in. Rather, the mere existence of a lender of last resort would likely calm markets sufficiently 
to prevent the outflow of liquidity and rise of bond spreads. This is why then-ECB president 
Mario Draghi’s ‘whatever it takes’ speech was so effective in calming the markets even prior 




Ireland, Cyprus, and to some extent also Spain8 during the Eurozone crisis (De 
Grauwe 2013; De Grauwe and Ji 2015). 
 
A.2.1.4 The politics of European austerity  
The previous two sections have shown that the ideational and institutional 
foundations of the EU and particularly the Eurozone formed the basis for an 
economic policy consensus centred around fiscal restraint. Building on that, 
the design flaws of the Economic and Monetary Union explain why, despite 
the likely negative economic effects, immediate and severe austerity formed the 
bedrock of the crisis response in the Eurozone periphery. Lastly, in order to 
fully grasp the depth of the austerity measures implemented in and, in fact, 
imposed on the countries of the Eurozone periphery, the following outlines the 
politics of the Eurozone crisis that underpinned the austerity-heavy crisis 
response.  
 
In other words, while it has been established that austerity was effectively the 
only feasible adjustment strategy under the specific institutional and ideational 
limitations of EMU membership, countries in the core of the Eurozone, or 
creditor countries, could have softened the blow for their partners in the 
periphery, or debtor countries, by increasing their own spending. Particularly, 
countries with high current account surpluses, most notably Germany, could 
have used expansionary fiscal policy to stimulate demand within the bloc. This 
would have offset the internal devaluation policies in the debtor countries 
through internal revaluation in the creditor countries. Not only would this 
likely have led to a lower loss of output but, considering the particularities of 
the design flaws of the Eurozone, it would have also lessened the severity of 
 
8 De Grauwe (2011) argues that Greece was different from these countries as it was insolvent 
even before the crisis unfolded and its government avoided default only by hiding the true 




the austerity measures imposed on the Eurozone periphery. However, as 
illustrated in section A.2.1.1 and Table 1, Eurozone creditor countries chose 
not to implement this strategy. Instead, by following their own course of fiscal 
consolidation while pressuring the countries of the periphery into deeper 
austerity, they put the bulk of the adjustment (i.e. austerity) burden onto 
Southern Europe and Ireland. 
 
The explanation for this policy choice is rooted in a fundamental misdiagnosis 
of the origins of the Eurozone crisis, particularly in the Northern member states 
and, most importantly, Germany, as a crisis of competitiveness. Following this 
narrative, for the German political elite the crisis was rooted in the profligacy 
of governments9, and predominantly those in Southern Europe (Blyth 2013; De 
Grauwe 2013). Similarly, by this logic, the governments of the Eurozone 
periphery had failed to implement sufficient supply-side structural reforms. 
Drawing on the German experience of the early 2000s and the economic success 
that has been ascribed to the structural reforms implemented under the 
Schröder government in order to overcome economic stagnation, similar 
policies in true ordo-liberal fashion, along with drastic austerity measures, then 
erroneously formed the cornerstone of the reforms imposed on the Eurozone 
periphery despite the rather limited comparability of the two cases (Scharpf 
2013, 134f.). 
 
This misdiagnosis of the Eurozone crisis as a competitiveness crisis also explains 
why German austerity proponents saw no contradiction in the fact that 
Germany itself, along with France, was the first member state to have broken 
the deficit rule of the Stability and Growth Pact in 2003 and used its political 
clout to avoid punitive measures (Howarth 2007), but now pushed for a strict 
 
9 It is perhaps no coincidence that German is one of the few languages that uses the same word 




enforcement of the same rules. Having undergone a process of fiscal 
consolidation itself and even enshrining the so-called ‘Schuldenbremse’ (debt 
brake) prohibiting structural deficits in excess of 0.35 per cent of GDP in its 
constitution in 2009, Germany had become a champion of austerity, which it 
saw as the basis for its own economic recovery in the early 2000s (see also 
Mathis and Kutter 2013). The obsession of both German policy makers, 
particularly but not exclusively among conservatives10, as well as the public 
with the ‘Schwarze Null’ (‘black zero’, a metaphor for a balanced budget) as 
the guiding principle of German fiscal policy is testament to that. Certainly, 
this rationale also entailed a strong emphasis on the notion of moral hazard: 
Conservative politicians in Germany were particularly adamant on obviating 
any move towards a mutualisation of debt, an idea they viewed as dead on 
arrival, instead pushing to make an example of countries like Greece in order 
to deter future fiscal ‘sinners’ (Dullien and Guérot 2012; Gocaj and Meunier 
2013). 
 
Similarly, the misdiagnosis of the Eurozone crisis as a competitiveness crisis 
exclusive to the Eurozone periphery also explains Germany’s and other 
countries’ – such as the Netherlands’ – reluctance to acknowledge the 
problematic nature of their large current account surpluses (Stockhammer 
2011). The argument goes: If the periphery countries suffered from a crisis of 
competitiveness, rather than internal revaluation in the surplus countries, 
which would stimulate demand also in the periphery, the appropriate response 
would naturally be internal devaluation in the deficit countries, which would 
 
10 While the ‘Schwarze Null’ is most famously associated with then-finance minister Schäuble 
of Merkel’s conservative CDU, it is important to note that the consensus around balanced 
budgets that the schwarze Null encapsulates crosses party lines. In fact, when the German 
Grundgesetz was amended to incorporate the debt brake, only Green and Left Party legislators 
opposed it in parliament while both Christian Democrats and Social Democrats voted in favour 





lead to greater export competitiveness and ultimately economic recovery11. The 
policy response to the Eurozone crisis fashioned by the ideational framework 
of German Ordo-liberalism also extended to its institutions and in particular 
the ECB. Woodruff, building on Polanyi, argues that the ECB’s crisis response 
can be described as ‘governing by panic’ (2016), essentially ‘weaponising’ 
market panics by threatening to allow them to go unchallenged in order to 
push for austerity measures domestically in the debtor countries. 
 
Importantly, the political sway of the ordo-liberal coalition under the 
stewardship of Germany and the insistence on asymmetric internal adjustment 
in the Eurozone periphery was not met with opposition from potential natural 
allies of periphery countries in the Eurozone core such as France. Despite the 
initially Keynesian response to the crisis, the Sarkozy-Fillon government was 
rather quick to implement fiscal consolidation measures by 2011 for fear of 
losing “France’s cherished AAA status” (Clift and Ryner 2014, 146). During 
the presidential campaign, Socialist challenger Hollande had run on a platform 
criticising the Eurozone crisis management and lack of Keynesian-inspired 
demand-stimulating policies, and in particular promised to renegotiate the 
strict fiscal rules of the Fiscal Compact (BBC 2012). After his electoral victory 
in 2012, however, his government ultimately continued on the path of fiscal 
consolidation charted by Sarkozy in the year prior. On the one hand, this was 
supported by powerful French political elites in the Treasury, the Banque de 
France, and the Budget Ministry pushing for fiscal discipline and ‘sound 
money’ policies (Bezes and Le Lidec 2015). On the other hand, the (however 
accurate) perceived threat of financial markets, traditionally more distrusting 
of French Socialist governments, pushing up bond yields muted proponents of 
 
11 Redeker and Walter (2020) argue that aside from the ideational basis Germany’s reluctance 
to balance the adjustment burden through internal revaluation also stems from the fact that 
distributive conflicts (internal revaluation would have likely been costly for the German export 




expansionary fiscal policy (Clift and Ryner 2014). Ultimately, efforts by the 
Hollande government to reorient French economic policy towards Keynesian-
style demand-side policies also foundered on domestic and internal party 
opposition (Clift 2014), thus making way for the austerity-heavy response 
inspired by German Ordo-liberalism. 
 
Combining the above-outlined ideational, institutional, and political 
constraints attached to EMU membership in the particular context of the 
Eurozone crisis, it is clear that despite the likely negative economic effects, 
fiscal consolidation would not just be the only adjustment strategy available 
for policy makers in the Eurozone periphery, but that member states in the 
core of the Eurozone, most prominently Germany, would use their clout to 
impose deeper austerity on their Southern European and Irish partners. At this 
point it is important to note, however, that austerity per se can take on 
different forms in terms of combining expenditure cuts and tax increases. On 
the basis of the above-outlined policy consensus based on ordo-liberal economic 
ideas that the European integration project has so far followed, it is clear that 
expenditure cuts would take priority over tax increases given the limited role 
assigned to the state in Washington-Consensus-style economic orthodoxy 
(Stiglitz 2008).  
 
A.2.2 Austerity and the politics of inequality 
The previous section established that the EU and in particular the Eurozone 
(1) was relatively alone in their pursuit of harsh and wide-spread austerity 
measures in the aftermath of the GFC and especially in the sovereign debt 
crisis compared with non-European countries; (2) bore the negative 
consequences of pro-cyclical fiscal consolidation in the midst of (or shortly after 




of 2012-13, but (3) due to institutional, ideational, and political reasons pressed 
ahead with this set of policies regardless. 
 
The thesis shows in detail in the second paper that phases of austerity are 
ultimately to be considered as instances of distributional conflict, given the fact 
that government expenditure cuts and tax increases invariably produce winners 
and losers. This means that in order to explain the distributional impact of 
austerity measures, it is necessary to understand what drives the distributional 
conflict triggered by austerity pressures and how policy makers typically solve 
such conflicts. 
 
In a narrow sense, this is done by outlining the extant literature on the politics 
of inequality and redistribution. In this vein, a particular focus is put on the 
welfare state as the key factor in mitigating inequalities produced by market 
mechanisms in advanced capitalist democracies, which are all characterised by 
the existence of mature welfare states with large although varying 
redistributive capacities. In this regard, the section outlines several political 
science theories seeking to explain different levels of inequality and 
redistribution, their institutional roots, and political determinants within 
different welfare state settings. Additionally, in a wider sense, it cannot be 
ignored that any profound analysis of the distributional impact of policy 
reforms ultimately also relate to the notion of institutional change, which will 
be explored further throughout the three papers of this thesis. 
 
Inequality has become a prominent topic of scholarly study in recent years 
thanks to authors such as Anthony Atkinson whose impressive opus vitae has 
been dedicated to bringing the topic “in from the cold” (Atkinson 1997). One 
of the reasons for the increased attention to issues revolving around economic 




inequality, both in terms of its economic and political manifestations. With 
regard to the former, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez show that income inequality 
increased significantly since the 1980s in the English-speaking countries, which 
the authors attribute to ever-increasing top wage shares (Piketty and Saez 
2003; Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2011; Atkinson 2015). While some European 
countries like France have resisted this trend, the same group of authors show 
that there is, in fact, a structural component to rising income and wealth 
inequality: Income inequality is crucially driven by capital income with 
historical evidence pointing towards rising levels of income inequality being due 
to increases in capital income and vice versa (Piketty and Saez 2014). Wealth 
inequality, in turn, can be seen as a function of rising rates of return on capital 
compared with relatively low growth rates in total economic output. Piketty 
famously distilled this insight in his 2014 bestselling book Capital in the 
Twenty-First Century (Piketty 2014). 
 
Of course, considering income and wealth inequality as purely driven by 
structural factors is a great oversimplification, as Piketty himself pointed out 
his latest book Capital and Ideology, instead arguing for the necessity of a 
deeper understanding of ideational factors underpinning a political regime that 
allows for certain levels and structures of economic inequality (2020). Indeed, 
it is clear that one cannot ignore the decisive impact of redistributive policies 
with regard to levels of income inequality in the advanced capitalist 
democracies. Any analysis of rising inequality must, therefore, also take into 
account its political manifestations centred around the decline of redistributive 
policies such as taxes and benefits (Bartels 2018; Hacker and Pierson 2010). 
Much of the work on the political manifestations and determinants of rising 
income inequality and wealth inequality has put forth the argument that 
democratic capitalism is rigged due either to tax laws biased in favour of 
protecting the incomes and wealth of the highest earners or due to the capture 




regulations and the easing of their share of the tax bill. However, recently, a 
contrasting argument has (re-)emerged, which questions such accounts of 
democracy working only for the rich. Instead, it reaffirms the notion that 
democracy and capitalism in fact work together to serve the median, or 
decisive, voter and, by extension, middle class interests above all else (Iversen 
and Soskice 2019). The following provides a review of the existing political 
science and political economy literature on the causes of different patterns of 
inequality and redistribution in the advanced capitalist democracies. 
 
This literature can be understood through the lens of a Model of Constrained 
Partisanship  as recently put forward by Beramendi, Häusermann, Kitschelt 
and Kriesi (2015). The model conceives of social and economic policies as a 
product of a combination of both demand and supply side politics. In other 
words, governments are, on the one hand, guided by electoral politics, i.e. the 
demand side of politics, structured around and constrained by the well-known 
cleavages among the electorate (building on the seminal work of Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967). On the other hand, policies are determined to a significant 
degree by constraints stemming from the supply side of politics, including the 
institutional framework of the polity, which includes institutionalised demands 
made by voters in previous rounds of policy-making such as different elements 
of the welfare state. Among the vast literature on the politics of inequality and 
redistribution, we can attribute the various insights to either of the two sides 
of this model, focusing either on the role of voters in pushing governments into 
particular patterns of redistribution, or institutions constraining policy makers’ 
actions for instance by structuring certain electoral cleavages or limiting policy 
makers’ options through pre-existing redistributive policies.  
 
One line of argument regarding how and why governments redistribute, which 
directly speaks to the demand side of politics, is that redistribution outcomes 




distribution, which affects powerful political coalitions and thus whose votes 
must be captured by aspiring government parties. Initially posited by Downs 
(1957), the median voter theorem states that the distribution of pre-fisc 
incomes is right-skewed. In other words, the median voter’s income is below 
the mean income, meaning governments are pushed by this average voter for 
ever more redistribution from higher to lower incomes until equilibrium is 
reached at the point where the costs of work disincentives through taxation are 
on par with the benefits from higher levels of redistribution. 
 
Romer (1975) and Meltzer and Richard (1981) (“RMR”), in an important 
subsequent development of this argument, have shown that the median voter 
theorem can thus be utilised to explain increasing levels of redistribution 
through taxes and benefits. In a more modern iteration, Iversen and Soskice 
(2019) have once more stressed this line of thinking, arguing that, in capitalist 
democracies, groups closest to the middle of the income distribution are 
politically the most powerful as they constitute the so-called “decisive voters” 
who are in a powerful position to demand re- and pre-distributive policies. 
Importantly, this does not necessarily mean that governments are pushed 
towards more equitable policies per se and from the point of view of every 
voter. Rather, in one of the most pointed sections of their book the authors 
state that “the winners from advanced economies are typically the decisive 
voters […] The essence of democracy is not redistribution or equality, as so 
commonly assumed, but the advancement of middle class interests” (ibid., 19).  
 
A different strand of this literature with a somewhat more elaborate 
conceptualisation of electoral cleavages (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967) is centred 
around the social affinity hypothesis. Since the original formulation of the RMR 
model, a number of authors have pointed out that the empirical conclusions of 
the model are problematic: Indeed, according to the RMR model, societies with 




Empirically, this does not hold, with some of the most unequal societies among 
the advanced capitalist democracies such as the United States also 
redistributing the least, a phenomenon described by Lindert as “Robin Hood 
paradox” (Lindert 2004, 15). In essence, the various arguments put forward in 
the literature addressing the Robin Hood paradox through electoral cleavages 
are based on the question how congruous different voter groups are with regard 
to such cleavages and their position on the income distribution. For instance, 
Alesina and Glaeser argue in their analysis of how race and ethnicity affect 
patterns of redistribution that “when there are significant numbers of minorities 
among the poor, then the majority population can be roused against 
transferring money to people who are different from themselves” (Alesina and 
Glaeser 2004, 134). Various authors show that the social affinity hypothesis 
holds true for a number of electoral cleavages and how well they map onto the 
income distribution, including class (Shayo 2009) and religion (Scheve and 
Stasavage 2006). 
 
In an important contribution by Lupu and Pontusson, this argument is 
expanded further. The authors show that rather than the level of inequality it 
is its structure that is decisive for how much redistribution voters demand from 
governments. In other words, social affinity increases when voters from 
different income groups are less distant from one another in terms of absolute 
income levels, translating into stronger demands for redistribution and vice 
versa. Thus, voters from low and middle income groups are more likely to form 
an alliance and demand redistribution from high income groups if there is less 
distance between the former two, and more distance between them and the 
latter. The opposite is true when incomes are more dispersed at the bottom 
and less so at the top, in which case middle income voters are more likely to 
ally themselves with affluent voters to whom they feel a higher degree of social 





Turning to the supply side of politics, authors have pointed out the significance 
of ideological colours of the political power in government as another key 
explanation for what shapes redistribution decisions and, by extension, 
inequality (Boix 1998). For example, Bradley et al. (2003) in their study of 
what determines outcomes for inequality found that having centre-left 
governments in office was by far the most important determinant of higher 
levels of redistribution, both directly through fiscal policies and indirectly 
through the parties’ impact on the general size of the welfare state. It is 
important to once more point out the salience of the Robin Hood paradox and 
the relevance of absolute levels of inequality in this context. Rueda and 
Pontusson show that as societies grow more unequal, voters of left parties are 
moving further to the left on the economic policy dimension thus pushing the 
respective parties towards more redistribution. However, whether that actually 
translates into more redistributive policies depends crucially on the channel of 
mobilisation among low-income voters. Indeed, in cases where, as inequality 
increases, voter turnout among the less affluent declines, left parties will not 
espouse higher levels of redistribution (Pontusson and Rueda 2010). 
 
Combining the insights regarding the decisiveness of both the party in power 
and the decisive role of the median voter (in a more simplistic conception of 
electoral cleavages and not considering the structure of inequality), the 
importance of electoral systems in shaping the voting behaviour of decisive 
voters in the electorate has been offered as an explanation to varying levels of 
redistribution across the advanced capitalist democracies. Iversen and Soskice 
(2006) argue that the nature of the electoral system is, in fact, definitive for 
levels of redistribution. Utilising data from 1945 to 1998, they show that 
countries with Majoritarian electoral systems have led to centre-right 
governments 75 per cent of the time, while for Proportional Representation 
(PR) countries almost the reverse-image is true, with 26 per cent of 




to redistribute more than centre-right governments, Iversen and Soskice deduce 
that nations with PR systems are conducive to higher levels of redistribution, 
and thus lower inequality. 
 
This in turn rests on the notion that, in order to command a parliamentary 
majority, governments need to capture voters in the middle of the income 
distribution. The key insight put forth by Iversen and Soskice is that 
governments in Majoritarian systems, typically constituted by a single party, 
will drift away from the centre after the election, while this is prevented in PR 
systems by the possibility of a coalition partner representing the middle of the 
income distribution withdrawing from the coalition. On this basis, voters in 
the middle of the income distribution are more likely to form electoral coalitions 
with higher income groups in Majoritarian systems. This is because, given the 
likely drifting of the government to the left or right, voters in the middle of 
the income distribution fear a left government distributing income from 
themselves towards the poor more than they value the possibility of the same 
government redistributing from the rich to both the middle and the poor and 
thus prefer a right government redistributing less per se. 
 
At this point it is important to note that these theories are all based on 
democratic processes of policy making where elected governments are trusted 
with enacting policies on the behalf of voters. With regard to the object of 
study in this thesis, which relates to the Economic Adjustment Programmes 
overseen by unelected technocrats, the dynamics determining the distributive 
effects of the analysed reforms may be radically different. In fact, since all of 
the literature is based either directly or indirectly (e.g. through constraints 
posed by the electoral system) on the notion of accountability towards voters, 
it is essentially impossible to infer from this literature any predictions regarding 
how unelected technocratic policy makers solve distributional conflicts. For 




in shaping the policy prescriptions of unelected technocrats in the European 
Commission, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Central 
Bank. 
 
A.2.3 Labour market inequality 
Importantly, inequality has many different dimensions. Next to income 
inequality, for particular interest of this thesis is labour market inequality, 
given the substantial transformations of domestic labour markets induced by 
the comprehensive reform programmes administered by the Troika and the 
salience of the question how the adjustment burden was distributed among 
different labour market groups. The notion of labour market inequality for the 
purpose of the analysis presented in this thesis relates to different degrees of 
vulnerability to the possibility of becoming unemployed and the negative 
consequences associated with it. 
 
Inequality within labour markets has grown in the advanced capitalist 
democracies since the late 1970s. On the one hand this has been the result of 
a number of structural changes pertaining to: an increasingly integrated world 
economy associated with rising competition from low-wage countries displacing 
low-skilled workers in the advanced capitalist democracies (Rodrik 1998); the 
tertiarization of the economy shifting large numbers of workers from well-paid 
and well-protected industry sector jobs to less protected and more unequally 
paid service sector jobs (Iversen and Cusack 2000; Iversen and Wren 1998); 
related to that, an increase in the share of women entering the labour market 
as they work primarily in service sector jobs and are more likely to interrupt 
their careers to tend to their families (Estévez-Abe 2005; Oesch 2006); and 
large-scale technological change, which has predominantly affected low-skilled 
workers and workers in routine-based occupations (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 




On the other hand, however, a growing degree of dualisation in domestic labour 
markets of the advanced capitalist democracies is related to concrete legislative 
changes resulting in the formation of two increasingly distinct groups: (1) a 
core of well-protected insiders in stable forms of employment who enjoy a high 
degree of job protection and easy access to generous benefits, and (2) a 
significant group of outsiders in atypical forms of employment, often with 
temporary work contracts, restricted access to benefits, and high vulnerability 
to becoming unemployed due to a lower degree or limited coverage of 
employment protection legislation (Emmenegger et al. 2012). Naturally, these 
groups form distinct and usually opposed preferences regarding legislative 
changes in the labour market and influence policy makers in one direction or 
the other: Insiders tend to favour stricter labour market regulations, which 
forms the basis for their own protected status, while outsiders view such 
regulation as entry barriers to high quality jobs (Emmenegger 2009; Saint‐Paul 
2002). For this reason, policy makers play a key role in cementing labour 
market dualisation by catering to the usually larger and better organised 
number of insiders and their distinct preferences (Rueda 2005; 2006; 2007; see 
also Ebbinghaus 2006; Emmenegger 2009; Häusermann and Schwander 2012; 
Iversen and Soskice 2009). 
 
A.2.4 Technocracy versus democracy and the role of ideas and 
interests in shaping distributional outcomes 
Both with regard to income inequality and the way in which market incomes 
are redistributed through the functions of the welfare state, and labour market 
inequality pertaining to differences in labour market regulation for different 
groups, one common trend emerges: In the advanced capitalist democracies, 
elected governments play a key role in influencing these inequalities through 
purposive legislation. Specifically, all of the above theories boil down to the 




needs of certain groups in the populace (be they their own voters, the median 
voter, or well-organised labour market insiders), to curry favour with them, 
ultimately in pursuit of their own election-seeking interests. The question that 
then becomes interesting is, what happens to decisions about redistribution 
and outcomes of inequality if the motivation for electoral victory is removed 
from the equation – i.e. if policies are made not by democratically elected 
officials but by unelected technocrats. 
 
In the absence of exposure to electoral retribution from certain key voter groups 
for unpopular policies, such as tax hikes, pension cuts, or deregulatory labour 
market reforms, which are perceived as failing to respond to these groups’ 
needs, technocratic policymaking is guided by different motivations. For 
precisely this reason, the economic adjustment programmes governed and 
instituted by the technocratic, unelected Troika of the IMF, the European 
Commission, and the ECB provide unique and revealing cases for 
understanding how technocratic governance of policies affects redistribution 
and inequality. Conversely, by providing distinctly different cases to phases of 
economic adjustment administered by elected politicians, they also allow us to 
further our understanding of the wider relationship between democracy and 
different forms of inequality. 
 
The involvement of technocratic policy makers in policy decisions essential to 
distributive issues could go in two possible ways: (1) if we subscribe to the view 
that democratic processes and voter responsiveness force policy makers to 
redistribute progressively from the rich to the middle and/or the poor, then 
taking the electoral component out of the equation could mean that we observe 
less redistribution and more inequality (since nobody forces technocrats to 
redistribute; they are not held to account by any particular group among the 
citizenry). However, we also know that the same democratic processes can 




groups that wield less political power, which are typically concentrated at the 
lower end of the income distribution and/or in atypical forms of employment, 
instead choosing for instance to preserve the benefits and statuses of the voter 
in the middle of the income distribution or those that constitute the group of 
labour market insiders. In other words, democratic processes do not necessarily 
lead to better outcomes for the most vulnerable, both in terms of income and 
labour market status, since office-seeking politicians tend to be less responsive 
to their needs. Therefore, an alternative view could be that (2) technocrats are 
unfettered, too, by these dynamics and are therefore at liberty to redistribute 
in whichever way they deem beneficial without having to cater to certain voter 
groups. The ramifications of these two possible effects of technocratic 
involvement in (re-)distributive policies are enormous, as the exact effects are 
difficult to predict and could take extreme forms. It is therefore essential to 
understand the motivations governing the actions of technocratic policy 
makers. 
 
To comprehend these motivations of appointed technocrats that are not held 
to democratic account and thus eschew the usual strategies followed by office-
seeking politicians, a credible claim can be made, which is postulated in this 
thesis and corroborated by evidence, that the technocratic Troika institutions 
are motivated in the first instance less by interests (i.e. the desire to be re-
elected), and instead more by ideas, in this specific case of whatever they deem 
to be ‘good’ economic policy. Depending on the conception of their ideas of 
what amounts to good economic policy, then, we can imagine that this can go 
in one of two ways: (a) less redistribution overall, (if the technocrats’ idea of 
good economic policy does not incorporate strong redistribution); or (b) more 
or “more efficient” redistribution (if their views of good economic policy feature 





Following (a), we can comprehend why in the past we have observed far-
reaching negative redistributive effects of, for example, IMF and also World 
Bank loan deals and attached conditionality programmes in lower-income 
regions of the world such as Africa and Asia, especially in the 1990s and early 
2000s (Blanton, Blanton, and Peksen 2017; Forster et al. 2019). Unconstrained 
by voters forcing them into redistribution, and following their own idea of 
“good” economic policy, which from the 1980s up until the aftermath of the 
Great Recession incorporated distinctly market-liberal principles and a more 
minute role for the state (leaving little room for potential redistribution), 
inequality rose in the developing economy programme countries. This policy 
agenda of greater privatisation, market liberalisation, and fiscal retrenchment 
was a reflection of the economic orthodoxy of its day, of what constituted 
“sound economic policy”, and was thus adopted by international technocratic 
organisations such as the IMF. However, ideas about what makes for good 
policy are open to change (Béland 2009; Carstensen and Schmidt 2016). Hall 
(1993) for example illustrates how British macroeconomic regulation policy 
transformed wholesale in the period 1970 to 1990 from Keynesianism to 
monetarism as a consequence of social learning processes within the state 
apparatus, occurring as a result of reflection and lesson-drawing from past 
policy experiences. Ideas are powerful, especially when conflicting interests are 
rendered ineffective, and shifting ideas based on past lessons can propel a step-
change in future economic policies. Therefore, it is important to assess what 
recent ideas were within the Troika, not least between the two sets of actors 
coming from the US and Europe respectively (i.e. differences between the 
ideational preferences of the IMF as opposed to the European Commission and 
the ECB), to appraise what their consequences for different policies would be 
and how this would ultimately affect income and labour market disparities. 
 
Examining policy preference contents and formation of the IMF and the 




a shift in their definition of good economic policy, specifically in relation to 
their understanding of income inequality, but less so with regard to their views 
regarding labour market inequality. The Commission, similarly, identified 
during the reform process in the economic adjustment programme for Greece 
that the social impact of the reforms was a salient issue, emphasised expressly 
by a number of its top-level Commission officials including presidents José 
Manuel Barroso and Jean-Claude Juncker. The two cases of the IMF and the 
European Commission and their ideational standpoints are now explicated 
further. 
 
The IMF changed its comprehension of what type of economic policies can 
bolster long-term sustainable growth to incorporate measures abating 
inequality, as inequality is increasingly seen as a stumbling block to growth, 
and as redistribution is distinguished as a valid means to address this problem. 
This was ultimately the result of both institutional learning from the experience 
of the East Asian Crisis of the late 1990s, which led to the IMF’s legitimacy 
being questioned to a point where it threatened its institutional foundations 
(Chwieroth 2009), as well as the substantive shifts in economic orthodoxy 
following the global financial crisis (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012; Ban 
and Patenaude 2018; Clift 2018; DeLong et al. 2012). Adapted from the 
Kaleckian notion that lower income households have a higher marginal 
propensity to consume and spend a higher proportion of their disposable 
incomes, the IMF shifted its rather hawkish stance that progressive fiscal policy 
would result in an equity-efficiency trade-off, and gradually subscribed to the 
idea that using redistribution as a legitimate tool – a means to an end – would 
ultimately stimulate higher growth through reducing inequality (see e.g. Berg 
and Ostry 2011; Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides 2014; Lipton 2013). Moreover, 
while accommodating continuous internal struggles of pluralistic ideas, the IMF 
is ultimately a hierarchical organisation. Thus, once a new set of ideas, such as 




to tackle high levels of inequality, which are seen as impediments to long-term 
economic growth, takes hold and supersedes previously dominant ideas, this 
will quickly manifest in concrete policy proposals (Copelovitch 2010; Momani 
2007). 
 
Charting the journey of ideational evolution in the European Commission is 
more complicated as a stronger aspect of self-interest is involved. The 
Commission is arguably the most political out of the three Troika institutions, 
due to its proximity and accountability to the constituent EU member states, 
and furthermore because it suffers from a democratic input deficit (Follesdal 
and Hix 2006), and thus rests solely on its output legitimacy, meaning it is 
compelled to afford more attention to the social consequences it produces for 
member states. Despite considerations of augmenting output legitimacy to 
compensate for the democratic deficit, the process of European integration has 
in the past been characterised as a market-liberal as opposed to a socially 
conscious project, with a process of deregulatory integration across member 
states thanks to the rolling out of the Single Market, and a concomitant 
expansion of EU-level competences in more policy areas pushed through by a 
proactive European Court of Justice, also referred to as the negative integration 
bias of the EU (McNamara 1998; Scharpf 2010; Schmidt 2005; see also 
Beckfield 2019). 
 
Beyond the effects of the IMF’s and the European Commission’s previous 
policy stances on inequality, entering into the single currency union has itself 
had consequences for inequality, too. The workings of EMU for inequality can 
be gleaned from the Maastricht convergence criteria, placing strict upper limits 
on members’ state budget deficits and national debt levels. Having been 
labelled a model that encourages ‘austerity forever’ (Stierle and Haar 2012) or 
‘perpetual austerity’ (Iversen and Soskice 2018a, 258), the stringent fiscal rules 




welfare state expenditure, necessitating cuts in social policies targeted mostly 
at those nearer the lower end of the income distribution, and thus increasing 
risk of growing inequality. Eurozone member countries, having handed 
monetary policy competences over to a highly independent central bank, find 
themselves no longer able to pursue competitiveness or growth through 
currency devaluations, interest rate cuts, or generous Keynesian-style demand 
management. Instead the incentives are biased in favour of cutting taxes to 
galvanise growth, creating a continued need for public spending limits (in the 
face of lower tax revenues) to ensure the EMU debt and deficit criteria are still 
heeded (De Grauwe 2013), and thus impinging on national welfare states’ 
abilities to protect the poorest. 
 
In spite of this view that European integration has fostered continued 
convergence on a more laissez-faire common model for EU member states, other 
evidence focusing on the microlevel motivations of civil servants working for 
the European Commission indicates that so-called ‘Eurocrats’ (Geuijen et al. 
2008) have a stronger penchant for policies based upon a more regulated form 
of capitalism. Hooghe (2000; 2001) and Ross (2011) find that Commission 
bureaucrats are actually in favour of enshrining a stronger social dimension in 
the European integration project characterised by more generous social services 
and higher levels of redistribution. In the Eurozone crisis, the key priority for 
the Commission was to achieve economic recovery and fiscal consolidation in 
the EAP-recipient countries, not least because the crisis constituted a threat 
of the Eurozone breaking up, with potentially disastrous effects for the whole 
European integration project; the role of inequality and redistribution (and 
therefore a recalibration of the welfare state) was therefore further down their 
list of priorities. However, as there is no negative relationship between the two 
(achieving consolidation and recalibrating welfare states to make them more 
progressive), the latter did find its way into the EAPs. For the Commission, 




programme for Greece: after the IMF exited, thus allowing for a more direct 
evaluation of the preferences of the Commission in particular, the programme 
included a whole report on the social impact of the reforms, which Commission 
President Juncker stressed was a salient issue for the Commission. In that 
sense, the economic adjustment programmes can be viewed as what Mahoney 
and Thelen (2010) refer to as ‘soft spots’ in the historical institutionalist sense; 
they are policy areas that can be utilised by agents to achieve gradual change  
(see also Streeck and Thelen 2005; Thelen 2003; 2009), which Commission 
bureaucrats seem to have exploited to enshrine a stronger social dimension in 
the reform programmes, while maintaining the overall goal of achieving fiscal 
and economic adjustment. 
 
A.3 Research Design 
This thesis analyses and explains the distributive effects of different economic 
adjustment policies, including austerity measures such as tax hikes and benefit 
cuts as well as labour market reforms. At the heart of this analysis lies the 
question how policy makers in the Eurozone crisis distributed the burden of 
adjustment across different income and labour market groups in the face of the 
distributive conflicts arising from the pressure to (1) consolidate public 
budgets, and (2) implement structural reforms aimed at restoring cost 
competitiveness. In the first step of the analysis, it is, therefore, required to 
accurately measure the specific effects of the reforms on (1) the income 
distribution, and (2) labour market segregation before any assertions as to the 
roots of the observed effects can be made. The problem of accurate 
measurement, however, is not a trivial one. In fact, changes in the distribution 
of income as well as the segregation of labour markets can be caused by a 
multitude of different and interdependent factors of extreme complexity. 




as income inequality, in the face of a complex set of factors, therefore, requires 
the careful construction of counterfactuals, which in turn necessarily requires 
assumptions to be made. In the second step, the thesis explains the observed 
outcomes, asking in particular the question of how the involvement of the 
Troika impacted the reform process, the specific design of the reform measures, 
and by extension the distributive effects of these reforms.  
 
In order to make sense of this complex interplay of different factors, the thesis 
constructs a comparative case study of two countries, Greece and Portugal. 
Both countries were hit hard in the Eurozone crisis and became part of Troika-
administered economic adjustment programmes. The thesis is set up as a most 
similar systems design case study, which allows both for the accurate 
measurement of the dependent variables, and the discernment of the specific 
effect of the Troika involvement on the distributive outcomes of the reforms. 
This section serves to (1) justify the case selection and substantiate the case 
for a most similar systems design comparative case study, which includes an 
analysis of the country-specific dependent variables, and the comparability of 
the relevant independent variables identified in the literature review section of 
this introduction; and (2) outline of the methods used to measure the reform 
effects and ascertain the impact of the relevant independent variables 
 
A.3.1 Case selection 
Firstly, for the purposes of this project’s ambitions, it makes sense to exclude 
from our purview other Troika bailout recipient countries aside from Greece 
and Portugal. This will now be explicated by process of elimination. Next to 
determining the precise distributive effects of austerity measures depending on 
their design and composition, the object of interest is the specific impact of 
Troika involvement in the programmes, which disqualifies for example Italy, 




is inappropriate too, as the country did much to avoid a Troika programme 
with conditionality at almost all costs. It underwent only a financial sector 
adjustment programme, rather than a complete economic adjustment 
programme, and thus did not go through Troika-prescribed deep and far-
reaching fiscal and structural reforms. Spain undertook austerity almost 
proactively, which also allowed the country to retain its autonomy with regard 
to how policies should be designed. The case of Spain is therefore not conducive 
to gauging the effects of Troika involvement. This leaves Ireland, Cyprus, 
Greece, and Portugal. Ireland is wholly dissimilar to the latter three countries, 
having a radically different (liberal) welfare regime, making it impossible to 
sufficiently restrict for purposes of causal attribution the diversity among 
possible independent variables with regard to explaining the causes of the 
different distributional effects. Meanwhile, taking Cyprus into account would 
also reduce comparability, owing predominantly to its drastically smaller size. 
 
In addition to excluding other country-case possibilities, there are also 
important reasons in favour of the explicit selection of solely Greece and 
Portugal for the purposes of this project’s ambitions. It is important to note 
here that both countries were the most deeply affected by the sovereign debt 
crisis of any Troika country and thus party to the most drastic austerity 
measures. Both also had similar landscapes at the onset of the crisis, sharing 
important features. Afonso et al.’s 2015 study on how party linkages shaped 
the various responses to the crisis and fiscal adjustment in Greece and Portugal 
provides a case in point for the comparability of the two countries: both have 
similar levels of socio-economic development, both are part of the same family 
of welfare regimes (Ferrera 1996, this will be explored further in section 1.4.2 
of this thesis), both are of similar size, both were democratised during the same 
period, and both joined the EU in the 1980s (Afonso, Zartaloudis, and 





Having sketched out the reasons why Greece and Portugal are the most 
apposite comparative cases, the following turns to the requirements of most 
similar systems case study design (MSSD) and illustrates how the two countries 
satisfy these conditions. Both countries are similar along a number of 
independent variables crucial to the prerequisites for a MSSD that could 
otherwise potentially explain distributional choices of policy makers. This 
includes their particular welfare state model, the so-called Southern European 
welfare state (Gosta Esping-Andersen 1990; Ferrera 1996; Hemerijck 2013; 
Rhodes 1996), the Mediterranean variant of production regimes (Amable 2003), 
a similar composition of welfare spending with regard to discretionary 
expenditure or entitlement spending, which can in turn determine which 
expenditure items are easiest to cut (Breunig and Busemeyer 2012; Clayton 
and Pontusson 1998) and their electoral systems (Iversen and Soskice 2006; 
Persson and Tabellini 2004). Partisanship is one possible explanatory variable 
on which the cases differ: While both the Greek and Portuguese EAPs were 
initially negotiated by centre-left governments, the Portuguese programme was 
ultimately implemented by a centre-right government from 2011 onwards. In 
Greece, there was much more dramatic reshuffling of the political landscape, 
and throughout the duration of the EAPs the country saw frequent changes in 
the government in power, from centre-right to far-left coalitions. While this 
would ordinarily have to be considered as a possible explainer for potential 
differences in the distributive effects of the EAPs, this potentiality can be safely 
rejected on the grounds that, despite the many changes in government in 
Greece, the distributive effects of the EAPs did not change after 2012 (see 
Paper 2 of this thesis), thus undermining the explanatory potential of 
partisanship for the matter at hand here. 
 
Lastly, one key difference between the two countries, which the thesis identifies 
as the key independent variable explaining different distributive outcomes, is 




Troika controlled the reforms much more closely, prescribing specific policy 
measures, while in Portugal the reform prescriptions remained more general, 
outlining broad fiscal targets rather than strictly defined concrete measures. 
Moreover, pushback from the Portuguese was more effective (and perhaps more 
tolerated by the Troika), which relates to stronger veto points such as the 
Constitutional Court, the overall higher reform capacity of the Portuguese 
state, and the fact that Portugal returned to the long-term bond markets 
sooner than expected, thus effectively ending the dependence on payments from 
the Troika. 
 
Given that the preferences of the technocrats of the Troika and those of elected 
domestic policy makers regarding redistribution and inequality more generally 
follow different logics, as shown in the previous section, the divergent degrees 
of Troika control over the reform process is thus a powerful explanation for 
possible differences in the distributive effects of the programmes. 
 
A.3.2 Measurements, data, and methods 
The thesis first focuses on the income dimension of inequality as the key 
dependent variable. In order to assess the effects of the reform programmes on 
income inequality, it draws on microdata from the European Union Statistics 
on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) database, which is the most 
comprehensive data source available for European countries. On the basis of 
this data, inequality is measured in aggregate terms using the Gini coefficient 
and the S80/S20 ratio. These indicators are chosen due to their mutually 
complementary nature: The Gini coefficient, calculated by dividing the area 
between the Lorenz curve and the 45° line of equality by the area below the 
line of equality, is a powerful instrument for capturing changes in the middle 
of the income distribution. However, one of its weaknesses lies in the 




S80/S20 ratio measures the ratio of the aggregate income of highest quintile of 
income earners by the aggregate of the lowest quintile. Therefore, it is 
particularly well-suited to capturing changes at the tails of the income 
distribution, thus neutralising the weaknesses of the Gini coefficient when used 
in tandem. Both indicators are calculated for incomes at the household level, 
both before and after redistributive measures (i.e. market and disposable 
income). 
 
Furthermore, the thesis makes strong use of microsimulation techniques 
through tax-benefit microsimulation tool EUROMOD. The benefits of using 
microsimulation in conjunction with household-level microdata are vast: By 
constructing and comparing counterfactual scenarios, microsimulation allows 
the specific isolation of the distributive effects of policy changes from any 
effects of the wider recession (Bargain 2006; Sutherland and Figari 2013; for a 
more detailed explanation, see Paper 1, section 1.3.3). This means that 
microsimulation can be used to measure the precise effects of any policy reform 
that was part of the EAPs. Drawing on household-level microdata, and 
providing every tax and benefit policy in place in each year and country, this 
constitutes a major advantage over other econometric techniques that 
approximate the effects of certain policy reforms. This is of particular relevance 
in the context of the crisis, as the scope of confounding variables is immense; 
for instance, approximating the effects of a reform in unemployment benefits 
for income inequality during times where unemployment is growing rapidly is 
difficult. The use of microsimulation tools circumvents this problem by 
simulating the effects of the reform for each individual household’s income and 
then calculating inequality measures on the basis of the newly created income 
distribution containing the policy change. The microsimulation data presented 
in this thesis are novel in that the specific effects of the EAP reform measures 
were simulated, thus allowing for new insights on the interplay of different 




Moreover, aside from quantitative data, the thesis draws on evidence from the 
documents related to the EAPs, such as the Memoranda of Understanding, and 
the ex-post evaluation of the programmes compiled by the IMF and the 
European Commission, as well as public statements, speeches, and secondary 
interview data. This is both in order to describe and classify the negotiated 
and implemented reforms, and gauge the preferences of the different actors 
involved regarding the specific reform design. 
 
With regard to measuring labour market inequality, the thesis again makes use 
of EU-SILC microdata, but at the individual level of workers. As the database 
contains information not just regarding a worker’s income, but also a number 
of variables regarding her or his employment status, type of employment, type 
of employment contract, and working hours, the data can be used in order to 
attribute different labour market statuses to each individual, classifying them 
as either labour market insiders or outsiders. Further to providing a bird’s-eye 
view of the degree of dualisation in each year, the data also allow for 
calculations of transitions between the two groups as well as the unemployed 
based on longitudinal panel data. Through this method it is possible to measure 
the group-specific unemployment risk for both insiders and outsiders by 
comparing the transition ratios from each group to unemployment (for a more 
detailed explanation, see Paper 3, section 3.3.2). In conjunction with the 
analysis of labour market reforms, this allows for important inferences 
regarding the reform effects in either alleviating labour market dualisation or 
further exacerbating it. 
 
A.4 Synopsis and Contribution 
The following provides a synopsis of the thesis as well as an outline of the 




reforms on income inequality and labour market duality in Portugal and 
Greece, the thesis first zooms into the trends in income inequality in the process 
of the reforms. Using EU-SILC data, the thesis first shows that, despite deep 
recessions in both countries, disposable income inequality measured by both 
the Gini coefficient and the S80/S20 ratio stagnated. At the same time, market 
income inequality increased significantly, revealing that throughout the entire 
duration of the reform programmes, redistribution through the welfare state 
was sufficient to offset these increases despite the deep cuts in benefits and 
other social expenditure. While this contradicts large parts of the public 
discourse about the crisis in Southern Europe, the observed development of 
income inequality may simply be a result of automatic stabilisers kicking in 
(although it is noteworthy that the austerity measures evidently did not 
retrench them in this regard) or other factors. Therefore, the thesis further 
tests the exact effects of the reform measures on the income distribution. 
 
Using microsimulation techniques, the thesis uncovers surprisingly that, in 
contrast to expectations in the orthodox economic literature, the Troika-
induced reforms had a specifically inequality-reducing effect in both economies. 
The thesis continues by decomposing the individual reform measures in order 
to identify which ones had the most progressive (and regressive) effects. In a 
contribution to the economic literature on the distributive effects of austerity 
measures, the thesis presents strong evidence that the composition of fiscal 
consolidation measures, i.e. to what extent they are based on expenditure cuts 
or tax increases, in fact matters little to how these reforms affect inequality. 
Instead, both types of reforms can be designed in either progressive or 
regressive ways, putting the exact design rather than the composition of 
austerity measures centre-stage. This is illustrated by changes in means-tested 
benefits, which had regressive effects in Portugal, but overwhelmingly 
progressive effects in Greece. Overall, this calls into question the findings of 




expenditure-based programmes. This is likely due to differences in the research 
design and showcases the benefits of using in-depth comparative case studies 
to qualify the correlations (e.g. between expenditure-based consolidation and 
higher inequality) found in large-n economic studies. 
 
Moreover, although the general finding of progressive austerity measures is 
striking and unexpected according to the traditional economic literature on the 
impacts of revenue-raising and expenditure-cutting austerity for income 
inequality, the thesis pinpoints that the answer to this puzzle is nestled in the 
precise policy preferences for the reform packages formulated by two of the 
Troika partners – the IMF and the European Commission – which, as shown 
previously, are crucial for the distributive effects of the reforms. These actors 
stressed in the EAP-related documents the imperatives to afford protection to 
the lowest income groups in the population during the austerity process, for 
reasons of: protecting lowest income people from vulnerability, abating public 
pushback or resistance to reform implementations, and thanks to a belief in 
the soundness of progressive redistributive policies for securing sustainable 
economic growth (based on the notion of lower income households’ higher 
marginal propensity to consume) and thus expediting both the economic 
recovery and, by virtue of this, the timely repayment of the loans. The thesis 
at this point presents evidence of both the preferences of the Troika actors 
gauged through the documents, secondary interviews, and public statements 
and speeches, and the ideational foundations for these preferences for both the 
Commission and the IMF. The Commission differs from the IMF in the 
important respect that it faces a dilemma between the political accountability 
towards the hawkish creditor countries of the Eurozone, acting as their agent 
in the reform process, and on the other hand its responsibility as a guardian of 
the Treaties in defending the European Social Model. Commission technocrats 
in particular therefore used the adjustment programmes to introduce a more 




however, adhering to the overall austerity paradigm and not questioning the 
fiscal consolidation path that in particular Germany and its allies in the 
Council insisted upon. 
 
Based on the two important empirical contributions that (1) austerity can have 
progressive effects, and (2) Troika officials especially in the IMF and 
Commission had a predisposition towards more redistributive policies, in the 
second paper, the project hones in on the income inequality data at a more 
granular level as well as testing for changes over time rather than comparing 
before and after scenarios of the EAPs. The paper finds that the effects of the 
reforms on incomes in Greece were, in fact, more progressive, i.e. more 
inequality-reducing, than in Portugal in that lower income groups benefitted 
from the reforms in Greece, while in Portugal it was mainly middle income 
groups that remained shielded from any adverse effects of the reforms. To 
disentangle why this has been the case, despite both countries receiving 
analogous austerity prescriptions and being examples of ‘most similar systems’, 
the project looks more closely at the Troika’s more vigilant, closer involvement 
in the Greek case. The thesis presents evidence that this is traceable to Greece’s 
historical track record of lower capacities of policy implementation, owing to 
endogenous problems in its governance and public administration system, as 
well as stronger clientelistic linkages between certain voter groups and the 
government. At the same time, there was more pushback against the reform 
prescriptions in the case of Portugal, pertaining to stronger domestic veto 
points such as the Constitutional Court being instrumentalised by the 
Opposition parties and the President, and the early return of the country to 
the long-term bond markets, tilting the bargaining game vis-à-vis the Troika 
back in Portugal’s favour. 
 
Variation between Greece and Portugal in the degree of unelected, 




democratic, domestic government-led policy oversight and execution is 
identified as the independent variable which explains the marginally greater 
progressivity of austerity in Greece. This is corroborated in particular by 
juxtaposing the degree of Troika control in Greece with the distributive effects 
over time: The documents reveal that the Troika only tightened its grip on the 
Greek reform programme in 2012 when major fiscal targets had not been met. 
Parallel to that, the distributive effects became more progressive at precisely 
this point, which constitutes a break in the trend of initially regressive reforms 
in the first two years of the adjustment process. Further process tracing reveals 
that the Troika’s grip on the Greek reform process tightened further, and in 
particular during the Syriza administration, with distributive effects becoming 
more progressive. Importantly, this cannot be attributed to partisanship and 
the far-left Syriza government coming into power, as is illustrated through a 
brief case study on the major Greek pension reform, which had progressive 
effects but was met with adamant opposition from the Syriza government (and, 
in fact, watered down somewhat making it less progressive than the original 
proposal). 
 
With regard to the broader implications for the interplay of democracy and 
technocracy with inequality, the answer to the diverging inequality outcomes 
can be found in the guiding logic of the two differing sets of actors. The Troika, 
being an unelected technocratic entity that is neither accountable to nor 
compelled to respond to the populace, is able to pursue more effectively what 
it deems to be superior economic policy ideas, i.e. in this case those that 
safeguard the lowest income groups for the sake of spurring economic growth, 
and thus in the longer term helping secure loan repayments. Due to Greece’s 
flawed implementation record, therefore, the Troika wielded more power and 
control, and could more effectively push through more progressive fiscal 
measures. The democratically elected domestic government, on the other hand, 




of the reform measures; the guiding logic was thus very different to that of the 
Troika’s. National politicians are office and re-election seeking creatures, the 
pursuit of which, in turn, rests on currying favour with the ‘decisive’ or ‘median 
voter’ among the citizenry (Iversen and Soskice 2019). Thus, to the extent 
possible, domestic politicians will aim to execute painful adjustment measures 
in a way most amenable to the median income voter, as this group in the 
electorate is most decisive to the politicians’ re-election prospects. 
 
This constitutes one of the major conclusions of this thesis: unelected 
technocrats may be at liberty to implement inequality-reducing reforms, while 
elected governments are often not, due to their office-seeking nature and the 
need to protect certain important voter groups, which may come at the price 
of implementing less progressive or even regressive reforms. Two important 
qualifications need to be made at this point and are explored further in the 
thesis: (1) Technocrats are, of course, no knights in shining armour fighting to 
protect the vulnerable – the various IMF programmes up until the late 2000s 
have shown this well enough. Instead, technocrats are guided primarily by their 
ideas and interests, and if these align with more progressive policies, 
technocrats may be in a better position to implement such policies than elected 
governments that have to fear electoral retribution; (2) the mechanisms for 
elected governments that may keep them from implementing progressive 
reforms are not always be direct. As we know from Beramendi et al. (2015) 
and the growing electoral turn literature, governments are beholden to the will 
of the voters. However, and that is a blind spot of the electoral turn literature 
despite the fact that it is, in fact, theorised in the original Beramendi et al. 
contribution: Institutional constraints matter. In that sense, legacies from past 
policy making rounds may contribute to making it difficult for elected 
governments to implemented progressive reforms. A case in point is the 
rejection of the Portuguese pension reform and public sector pay cuts, both of 




but the opposition and the President that had brought the case to the courts, 
which then ultimately rejected the reforms, illustrating how constrained 
governments can also be by voters preferences from precious policy making 
rounds that were enshrined in institutions and national legislation. 
 
Further to illuminating the effects of the economic adjustment programmes on 
the distribution of income in Greece and Portugal, in the third paper the thesis 
turns to a further key dimension targeted by the reform packages, namely 
structural reforms to the labour market. This is done to complement and 
extend our understanding of the effects of the reforms, in addition to testing 
whether, akin to the fiscal measures, labour market reform policies sketched by 
the Troika advanced the idea of safeguarding the most vulnerable population 
groups. One argument in this regard is that even if fiscal reforms had been 
progressive, labour market reforms may have had such negative effects for 
workers that the overall thrust of the reforms would still be described as 
regressive. The thesis provides evidence against this. Southern European 
countries’ labour markets are denoted by heavy segmentation or dualisation in 
the literature, with privileges such as high employment protection and high 
severance pay set down in law and afforded to so-called labour market insiders, 
at the cost of greater entrenched job insecurity and precarity for labour market 
outsiders. The effects of the labour market reforms are chronicled in both 
Portugal and Greece, revealing that, where the Troika had less say in practice, 
i.e. in Portugal, the established insider-outsider dynamic remained broadly 
intact, underpinned among other factors by the Portuguese judiciary’s 
assertion that sweeping labour market flexibilization could be deemed 
unconstitutional. In Greece, by contrast, a process of across-the-board 
deregulation and liberalisation began to take hold, pushing erstwhile insiders 
to outsider status and increasing their group-specific unemployment risk, while 





The contents of the labour market reform policies were, therefore, unlike those 
of the fiscal policy reforms, where the Troika had a predilection for protecting 
the lowest income groups, and applying this in practice where it exerted more 
control (in Greece). Whereas the IMF and the European Commission displayed 
a change in fiscal policy thinking (or at least an incompatibility with 
expectations in the orthodox economic literature), in the direction of seeking 
to proscribe large-scale income inequality as a means to maximise the chances 
of success of the programmes, in structural reforms of labour markets, a more 
traditional, more predictable, approach was adopted – one of deregulating and 
liberalising of labour markets for everybody. 
 
This sheds light on an interesting finding. In line with the ideas, interests, and 
institutions framework for explaining policy change versus continuation, the 
differing degrees of progressivity of the reforms in both countries seems to 
endorse the relevance of especially the role played by ideas and interests in the 
austerity measures of the Eurozone bailout and reform programmes. The 
Troika, following what they deemed as sound economic policy ideas for 
bolstering more sustainable economic growth, applied fiscal reforms that would 
redistribute more to those in the lowest income deciles when they were 
presented with the chance of doing so in practice in the case of Greece, fearing 
no adverse democratic backlash by virtue of being unelected technocrats. The 
somewhat less progressive redistributive outcomes in Portugal, conversely, 
where national politicians exercised greater control over policy implementation, 
lends credence to the argument that democratically elected national officials 
followed their interests, shielding the median voter from the reforms as best 
they could to augment chances of staying in office. Similarly, the across-the-
board deregulatory labour market reforms in Greece relate to an unchanged 
set of ideas held by Troika technocrats regarding the ideal design of labour 
market reforms, which does not accommodate compensatory measures for the 




deregulation and the resulting higher flexibility of labour markets is more 
efficient and therefore provides the best preconditions for long-term economic 
growth. 
 
In the next chapters of the thesis, the research is presented in three separate 
stand-alone papers. The thesis closes with concluding remarks outlining the 
key contributions of the research, a discussion of its limitations, and a brief 





––––– Paper I ––––– 
Austerity, inequality and the Troika: A microsimulation 
approach to measuring the distributive effects of fiscal 
consolidation measures in the Eurozone crisis*12 
 
ABSTRACT 
The paper analyses the fiscal consolidation measures that were part of the 
Economic Adjustment Programmes for Greece and Portugal and their effects 
on income inequality. Using EU-SILC microdata, the paper finds that 
inequality of disposable incomes did not rise throughout the duration of the 
reform programmes despite substantive increases in market income inequality 
paired with cuts in social expenditure. Further to that, the paper uses 
microsimulation techniques to measure the exact first order distributive effects 
of the fiscal reforms. It finds that both the Greek and Portuguese EAPs lowered 
inequality vis-à-vis the pre-reform tax-benefit system. Furthermore, the paper 
decomposes the reforms by policy class measuring their individual distributive 
effects. A key finding the paper presents here is that the design of the reform 
measures matter crucially for how they affect inequality, regardless of the 
policy class as which they are labelled. This constitutes a departure from the 
orthodox economic literature, which stipulates that it is the composition, i.e. 
whether austerity is based on expenditure cuts or tax increases, that defines 
the distributive effects of such reforms. Explaining the surprising finding of 
progressive austerity, the paper turns to the policy preferences of the Troika. 
In contrast to previous findings of institutions such as the IMF being associated 
with policies that increase inequality, the paper presents evidence of an 
ideational shift in the institutions, assigning a larger role to inequality as an 




* Parts of the findings presented in this paper were published as: Mushövel, Fabian. 2019. 
“Austerity and Inequality. The Distributive Effects of Fiscal Consolidation Measures in the 
Eurozone Crisis.” In Structural Reforms and Economic Growth in Europe., edited by Nauro 





By 2019, the European Economic and Monetary Union seemed to be returning 
to a state of political normalcy after almost a decade of economic turbulence 
and deep reforms to EMU economic governance. At the centre of the Eurozone 
crisis stood the requests for financial assistance by a number of member states 
forced by skyrocketing levels of public debt. In response to the bailout requests, 
the Troika of European Commission, European Central Bank, and 
International Monetary Fund negotiated large-scale austerity programmes with 
the recipient countries’ governments in return for their financial assistance. 
These programmes led to mass protests in the recipient countries and were 
criticised almost uniformly in the scholarly literature. One major point of 
contention concerned the adverse effects of pro-cyclical spending cuts and tax 
increases on economic growth. Another one, which tends to be overlooked in 
favour of the former, is the impact of extensive austerity measures on the 
countries’ ability to cushion the effects of the crisis on vulnerable income groups 
through the stabilising functions of the welfare state. The paper tests the 
validity of this critique by measuring and explaining the distributive effects of 
austerity programmes. It shows that, despite a number of much-cited economic 
accounts predicting rising levels of inequality as a result of such reforms, the 
adjustment programmes were in fact accompanied by higher levels of 
redistribution keeping inequality of disposable household incomes stable 
throughout the programmes. 
 
The paper showcases this in a comparative case study of the Greek and 
Portuguese Economic Adjustment Programmes (EAPs), covering the entire 
duration of the Portuguese programme from 2011 to 2014, and the reforms 
under the different Greek programmes between 2010 and 2017. Specifically, the 
case study answers the question how the EAPs affected the redistributive 




of incomes in those countries. It does so by combining the use of household 
income microdata taken from the latest waves of EU-SILC surveys with data 
obtained through simulations run with tax-benefit microsimulation tool 
EUROMOD. In more detail, the data presented in this paper show that (1) 
inequality has not increased substantively throughout the crisis, (2) rather than 
being curtailed by fiscal consolidation pressures, the level of income 
redistribution in the recipient countries increased, and (3) the reforms 
implemented under the EAPs had a direct inequality-reducing effect, which, 
throughout most of the programmes, were large enough to offset the increases 
in market income inequality induced by the recession through e.g. higher 
unemployment. 
 
Based on these findings, the paper offers insights into the interplay between 
the design and composition of fiscal consolidation measures and inequality that 
have so far been under-researched in the literature: Whether fiscal 
consolidation is achieved mainly through spending cuts or revenue increasing 
measures seems less crucial to the distributive impact of those measures. 
Instead, the critical factor is the exact design of the measures and the 
proportion of the adjustment burden that is put on higher incomes, as well as 
the degree to which the most vulnerable income groups are protected or 
compensated for income losses. 
 
Rejecting the idea of an automatism between a particular composition of fiscal 
consolidation measures and their distributive impact, the paper argues that 
policy-makers are faced with choices regarding the design of the consolidation 
measures, which in turn produce different distributional outcomes. However, a 
large literature suggests that the Troika institutions in particular have in the 
past neglected the social dimension of fiscal consolidation measures and thus 
left this fiscal space unutilised in terms of achieving progressive distributive 




European EAPs. It presents evidence that the Troika institutions put a strong 
focus on making the painful reform prescriptions as socially acceptable as 
possible, as is revealed in a number of policy documents such as the Memoranda 
of Understanding, the regular programme reviews, and the post-programme 
evaluation reports. The paper also argues that the Troika decisions regarding 
the distributive nature of the programmes were driven mainly by the 
Commission and the IMF and less by the ECB, which was primarily concerned 
with ensuring price stability as well as general fiscal prudence but had no stake 
in the distributive effects of the programmes. 
 
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the reasons for both the Commission 
and the IMF pushing for more progressive reforms varied: For the European 
Commission, the key goal was to not lose the brittle public support for the 
reform programmes and thus jeopardise their implementation in a political 
climate that was already hostile towards the painful reforms. For the IMF, 
conversely, the paper presents evidence that views within the Fund habe been 
shifting from an agnostic to a more concerned stance towards high levels of 
inequality. This mirrors in part the concerns of the Commission to maintain 
public support in order to be able to implement necessary reforms. In addition, 
however, this concern is based on a more general understanding developed since 
the East Asian Crisis and in particular the GFC that high levels of inequality 
are harmful to long-term economic growth and that stronger and more efficient 
redistributive policies can boost economic activity. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines what the scholarly 
literature tells us about how fiscal consolidation programmes affect inequality, 
as well as showing how the economic policy consensus of the Troika partners 
was likely to result in a composition and design of the EAPs that, based on 
previous findings, was expected to lead to higher inequality. This argument is 




economic necessities rooted in the incompleteness of the Economic and 
Monetary Union. The third section provides the rationale for choosing Greece 
and Portugal as case studies, being countries that ultimately differed greatly 
in the composition of the fiscal consolidation measures they were prescribed. 
The section continues by outlining the methodological approach of the paper 
including the use of tax-benefit microsimulation tool EUROMOD as well as 
explaining the indicators used to measure income inequality and presenting the 
datasets. The fourth section presents the empirical analysis and discusses 
evidence from policy documents, interviews and official statements by Troika 
bureaucrats regarding the different institutions’ stance on inequality and 
redistribution. 
 
1.2 Theoretical Considerations and Case Selection 
 
1.2.1 Understanding the crisis management of EU policy makers – 
the political economy of European austerity 
 
The crisis management in the Eurozone was determined by the policy 
consensus that shaped and was shaped by the European integration process, 
the economic necessities emerging from the unique intricacies of an incomplete 
Economic and Monetary Union, and the politics of the Eurozone crisis. In 
conjunction, these three factors explain why the uniform response to the 
sovereign debt crisis was centred around immediate and severe austerity 






The European project is often described in the literature as following 
‘neoliberal’ principles (McNamara 1998; Scharpf 1999)13. While McNamara 
argues this for the case of monetary policy, there is no doubt that the emerging 
consensus in that area also had a profound effect on fiscal policy by prioritising 
price stability over other policy objectives: Strict fiscal rules had to be created 
so as to not jeopardise the overarching aim of price stability. Overall, the 
emerging policy consensus was in line with the global shift from Keynesianism 
to Monetarism (Hall 1993), and an adherence to policies subsumed under what 
came to be known as the Washington Consensus (Williamson 1990). These 
principles were ultimately enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP), and more recently the Fiscal Compact (De Grauwe 
2018; Fitoussi and Saraceno 2013) leading some commentators to coin the term 
Brussels-Frankfurt Consensus (Sapir et al. 2004) and Brussels-Frankfurt-
Washington Consensus (Fitoussi and Saraceno 2004).  
 
In the resulting policy regime, on the monetary policy side, the European 
Central Bank was tasked with ensuring price stability as its prime objective 
and equipped with unprecedented independence from national governments as 
per Articles 104(1), 105(1), and 107 of the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on 
European Union 1992). On the fiscal policy side, EU member states agreed to 
adhere to the strict fiscal rules of the SGP and later the Fiscal Compact, which 
maintained the SGP’s maximum level of public debt at 60% of GDP but in 
addition stipulates that governments balance their budgets over the business 
 
13 Scharpf argues that European integration is characterised by a bias towards negative 
integration, i.e. de-regulation rather than re-regulation, which in turn rests on the inherent 
impediments of positive integration in a quasi-federal setting, which he describes as the joint-
decision-trap (2006) as well as the institutional asymmetry of the EU, which is stipulated by 
the notion of “integration through law” (S. K. Schmidt 2012). As a consequence, Scharpf argues 
that EU member states would converge towards an integrated liberal market model (2010; see 




cycle regardless of absolute debt levels14 (European Union 2012). Government 
expenditure and the room for fiscal manoeuvre was thus limited for EMU 
member states already before the onset of the Eurozone crisis and even more 
so after fiscal rules were tightened further. 
 
While the policy consensus that was built around the prioritisation of price 
stability and adherence to strict fiscal rules lays the ideational and institutional 
groundwork for general fiscal restraint, it fails to explain the timing of the deep 
austerity measures implemented in the Eurozone crisis. In other words, why 
did policy-makers choose to employ such measures in an already struggling 
economy despite the fact that this could reasonably be expected to further 
stifle economic growth? In this regard, it is necessary to understand the unique 
intricacies stemming from the incomplete design of the Economic and Monetary 
Union. 
 
Ordinarily, when faced with an economic shock inducing a liquidity or even 
solvency crisis, there are broadly speaking three options amongst which policy-
makers can choose in order to achieve the necessary adjustment, provided that 
default is not an option15: (1) stimulating demand through expansionary fiscal 
or monetary policy, (2) currency devaluation, and (3) austerity through 
increasing government revenues or cutting public expenditure (Matthijs 2016). 
However, with the room for fiscal manoeuvre being extremely limited for EMU 
member states under the restrictions of the SGP and Fiscal Compact, the 
possibility for substantive demand stimuli through expansionary fiscal policy 
over a longer period of time was foreclosed as a viable policy option. Moreover, 
 
14  The Fiscal Compact specifies that a ‘balanced budget’ is achieved when a country’s 
structural deficit, i.e. its general deficit minus the impact of the economic cycle on government 
spending and revenue, is at 0.5% of GDP or lower. 
15 For the sake of the argument it is assumed that a default of one country was not a realistic 
option for policy-makers in the Eurozone crisis due to the risks of contagion effects in the 




since governments of EMU member states have no direct control over the 
common currency or the ECB, both currency devaluation and unilateral 
expansionary monetary policy are impossible. Effectively this leaves austerity 
as the only feasible instrument in the adjustment process. In addition, the fact 
that the pre-OMT ECB is unable to act as a lender of last resort that provides 
EMU member states with liquidity to service their debt gives rise to the threat 
that even member states with healthy public finances may face a solvency crisis 
as a result of a simple liquidity crisis, which exacerbates the need for immediate 
austerity measures (De Grauwe 2013). 
 
Despite the ideational and institutional factors contributing to the primacy of 
austerity as the dominant policy response to the Eurozone crisis, creditor 
countries could have softened the need for fiscal consolidation in the Eurozone 
periphery through expansionary fiscal policy of their own. In other words, 
internal devaluation in the debtor countries could have been offset to some 
degree by inter revaluation in the creditor countries, particularly those with 
large current account surpluses such as Germany. This approach would have 
likely resulted in a lower loss of output and moderated the severity of the 
austerity measures in the debtor countries. The refusal by the creditors to do 
so, and in turn chart a course of fiscal consolidation, themselves, was due to 
three factors: (1) a misdiagnosis of the sovereign debt crises in the periphery 
as crises of competitiveness and government profligacy, (2) the political clout 
of ordo-liberal ideology in Germany, and (3) a lack of political capital in those 
creditor countries that could have otherwise opposed the group of fiscal hawks 
led by Germany. 
 
For the political elite in Northern European countries, and most importantly 
Germany, the crisis in Southern Europe and Ireland was the result of profligate 
governments that aside from overspending had failed to implement structural 




2013). This was fuelled by the powerful narrative, dominant mainly among 
German conservative politicians, that the economic success of Germany in the 
recent years was due to the sweeping labour market and fiscal reforms 
implemented by the Schröder government in the early 2000s, leading the 
country from being the ‘sick man of Europe’ to its economic powerhouse. 
Despite the limited comparability of the German case with the crises in the 
Eurozone debtor countries, German politicians pushed for similar reforms to 
become the cornerstone of the response to the Eurozone crisis (Scharpf 2013, 
134f.). 
 
Ideologically, the misdiagnosis of the crisis and the resulting push for deep 
austerity measures and supply-side reforms was rooted in Ordo-liberalism, the 
German variant of market liberalism (Bonefeld 2012). The fact that Germany 
was the first EU member state to have broken the deficit rule of the Stability 
and Growth Pact in 2003 but now pushed for the strict adherence to fiscal 
rules was entirely in line with this ideological foundation. After what was 
perceived as a painful but necessary reform process, Germany had enshrined 
the so-called ‘Schuldenbremse’ (debt break) in its constitution in 2009, 
prohibiting deficits above 0.35 per cent of GDP. The German political elite, 
however accurately or not, considered the combination of ordo-liberal supply-
side reforms and fiscal discipline the basis for Germany’s more recent economic 
success (see also Mathis and Kutter 2013) and thus inevitably pushed for the 
same ‘bitter medicine’ to be prescribed to the countries struggling in the 
Eurozone crisis. Naturally, this approach also entailed a strong punitive 
component rooted in the notion of moral hazard as conservative German 
politicians sought to make an example of countries like Greece in order to deter 
future fiscal sinners (Dullien and Guérot 2012; Gocaj and Meunier 2013) rather 
than easing these countries’ adjustment burden by expanding their own fiscal 





Lastly, member states with diverging ideological affinities that would have 
otherwise carried enough clout to oppose the course charted by the ordo-liberal 
coalition under German stewardship, most importantly France, lacked the 
political capital to seriously push for alternative policy options. The Sarkozy-
Fillon government had already given in to the austerity paradigm by 2011, 
mainly to preserve its “cherished AAA status” (Clift and Ryner 2014, 146). 
Once elected, Socialist president Hollande ultimately continued on the path of 
austerity despite having run on a platform to renegotiate the tightened fiscal 
rules of the Fiscal Compact and being critical of the austerity-heavy crisis 
response in Europe (BBC 2012). This was mainly due to (1) powerful political 
elites in the Treasury, the Banque de France, and the Budget Ministry pushing 
for a continuation of the ‘sound money’ policies charted by Sarkozy (Bezes and 
Le Lidec 2015), (2) an almost prophylactic response to the fears of rising bond 
yields with markets being traditionally more distrusting French Socialist 
governments (Clift and Ryner 2014), and (3) domestic and internal party 
opposition (Clift 2014). 
 
Effectively, the combination of these ideological, institutional, and political 
factors left policy makers in EMU member states with large-scale and 
immediate austerity measures as the only option to tackle the intensifying 
sovereign debt crisis despite the fact that their procyclicality would further 
hamper economic growth. However, fiscal consolidation can be achieved by 
both cutting public expenditure and increasing tax revenues. On the basis of 
the above-outlined economic policy consensus that the European integration 
project has so far followed, it is clear that expenditure cuts would take priority 
over tax increases given the limited role assigned to the state in Washington-
Consensus-style economic orthodoxy (Stiglitz 2008) as well as the unpopularity 





1.2.2 The distributive effects of fiscal consolidation measures – a 
review of the economic literature 
Having established the political context of the austerity measures implemented 
in response to the Eurozone crisis, this section serves as a review of the existing 
economic and political economy literature on the distributive effects of such 
measures. In the past, research on phases of fiscal adjustment has largely 
focused on the determinants of success of the adjustment efforts. Much work 
has therefore been done in particular since the early 1990s on the effects of 
different variables of fiscal adjustment programmes, such as their size and 
composition. Most prominently, Alesina & Perotti (1995; 1996) and 
McDermott & Wescott (1996) show that expenditure-focused fiscal 
consolidation programmes, i.e. programmes that rely heavily on cutting 
government spending rather than increasing taxes, have a higher likelihood of 
success as well as being more sustainable fiscally in the long run. 
 
The effects of such programmes on economic inequality, however, have only 
recently begun to climb further up on the research agenda. Studies in the past 
have distinguished between fiscal adjustment programmes in advanced 
economies, in which such programmes were implemented by national 
governments, and developing economies, usually as a condition for financial 
assistance from the IMF.  
 
With regard to fiscal adjustment programmes in advanced economies, Agnello 
& Sousa (2014) analyse 18 industrialised countries from 1978 to 2009. Their 
study finds that periods of fiscal consolidation correlate with significant 
increases in income inequality. Of particular relevance to the analysis at hand 
is the finding that the composition of fiscal adjustment programmes is vital for 
their impact on income inequality: the authors show that spending cuts lead 




government revenues, such as tax increases, seem to compress the income 
distribution. This is plausible given that spending cuts usually include cuts in 
social expenditure, which leads to less redistribution of market income. 
Increases in revenues through higher taxes, on the other hand, tend to move 
within an already progressive tax system, which expands its ordinarily 
inequality-reducing nature.  A different study by Ball et al. (2013) analysing 
17 OECD countries over the same period finds that both expenditure-based 
and revenue-based consolidation programmes have inequality-increasing 
effects, although the effects are more pronounced for expenditure-based 
measures. Woo et al. (2013) confirm this for the same sample and time period 
in addition to finding that, by altering the composition of the fiscal 
consolidation measures with regard to the progressivity of tax reforms and 
targeted social benefits, the inequality-increasing effects of the fiscal 
consolidation measures can be offset to a certain degree. 
 
With regard to phases of fiscal adjustment in developing economies as part of 
a programme supervised by a supranational institution, Oberdabernig (2013) 
analyses the distributional effects of IMF programmes in 86 countries between 
1982 and 2009. The study finds that, in the majority of cases, the programme 
implementation was significantly correlated with an increase in income 
inequality as well as poverty. However, the study includes one important 
qualification ascertaining that from 2000 onwards, this trend is reversed and 
IMF programmes between 2000 and 2009 correlate with falling levels of 
inequality and poverty. This coincides with the adoption of the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) by the IMF, although the author 
stresses that the analysis does not provide a clear confirmation that the PRGF 
in fact caused the change in the distributive effects of IMF programmes. 
 
Political economy accounts of how austerity measures affect inequality point 




to lead to higher inequality. Beyond large-n quantitative studies observing the 
correlation of austerity measures and income inequality, political economists 
add that different groups in the economy are affected differently depending on 
their socio-economic preconditions. Some groups are more likely to carry the 
burden of fiscal adjustment. Building on the work of Simmons (1994) and 
Gourevitch (1986), Matthijs (2016) argues that austerity measures tend to have 
a deflationary effect and thus disproportionately hurt debtors, whose debts 
increase in real value, and those relying largely on wages for their income who 
might “suffer either through lower nominal wages, […] cuts in benefits, less 
generous government services, or higher unemployment.” As these people tend 
to be in the lower part of the income distribution, the argument is that fiscal 
adjustment based on austerity increases inequality. 
 
Another insightful account of the distributive effects of austerity in a European 
context provided by Matthijs (2016) comes from an application of Hacker and 
Pierson’s winner-take-all politics (2010). The most important element of this 
line of argument is based on the notion of policy drift, which refers to 
institutional change brought about by leaving policies unchanged regardless of 
shifting circumstances, often to the benefit or detriment of certain economic 
actors. In the context of European austerity, this rests on the work of 
McNamara (1998) who has described European monetary (and by extension 
also fiscal) policy, characterised by favouring low-inflation policies and strict 
fiscal rules, as the product of an elite-based consensus built around neoliberal 
ideas. In the Eurozone crisis, this resulted in systematically favouring the 
interests of capital over labour, which further exacerbates inequality (Cioffi 
and Dubin 2016; Fourcade 2013; Matthijs 2016). 
 
The literature shows that, based on past findings, increases in the levels of 
income inequality can be expected during and after phases of fiscal adjustment. 




heavily on expenditure cuts rather than revenue-increasing measures. This is 
of particular importance for the analysis at hand for two reasons. Firstly, the 
findings imply a trade-off between the higher likelihood of success and 
sustainability of fiscal adjustment programmes on the one hand and progressive 
distributional outcomes on the other, since the former requires relying on 
expenditure-cuts, while the latter is jeopardised by those exact expenditure 
cuts. Secondly, beyond the higher likelihood of success ascribed to expenditure 
cuts, it is also in line with the economic policy consensus that has emerged as 
part of the European integration project to favour such measures over tax 
increases. This points to austerity measures in the European context being 
particularly likely to increase inequality.  
 
1.2.3 Policy making in hard times – an alternative view to the 
distributive effects of fiscal consolidation measures 
The accounts presented in the previous section provide a rather clear empirical 
case for a positive correlation of phases of fiscal consolidation and rising levels 
of income inequality. However, these studies hint that there can be exceptions 
as is demonstrated by the findings regarding IMF programmes in the post-2000 
period. Specifically, it seems that the trade-off between the higher likelihood of 
success and the more adverse distributive effects of expenditure-based fiscal 
consolidation programmes can be circumvented to some degree and that 
inequality reductions can in fact be achieved in spite of an expenditure-based 
approach to fiscal consolidation if designed accordingly. The following unpacks 
this argument further. 
 
To recall, fiscal consolidation can be achieved through a combination of 
measures that either cut public expenditure or increase tax revenues. This 
means that, at least theoretically, there is no reason that austerity measures 




lowering benefits for higher income groups such as high pension earners, cutting 
salaries for high-paid public sector employees, or introducing means-testing 
elements to e.g. childcare benefits or unemployment benefits thereby limiting 
higher income groups’ access to such benefits. At the same time, tax increases 
can easily be designed in a progressive manner that shifts the tax burden 
towards higher income groups, particularly through higher income tax rates or 
increased taxes on wealth, property, assets, capital income, or inheritance. In 
fact, such measures may even be more likely to achieve the goal of consolidating 
public budgets and lowering the deficit simply because there is a greater savings 
potential if higher income groups are targeted (Callan et al. 2011). 
 
This has important implications that stand in opposition to the determinism 
suggested by the studies cited in the previous part of this section: There is an 
element of choice as to how policy makers specifically design fiscal consolidation 
measures, which has a crucial bearing on how these measures affect the income 
distribution. Indeed, fiscal consolidation measures can in reality take on many 
shapes and forms suggesting different “varieties of austerity” (Farnsworth and 
Irving 2012) that go beyond the recommendations that can be deduced from 
the economic literature regarding the optimal composition of austerity 
measures and the mere balance between expenditure- and tax-based measures. 
With regard to the implications for the welfare state and its redistributive 
functions, there is in fact evidence that crises and the political realignment 
they bring about “are as likely to widen the scope for progressive welfare state-
building as they are to diminish it” and that “how states respond is a matter 
of […] political choice” (Farnsworth and Irving 2011, 278). 
 
We know for instance that the immediate responses to the European sovereign 
debt crisis following the GFC were rather varied in different countries (see e.g. 
Schelkle 2012). Although over time, harsh and comprehensive austerity 




to cope with elevated levels of government debt (Bermeo and Pontusson 2012, 
27), this rested on different conceptualisations of austerity (Bremer and 
McDaniel 2019; Finseraas and Vernby 2011). In other words, despite the fact 
that austerity appears to have been inevitable for countries facing a sovereign 
debt crisis, the exact design of the reform measures was not predetermined by 
economic necessity. 
 
Given the wide variety of austerity measures and that their effects on the 
income distribution seem to depend crucially on their design, it seems 
inaccurate to predict that austerity programmes will have certain 
predetermined distributive outcomes. A survey of different planned European 
austerity packages conducted at the onset of the sovereign debt crisis confirms 
this, showing that the programmes indeed vary to the extent that their likely 
overall distributive effects were expected to range from largely regressive to 
mostly progressive depending on their design (Theodoropoulou and Watt 
2011). Research building on ex-ante microsimulations point in a similar 
direction showing that austerity measures in different European countries can 
in fact have rather ambiguous distributive effects and are far from 
unequivocally inequality-increasing. Specifically, a number of countries 
implemented or announced to implement austerity measures to inequality-
reducing effects by for instance raising taxes on higher incomes or restricting 
the access of high-income individuals and households to certain benefits while 
expanding them for less affluent households (Callan et al. 2011; Sutherland et 
al. 2013; Perez and Matsaganis 2018). The argument presented in this thesis 
speaks to and joins a growing body of research that is critical of the 
deterministic view of the distributive effects of austerity measures.  
 
The argument that is presented here is of course not a new one. A large body 
of research building on Gourevitch’s seminal work on Politics in Hard Times 




times of crisis. This paper does not seek to contribute to the debate on whether 
it is indeed politics or rather economic necessity that dominates policy choice. 
Instead it focuses on the element of choice itself in proposing a 
counterhypothesis to the findings in the literature presented in the previous 
part of this section regarding the distributive effects of fiscal consolidation 
measures. In fact, as Gourevitch reminds us, “the moments of greatest freedom 
are crisis points [while] choices are more constrained in stable times” 
(Gourevitch 1986, 240). The impact of the choices made by policy makers in 
such times of crisis is thus perhaps larger or at least more obviously visible 
than during times of stability. These choices should therefore be at the centre 
of the analysis of how comprehensive economic adjustment programmes affect 
the income distribution: Rather than equating a particular composition of 
austerity measures, i.e. whether they are expenditure- or revenue-based, or 
even the sheer presence of fiscal consolidation measures per se with certain 
distributive effects, an alternative view is therefore that austerity measures 
have varying distributive effects depending on their exact design. The design 
in turn is a reflection of policy makers’ aims and preferences regarding how the 
consolidation burden is to be shared among different income groups on the 
basis of which they formulate choices regarding the reform design. 
 
1.2.4 Research question and hypotheses 
The paper’s central aims are to measure and explain the distributive effects of 
austerity measures in the Eurozone crisis. A review of the existing literature 
shows that there are some discrepancies between different empirical accounts: 
On the one hand, a number of studies have found austerity measures to be 
associated with increases in income inequality. Moreover, these studies show 
that increases in income inequality are especially large when austerity is based 
on cutting government expenditure rather than increasing taxes. This is 




state’s capacity to redistribute market incomes which is of particular relevance 
during a recession where a larger share of the population relies on benefit 
payments. Conversely, tax increases are likely to move within an already 
progressive tax system, thus enhancing the inequality-reducing effects of such 
measures. On the other hand, there seem to be exceptions, such as austerity 
programmes administered by the IMF in the post-2000 period.  
 
Other accounts argue that austerity, i.e. the need to consolidate public budgets, 
has no inherent distributive effects in one or the other direction since both 
expenditure cuts and tax increases can be designed in a way that they either 
increase or lower inequality by distributing the adjustment burden accordingly. 
Accepting this premise assumes that policy makers have a choice in how they 
design such measures and that the effects of austerity programmes on 
inequality depend on the aims and preferences of the policy makers involved in 
the adjustment process. On this basis, the paper formulates the following 
competing hypotheses regarding the distributive effects of austerity 
programmes: 
 
H1: Austerity measures increase income inequality. The exact 
effects are determined by the composition of the programmes 
with expenditure-based programmes being more likely to 
increase inequality than tax-based programmes. 
 
H2: Austerity measures have no predetermined distributive effects 
based on their composition. Instead, the particular design of 
the reform measures determine how they impact inequality, 
which in turn depends on how policy makers choose to 




preferences are thus key to understanding the distributive 
effects of austerity measures. 
 
1.3 Research Design 
1.3.1 Measuring inequality – a review of commonly used indicators 
Many attempts have been made in the past to develop an indicator that 
satisfactorily measures income inequality16. However, as all of those indicators 
fall short of satisfying the entirety of the desired properties of an inequality 
indicator (Anand 1984; Shorrocks 1988), the indicator that emerged as the 
most commonly used, mostly due to its high ease of interpretation, is the Gini 
coefficient, which is in turn based on the Lorenz curve. This paper uses the 
Gini coefficient as the prime indicator for income inequality. 
 
Visually, the Gini coefficient is calculated by dividing the area between the 
Lorenz curve and the 45° line of equality by the area below the line of equality, 
with the Lorenz curve plotting the cumulative proportions of income of the 
poorest x% of the population, for different values of x. The Gini coefficient 
therefore always takes values between 0 and 1, where 0 denotes absolute 
equality and 1 describing an extreme case where one person (or household, etc., 
depending on the measurement unit) earns all the income (Cowell 2011). In 
this analysis, the Gini coefficient is calculated on the basis of equivalised 
disposable household incomes. This is because market income, i.e. income 
before taxes and benefits, does not capture a state’s redistributive efforts, which 
is the central object of analysis in this paper, and the household, rather than 
the individual, is the unit that redistributive policies in the tax-benefit system 
 
16 For more detailed discussions of various advantages and shortcomings of different inequality 
indicators see Anand (1983); Atkinson (1970); Foster & Sen (1997); Foster(1985); Kakwani 




are based on. The Gini coefficient is calculated annually by aggregating 
monthly data.  
 
However, while the Gini coefficient is a good measure for changes in the middle 
of the income distribution, it is rather insensitive towards changes at the 
bottom and top ends of the income distribution. The analysis based on the 
Gini coefficient is therefore complemented with the S80/S20 ratio, which is 
calculated by dividing the aggregate income of the top quintile of the income 
distribution by the income of the bottom quintile. The S80/S20 ratio has 
emerged as a commonly used addition to the Gini coefficient in measuring 
inequality because it is particularly sensitive towards changes at the tails of 
the income distribution thus cancelling out the methodological weaknesses of 
the Gini coefficient. Equivalent to the Gini coefficient, the calculations are 
based on annual equivalised disposable household incomes. 
 
1.3.2 Presentation of the datasets  
The inequality levels measured by the Gini coefficient presented here are based 
on microdata from the Survey of Income and Living Conditions carried out by 
Eurostat (EU-SILC). This dataset provides a range of social indicators, 
including poverty, income, social exclusion, and living conditions. The data are 
collected in the year after the reference period.17  In most countries, data 
collection is based on household surveys, however, a small number of countries 
rely on a combination of administrative registers and representative interviews 
with household members (Iacovou, Kaminska, and Levy 2012). While it must 
be stated that these differences in the collection process and the sampling 
procedure create minor issues of comparability between different countries, it 
is the most accurate and comprehensive dataset that exists for the analysis of 
 
17 Exceptions are the UK and Ireland, where data are collected during the reference period, 




income inequality in the EU, and is widely used in academic research. The data 
from the EU-SILC waves provide information on household disposable income 
on a monthly level, which is aggregated to an annual level, and equivalised 
through the ‘modified OECD equivalence scale’ to account for different 
household sizes. 
 
The analysis in this paper is complemented by findings based on European tax-
benefit microsimulation tool EUROMOD administered through the University 
of Essex. Microsimulation tools are frequently used by researchers to account 
for time lags in the data availability. They allow calculations of household 
incomes based on previous waves of household income survey data 
(EUROMOD is based on EU-SILC data) by adjusting future household 
incomes depending among other things on changes in the tax-benefit system. 
This is done by making use of additional data provided by national statistical 
offices and other institutions like central banks, accounting for distortionary 
effects, such as earnings growth (Bank of Greece 2013), tax evasion 
(Matsaganis, Leventi, and Flevotomou 2012), rise in unemployment (Figari et 
al. 2010), and non-take-up of social benefits (Matsaganis and Leventi 2014, 
213). EUROMOD has been validated on both micro and macro level and tested 
in various applications (for further reading see Bargain 2006; Sutherland and 
Figari 2013). In recent years, EUROMOD analyses have found their way into 
the mainstream of economic policy analysis not just in academia but also in 
policy making cycles, as illustrated by a number of European Commission 
publications referred to by then-Commissioner for for Employment, Social 
Affairs and Inclusion, László Andor (2013). 
 
For the context of this paper, the advantages of using tax-benefit 
microsimulation tools go further than filling time lag-induced gaps in the data. 
As EUROMOD contains all tax-benefit policies of a given EU country in a 




By changing the policies in the model and applying it to the same income data, 
it is possible to assess the effects that particular policy reforms such as changes 
in unemployment benefits or pensions have on an individual’s or household’s 
income and, by aggregating these figures, the overall income distribution in a 
given year. This in turn enables the use of indicators such as the Gini coefficient 
to capture the distributive impacts of policy measures against a counterfactual 
scenario that can be constructed with EUROMOD where said policy changes 
are absent (Duclos and Araar 2006; Reynolds and Smolensky 1977). For the 
scope of this paper, this is particularly valuable because it allows to exclude 
the effects that the recession had on income inequality through e.g. increased 
unemployment and thus isolate and quantify the exact distributive effects of 
the policy reforms. 
 
In this context, it needs to be stated that while the analysis with EUROMOD 
provides useful additions to the analysis of survey data, it is restricted to ‘first-
order’ distributive effects of policies. The concept of first-order distributive 
effects relates to direct effects of policy reforms on the income distribution, e.g. 
the direct effects of a reform in the tax-system on the different income deciles. 
This excludes ‘second-order’ distributive effects, which affect inequality 
indirectly through other factors such as employment. This gains importance in 
cases where policy reforms have sufficiently large effects to change the economic 
outlook of a country, e.g. if a reform in unemployment benefits affects gross 
incomes in such a way that aggregate demand falls sufficiently to trigger a 
further increase in unemployment, this will affect inequality in addition to the 
direct effects the reform had in the first place. However, preliminary results of 
studies that are working on resolving this issue indicate that second-order 
effects are not necessarily large enough to offset first-order effects (see e.g. 
Paetzold and Tiefenbacher 2018). Moreover, it is unclear that second-order 
effects would inevitably be unidirectional, as the reforms are ultimately aimed 




employment, particularly when compared to a possible scenario without 
reforms18. 
 
1.3.3 Case selection 
Section 1.2 of this paper has shown that, on the one hand, there is a consensus 
in the economic literature that expenditure-based fiscal consolidation is more 
sustainable than revenue-based consolidation and, on the other hand, an 
expenditure-based approach to the consolidation efforts in the Eurozone crisis 
is also in line with the economic policy consensus of EU policy-makers. 
Consulting the Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) that preceded the EAPs 
yields that the policy makers of the Troika and the national authorities agreed 
on a course of action that strongly reflects these expectations. Outlining the 
planned policy reforms to achieve the intended fiscal consolidation, both the 
MoU of the Greek and the Portuguese programmes contain a similar focus on 
expenditure-based fiscal consolidation measures. In fact, both MoU stipulate 
that the fiscal consolidation effort would be based on expenditure cuts by a 
ratio of 2:1 vis-à-vis revenue-increasing measures (see Figure 3).  
 
In that sense, based on the economic literature on the effects of expenditure-
based fiscal consolidation programmes, it would be reasonable to expect similar 




18 For an insightful discussion of how structural reforms affect the distribution of incomes see 




Figure 3: Projected austerity measures prescribed in the MoU per 
year, as % of GDP 
 
 
Sources: Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece (European Commission 2010a), and 
Portugal (European Commission 2011c). 
 
However, both in the case of Greece and Portugal, the Troika was faced with 
unforeseen circumstances during the implementation phase of the EAPs, which 
caused them to change some of the prescribed policy measures from the original 
MoU. In the Greek case, a much deeper recession than anticipated wiped out 
a quarter of the Greek economy throughout the duration of the crisis, which 





























expected. On this basis, the targets of the fiscal consolidation effort in the first 
EAP were revised repeatedly and substantially, and a second programme was 
set up in 2012.19 The general strategy of basing the consolidation effort largely 
on expenditure-based measures, however, was maintained since the beginning 
of the adjustment process: The Troika’s response to Greece missing its fiscal 
targets in 2010, 2011, and 2012 was in fact to demand further efforts to close 
fiscal gaps in earlier years through ever deeper spending cuts. When additional 
revisions became necessary in subsequent years, the reform prescriptions were 
again corrected in scale but maintained the 2:1 expenditure-revenue-ratio.20 
 
By comparison, the Portuguese programme was initially met with fewer 
difficulties not least due to the relatively smaller downturn of the Portuguese 
economy. However, while the overall budget consolidation targets were met, 
the implemented reforms departed substantively from the strategy outlined in 
the Portuguese MoU and those employed in the Greek case regarding the 
composition of the budget consolidation measures: Because a large part of the 
consolidation effort in Portugal was initially based on one-off measures, the 
Troika shifted their focus to ensuring more sustainable consolidation measures 
after 2011. In doing so, it became evident that cuts in government expenditure 
 
19 It also became evident that the strategy of outlining general long-term policy prescriptions 
and fiscal consolidation targets was not productive amid the deterioration of the 
macroeconomic environment and the Troika abandoned it in favour of continuously updated 
medium-term fiscal strategies (MTFS). 
20 The second revision of the first EAP in December 2010 brought the first wave of additional 
measures that amounted to an additional 2.5% of GDP in 2011, bringing up the consolidation 
effort to 5.7% of GDP in that year, and an additional 5% throughout 2012-2014, two thirds of 
which were to be expenditure-based. In mid-2011 the Greek government adopted the first 
Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS) outlining the details of the increased consolidation 
targets for 2012-2014. However, already later in that year, it became evident that the additional 
austerity measures were not enough to meet the fiscal target for 2012, resulting in heavier 
frontloading of those measures agreed-on in October 2011. In total, the consolidation effort in 
2010 and 2011 amounted to 8.4% and 7.7% of GDP respectively, with another 5.5% planned 
for 2012. After the second EAP was agreed-on and the adjustment period for Greece extended 
by two years, the MTFS for 2013-2016 was adopted, including savings of 7.2% of GDP over 
2013-2014, only 1.9% of which was revenue-based. From 2014 onwards, fiscal consolidation 




were difficult to enforce given a number strong veto points in Portugal’s 
political system. In particular, the Portuguese constitutional court rejected 
several of the reforms the Troika had pushed for (Cisotta and Gallo 2014; 
Moury and Standring 2017). At the same time it became apparent that 
revenue-increasing measures were more effective in achieving fiscal 
consolidation than initially assumed. This led to both the Portuguese 
government and with some delay the Troika officially abandoning the objective 
of a two thirds expenditure-based programme by 2013. The measures 
implemented throughout the Portuguese programme were overall much more 
revenue-based than both the measures envisioned in the MoU, and the 
measures implemented in the Greek EAPs. In fact, by the end of the 
Portuguese EAP, revenue-based measures were more than twice as large as 
initially planned in the MoU (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Revenue-based measures in the MoU vs. actually 
implemented measures, per year, in billion € 
 
Sources: Ex Post Evaluation of the Portuguese EAP (European Commission 2016) 
 
Against this evidence, a comparative case study of the distributive effects of 
the Greek and the Portuguese programmes makes sense: As the literature 














consolidation are more likely to result in increases in inequality than tax-based 
programmes, the Greek EAPs can be expected to result in higher levels of 
inequality. With regard to the specific distributive effects of a more heavily 
revenue-based programme such as the Portuguese, there is some disagreement 
in the literature on the distributive effects of revenue-based fiscal consolidation 
phases, which are taken to either result in lower overall levels of inequality, or 
smaller inequality increases than expenditure-based fiscal consolidation efforts. 
This suggests that the Portuguese programme would be more progressive than 
the Greek EAPs, although no predictions can be made regarding its precise 
distributive effects.  
 
1.3.4 Methodological approach  
The empirical analysis for the two case study countries is divided into three 
parts. In the first part, income inequality levels measured by the Gini 
coefficient and the S80/S20 ratio based on EU-SILC microdata are calculated 
for the years of the programme duration in Greece and Portugal, as well as the 
years preceding the crisis. This analysis is completed with a comparison of 
levels of inequality measured by the Gini coefficient of disposable household 
incomes with inequality of market incomes, i.e. incomes of households before 
transfers through taxes and benefits (including pensions). This exercise serves 
as an approximation for the redistributive capacities of the welfare state of the 
two case study countries. 
 
The above-described analysis provides a comprehensive picture of how 
inequality as well as redistribution have developed throughout the duration of 
the Greek and Portuguese EAPs. However, income inequality is influenced by 
a variety of different factors, which is why the second part of the section 
provides supporting data created with EUROMOD which isolates all of these 




implemented as part of the EAPs. This is done by comparing income inequality 
levels measured by the Gini coefficient under a reform scenario and a simulated 
counterfactual scenario. In the reform scenario, the effects of all policy reforms 
that were implemented as part of the Greek and Portuguese EAPs are 
measured. In the counterfactual scenario, the tax-benefit systems of both 
Greece and Portugal are held constant from the year prior to the respective 
programme inception and applied to the same annual income data as the reform 
scenario for the duration of the EAPs. In the Greek case, the counterfactual 
scenario is built on the tax benefit system of 2009 (the year before the first 
Greek EAP began), which is applied to the available years of the programme 
implementation (2010 through 2017). In the Portuguese case tax-benefit 
policies from 2010 are applied to simulate their distributive effects in the years 
of the Portuguese EAP (2011 through 2014). 
 
The third part turns to qualitative evidence in order to corroborate the 
quantitative findings. Based on the two competing hypotheses outlined in 
section 2, the distributive effects of austerity measures in the EAPs are 
expected to either be predetermined by their composition (H1) or defined by 
the aims and preferences according to which policy makers designed the reform 
measures (H2). Therefore, the third part of the empirical section scrutinises 
relevant policy documents such as the EAPs and the Memoranda of 
Understanding in which the Troika and domestic governments outline their 
reform proposals and targets. Moreover, the post-programme evaluation 
reports provided by the European Commission and the IMF are analysed. The 
purpose of this exercise is to identify the aims formulated by the Troika 
institutions regarding the desired distributive effects of the reform 
prescriptions. Secondary evidence such as interviews with policy makers in the 
Troika institutions is drawn upon to take account of the fact that the three 
institutions may have had diverging preferences and aims that are insufficiently 




1.4 Empirical Analysis 
1.4.1 The development of income inequality in the Eurozone 
The analysis of EU-SILC data yields two major findings (see Figure 5 and 
Figure 6): Firstly, inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient of disposable 
household incomes has all but stagnated with only minor fluctuations in both 
countries. Some qualifications need to be made at this point: (1) in Greece, 
there is some increase in the Gini coefficient of disposable household income 
between 2010 and 2012, after which inequality remains constant for the 
following years. Compared to earlier years, inequality levels during the Greek 
EAPs stay at similar levels. (2) In Portugal, inequality of disposable household 
income remains constant from the beginning of the EAP onwards. However, 
the downward trend that inequality levels had been following in the years prior 
to the beginning of the EAP was interrupted. (3) The results for Greece are 
corroborated using the S80/S20 ratio as a second inequality indicator, which 
follows a similar trend. For the Portuguese case, the S80/S20 ratio shows 
increases in the years 2011-2013. This trend, however, began in the year 2010 
and thus predated the inception of the EAP. It was only in the last year of the 
EAP that the S80/S20 ratio fell again. In absolute terms, the S80/S20 ratio 
remained below pre-2008 levels throughout the entire duration of the EAP. 
The changes in the S80/S20 ratio suggest that there have been changes at the 
tails of the income distribution that are not picked up by the Gini coefficient. 
 
Secondly, inequality of market household incomes, i.e. household incomes 
before taxes and transfers, has increased substantially with the inception of the 
EAPs in both Greece and Portugal. While this can be attributed to the 
recession and rising unemployment, it is somewhat surprising in conjunction 
with the previous finding of stagnating levels of disposable income inequality. 




representing the percentage difference between inequality of market and 
disposable household income. In the Greek case this difference has increased 
from 33% in the year before the EAP began (2009) to 43% from 2013 onwards. 
In the Portuguese case, the difference increased from 33% in 2010 to 47% by 
the time the programme had been concluded (2014). In other words, in both 
cases redistribution rose sufficiently to offset almost the entirety of the 
increases in market income inequality induced by the recession. 
  
Based on these findings, it follows that the increases in inequality as expected 
from the review of the economic literature described in section 2 of this paper 
failed to materialise. This is true for both the Greek and the Portuguese case. 
In addition, the growing gap between market and disposable household income 
inequality shows that the redistributive functions of the welfare state have 
remained intact in both Greece and Portugal. In fact, more income has been 
redistributed throughout the duration of the EAPs than in the years prior to 
that. Moreover, considering the different composition of the Greek and 
Portuguese EAPs, the data show that both the strongly expenditure-based 
fiscal consolidation efforts in Greece, and the revenue-based consolidation in 
Portugal, were accompanied by remarkably similar outcomes regarding 
inequality of disposable household incomes and the redistribution of incomes 











Sources: Eurostat (EU-SILC survey [ilc_di12; ilc_di12b]). 
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Sources: Eurostat (EU-SILC survey). 
 
1.4.2 Different starting points? The differences in welfare state 
architecture and redistributive capacities of Greece and Portugal 
The data presented above underscore the importance of using additional 
techniques to measure the precise distributional impact of the reforms for 
reasons outlined as follows. First, the question emerges whether the Greek and 
Portuguese welfare states are comparable or whether they differ so starkly in 
their architecture and redistributive capacity that measuring the distributive 
5.8 6.1 6.0 5.9 5.8 5.6
6.0






























effects of the reform efforts would be a moot point, if the starting points going 
into the adjustment process were simply too different. The vast literature on 
the welfare state shows that the architectures of the Greek and Portuguese 
welfare states, indeed, show some important differences that can be traced back 
to diverging modernisation trajectories of the two welfare states (Hemerijck 
2013). First, however, both welfare states underwent a first expansion of social 
policy after democratisation, respectively the fall of the Greek military junta 
and establishment of the Third Hellenic Republic in 1975 and the end of the 
Salazar-Caetano dictatorship and subsequent adoption of the Portuguese 
Constitution in 1976 (Bermeo 2000; Ferrera 2010). These events resulted in a 
maturation of the two welfare states that strongly resembled the Continental 
welfare regimes in that they promoted the male breadwinner model (Gosta 
Esping-Andersen 1990) with only a marginal role for family benefits albeit with 
the important difference to their continental counterparts that old age pensions 
received an immense prioritisation thus constituting the distinct Southern 
European welfare regime (Ferrera 1996; 2005; 2010). This left more 
traditionally redistributive measures such as unemployment benefits and those 
targeted at the poor underdeveloped well into the 1980s (Matsaganis et al. 
2003). 
 
Portugal, already more advanced than Greece, and, in fact, most Southern 
European countries, with regard to female labour market participation 
experienced a further push for welfare state modernisation upon entering the 
EU in 1986 and through the 1990s and 2000s resulting in for instance the 
introduction of a minimum income scheme in 1997. In Greece similar 
modernisation efforts since the 1980s were met with more resistance, especially 
regarding the modernisation of its already then unsustainable and regressive 
pension system (Matsaganis 2005). Accession to the newly formed European 
Economic and Monetary Union in 2001 ushered in a further period of high 




modernisation a further push the convergence of Greek bond yields and easy 
access to credit for Greek governments led to further inertia (Spanou and 
Sotiropoulos 2011) leaving the country lagging behind its Southern European 
partners (Guillén and Petmesidou 2008). 
 
Despite these diverging historical trajectories, when comparing the spending 
levels on different items of social policy in Greece and Portugal, there are more 
similarities than differences, especially at the point of the eve of the European 
sovereign debt crisis in 2009. Figure 7 illustrates the following: Between 1990 
and 2009, the Greek and Portuguese welfare states grew in relatively similar 
terms, with Greece starting at a higher absolute spending level and showing 
somewhat slower growth than Portugal. By 2009, the overall size of the welfare 
state was similar in both countries, with 23.9% of GDP in Greece and 24.5% 
of GDP in Portugal, although it should be noted in this context that absolute 
social expenditure always fluctuates, firstly as GDP grows (since we are 
measuring the various spending items as a percentage of GDP), and secondly 
with the business cycle depending on for instance unemployment and the 
activation of automatic stabilisers. One stark difference between the welfare 
states is spending on old age pensions, which was more than twice the size in 
Greece compared to Portugal in 1990 (9% of GDP compared to 4% of GDP). 
This difference shrank substantially through 2009 (11.2% of GDP in Greece 
compared to 10.2% of GDP in Portugal). Compared to the two largest 
branches, old age pensions and health, spending on for instance unemployment 
benefits, which tends to be more directly redistributive, is small in both 
countries (as is the case in virtually all mature welfare states), although smaller 
still in Greece. Overall, there appears to be a convergence across the different 
branches of the welfare state over time in both countries with spending 
















































































































Figure 8: Differences in social expenditure by branch between Greece 
and Portugal in per cent of GDP 
 
Sources: OECD (Social Expenditure Database). 
Note: Positive values indicate a higher level of expenditure in Greece compared to Portugal. 
 
Importantly, pure spending on different branches of the welfare state says little 
about how redistributive the effects of the various policies under these branches 
are. In order to compare how redistributive the Greek and Portuguese welfare 
states have been, the following illustrates the differences between the two 
countries in the Gini coefficient of disposable and market household incomes, 
as well as the difference between the level of redistribution, which is obtained 
by comparing the differences between the Gini coefficients of market and 
disposable household incomes within each country. The data show the years 
between 2005 and 2015, i.e. the years preceding and following the GFC, as well 
as those of the sovereign debt crisis and the economic adjustment process. 
 
Figure 9 illustrates that the differences in how redistributive the Greek and 
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adjustment process, are miniscule 21 . Overall, the variation in the Gini 
coefficient for disposable incomes ranges from 0.002 to 0.03. As the numbers 
for the blue and orange lines are obtained by subtracting the Gini coefficient 
for Portugal from the Gini coefficient for Greece in each year, negative values 
indicate a more equal distribution of incomes in Greece (denoted by a smaller 
Gini coefficient) and positive values a more equal distribution of incomes in 
Portugal in the respective year. The opposite is true for the numbers 
represented by the grey bars, which denote the differences in the degree of 
redistribution between the two countries: Here, the within-country difference 
in the Gini coefficient for market and disposable incomes in Portugal are 
subtracted from the difference in the two indicators for Greece. This means 
that negative values indicate a higher degree of redistribution in Portugal while 
positive values indicate a higher degree of redistribution in Greece. This shows 
that despite the differences in the architecture of the welfare states of Greece 
and Portugal, their redistributive capacities were remarkably similar. Within 
these very small numbers, the Greek welfare state was in fact slightly more 




21 Moreover, market incomes have also been remarkably similarly distributed in both countries 




Figure 9: Differences in redistributive capacities of the Greek and 
Portuguese welfare states 
 
Sources: OECD (Social Expenditure Database). 
Note: Positive values of the Gini coefficient indicate a higher level of inequality in Greece 
compared to Portugal. Positive values of redistribution indicate a higher level of 
redistribution in Greece compared to Portugal. 
 
This data show that possible concerns regarding the comparability of the two 
cases due to different starting points regarding redistributive capacities of the 
welfare states going into the adjustment process cannot be substantiated. 
However, it is crucial that while the data presented above shows how 
redistributive the two welfare states were throughout the adjustment process, 
it is impossible to infer much regarding the distributive effects of the far-
reaching reforms that were implemented as part of this process and the 
Economic Adjustment Programmes in the two countries in particular. This is 
because any such evaluation would have to account for sensible counterfactual 
scenarios. In other words, we would have to know whether inequality patterns 
would have developed differently, in whichever direction, without these 
reforms. This is impossible when only considering microdata for disposable 
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redistributive patterns always move during recessions, even without any 
reforms, at all, as automatic stabilisers kick in to cushion some of the increases 
in inequality of market incomes that are typical for recessions. Therefore, the 
paper turns to the next and indispensable step in the analysis using 
microsimulations in order to measure specifically how incomes would have been 
distributed in the absence of any reforms, leaving all else (e.g. increased 
unemployment and therefore lower incomes in parts of the population due to 
the recession) constant. Doing so effectively isolates the distributive effects of 
the reforms and allows their specific measurement. 
 
1.4.3 A microsimulation approach to assessing the distributive 
effects of fiscal consolidation measures  
 
While the data presented in Figure 10 and Figure 11 give some valuable insight 
into the interplay between fiscal consolidation and income inequality, showing 
that contrary to the expectations derived from the literature inequality did not 
increase throughout the duration of the EAPs, these results may have been 
caused by a number of different factors. It is thus too early to evaluate either 
of the two hypotheses. The use of microsimulation allows for a more nuanced 
and straight-forward assessment of whether the reforms of the tax-benefit 
systems prescribed in the EAPs did in fact serve to alleviate market-induced 
increases in income inequality during the recession. To that end, this section 
presents a counterfactual scenario constructed with EUROMOD showing “what 
would have happened in the absence of the fiscal consolidation measures” 
(Sutherland et al. 2013, 6). In other words, the counterfactual shows how 
disposable income inequality would have developed, if market incomes in the 
various years throughout the programmes had been redistributed in each year 
through the same tax-benefit system that was in place in the year prior to the 




began (2009 for Greece, 2010 for Portugal). Comparing the differences in the 
income distribution between the reform scenario (i.e. what actually happened) 
and the simulated counterfactual (i.e. what would have happened without the 
reforms), leaving market incomes unchanged in both scenarios, thus effectively 
allows the isolation of the exact distributive effects of the various reforms in 
the tax-benefit system. 
 
This exercise yields that the reform measures in the EAPs did in fact produce 
lower levels of income inequality when compared to the simulated 
counterfactual of unchanged tax-benefit policies from before the EAPs began 
(see Figure 12). The reforms in the Greek EAPs produced a Gini coefficient of 
disposable household income of 6% below that in the counterfactual non-reform 
scenario by the year 2017. The reforms of the Portuguese EAP resulted in a 
Gini coefficient of disposable household income of between 2% and 3% below 
that in the counterfactual between 2012 and 2015. This confirms that the fiscal 
consolidation measures in the EAPs had inequality-reducing effects large 
enough to offset the increases in market income inequality throughout the 
duration of the EAPs. Moreover, the most progressive reforms were 
implemented as part of the Greek EAPs, which stands in opposition to the 
expectations formulated in H1 that expenditure-based fiscal consolidation 






Figure 10: percentage difference of Gini coefficient of disposable 





Sources: Calculations with EUROMOD version H1.0+. 
Note: Negative values indicate a lower Gini coefficient in the reform scenario compared 
with a counterfactual scenario without fiscal policy reforms. 
 
In order to further elaborate on the question of how the composition of 
austerity measures affects the income distribution, the following provides a 
higher level of detail as to how exactly the reforms in the EAPs in Greece and 
Portugal have affected different incomes. For that purpose, this section 
presents data produced with EUROMOD which simulates the effects of 
different classes of policies on each income decile. The data show the percentage 






















Figure 11 these data are presented cumulatively, i.e. as the sums of the annual 
percentage changes in income per decile as a result of the policy reforms. The 
cumulative data do not account for changes in original incomes, which the 
annual percentage changes refer to and therefore needs to be interpreted with 
some care.  
 
For the Greek case the findings include the following: The most progressive, 
i.e. inequality-reducing reform measures have been in the class of means-tested 
benefits. Particularly for the lowest income decile, changes in means-tested 
benefits led to substantive increases in disposable household income vis-à-vis 
the non-reform scenario. The second, third, and fifth decile saw comparatively 
smaller income increases through changes in means-tested benefits. Other 
classes of policy reforms produce mixed distributive outcomes. Changes in 
direct taxation produced progressive income reductions ranging from 5.9% for 
the second decile to 11.2% for the top decile. The lowest income decile is 
exempt from this trend with income reductions of 11.6% as a result of changes 
in direct taxation. 
 
The analysis of the Portuguese EAP yields rather different results compared 
to the Greek EAPs. While changes in means-tested benefits had the largest 
inequality-reducing effect in the Greek case, they had the largest inequality-
increasing effects in the Portuguese case. Lower income deciles saw income 
reductions due to changes in means-tested benefits of 15.2% (bottom decile), 
4% (second decile), and 1.7% (third decile), with income reductions shrinking 
further for all subsequent income deciles. Changes in direct taxation on the 
other hand were progressive with income reductions growing from 0.3% for the 





Beyond the distributive effects of the reforms by policy class, it is striking that 
despite the fact that both the Gini coefficient and the S80/S20 ratio show 
falling or at least stagnating levels of inequality throughout the Portuguese 
EAP, the decomposition by decile reveals the following: Middle income groups 
have remained somewhat shielded from the adverse effects of expenditure cuts 
and tax increases, resulting in an aggregate reduction of incomes for the second 
through to the seventh income deciles of between 4% and 6%. The eighth and 
ninth deciles have seen income losses of between 7% and 9% due to the reforms 
throughout the duration of the EAP. The biggest aggregate losses of incomes 
are registered for the very bottom and top deciles, with the first income decile 
losing 15.7% of their income throughout the EAP as a direct effect of the 
reforms, and the tenth decile losing 12.2%. 
 
Figure 11: percentage change in income due to the reforms in the 
EAPs per decile, by policy class 













































Portugal (cumulative effects 2010-2014) 
 
 
Sources: Calculations with EUROMOD version H1.0+. 
 
Regarding the effects by policy class, it is pertinent to look at one finding from 
the above analysis in more detail, which is that changes in means-tested 
benefits had the largest inequality-reducing effects in Greece, while the opposite 
was the case for Portugal. For that purpose, this section compares spending 
levels on means-tested benefits and non-means-tested benefits in both Greece 
and Portugal (see Figure 12). 
 
The data show that in Greece, government expenditure on means-tested 
benefits increased after the year 2012 to levels above those of 2009. Considering 
that the indexation refers to absolute expenditure levels and that in the same 
period the Greek economy shrank substantially, this signifies a large increase 
in government expenditure on means-tested benefits as a share of GDP. The 
increases in spending on means-tested benefits coincide with inequality-
reducing effects that changes in means-tested benefits had on the income 
distribution measured with EUROMOD. At the same time, spending on non-











































By comparison, spending on means-tested benefits in Portugal dropped to 
almost half of the 2010 spending level by the end of the EAP, whereas spending 
on non-means-tested benefits fluctuated between 10% below and above 2010 
spending levels. This suggests that the inequality-increasing effect of changes 
in means-tested benefits in Portugal stems from a simple reduction in 
government spending on means-tested benefits, the opposite of which was the 
case in Greece, where spending was shifted from non-means-tested to means-
tested benefits. 
 
More generally, these results call into question the notion that the mere 
composition of austerity measures, i.e. whether they are based on expenditure-
cuts or tax hikes, has a substantive bearing on their distributive effects: 
Throughout the adjustment programmes in both Greece and Portugal, total 
spending on non-pension benefits fell to similar levels at 71.8% of the base year 
(Greece) and 71.2% (Portugal) respectively. However, benefit reforms were 
progressive in Greece and regressive in Portugal due to the expansion of means-
tested and cuts in non-means-tested benefits in Greece, while most of the 







Figure 12: Government expenditure on means-tested and non-means-
tested benefits (excluding pensions) 







Sources: Calculations with EUROMOD version H1.0+. 
 
These results suggest that the austerity measures that were part of the EAPs 
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deterministic relationship between austerity measures – and in particular 
expenditure-based measures – and rising levels of income inequality, must be 
rejected. Moreover, the data presented here suggest that the composition of 
austerity measures, i.e. whether the consolidation effort is to be achieved by 
cutting government spending or by raising taxes, seems to be of secondary 
importance for their distributive effects: The heavily expenditure-based Greek 
programmes were found to be more progressive than the more revenue-based 
programmes of Portugal. Rather than their composition, it seems to be the 
exact design of the reforms that is crucial for their distributive effects.  This is 
exemplified particularly by the distributive effects by policy class calculated 
with EUROMOD: Spending cuts on benefits in Portugal had inequality-
increasing effects, while in Greece the opposite was achieved by shifting 
spending from non-means-tested to means-tested benefits while overall 
reducing spending on non-pension benefits. 
 
1.4.4 Limitations of the analysis and how to address them 
1.4.4.a On the merits and shortcomings of microsimulation approaches  
At this point it is important to note that microsimulation approaches to 
measuring the distributive effects of policy reforms inevitably have limitations. 
The following section serves to outline these limitations as well as argue why 
they represent necessary trade-offs of the analysis. Closely connected to the 
limitations of the microsimulation approach are certain limitations regarding 
the way in which inequality is measured and the conclusions that such 
measures yield for the wider assessment of the respective policy reforms’ 
impact. First, microsimulation serves to close a gap left by analysing inequality 
based on household- and individual-level microdata. Drawing on such data to 
infer the effects of certain policy reforms on the income distribution is 
insufficient in that it is confounded by various variables such as the wider 




deep economic recessions – much like those that are the object of study in this 
thesis – and the way in which they impact inequality: If significant parts of the 
working population lose their jobs due to an economic shock, this inevitably 
produces changes in levels of inequality. The exact ways in which this manifests 
depend a number of factors including the respective economy’s welfare state 
and various buffer policies such as unemployment benefits (Atkinson 2009), as 
well as the nature of the economic shock in affecting individuals across the 
board or only those in certain sectors and income groups. Similarly, the unit of 
analysis significantly affects the results produced when measuring income 
inequality during an economic downturn as for instance women and men may 
be affected in different ways, which in turn substantially affects incomes by 
household when compared to individual incomes (Bettio et al. 2012). 
Importantly, these dynamics can move in opposing directions so that it is 
technically unclear in what ways exactly recessions affect inequality (Jenkins 
et al. 2013), although in many cases they go hand in hand with rising levels of 
inequality through the channel of increased unemployment (Nolan 2009). 
 
Microsimulation tools allow to overcome this deficiency by excluding from the 
analysis the effects of the recession. In its essence, analyses based on 
microsimulations do not ask the question ‘what was’ but ‘what would have 
been’ in the absence of certain reforms, which then allows the estimation of the 
reform effects as the difference between the two scenarios (Sutherland and 
Figari 2013). In using such tools, the thesis speaks to and joins a growing group 
of scholars employing microsimulations to estimate precisely the distributive 
effects of different types of reforms (see e.g. De Agostini et al. 2014 and the 
over 500 contributions to the EUROMOD working paper series). However, it 
is also clear that in its focus on measuring the distributive effects of tax-benefit 
policies, such tools do not ordinarily include policies that affect the original 
incomes used to compute inequality indicators in the microsimulation process, 




for instance changes in public sector wages. Similarly, while microsimulation 
tools expressly incorporate the effects of direct taxation on household or 
individual incomes, it leaves out the distributive effects of indirect taxation, 
such as value-added tax, which often constitutes significant parts of reform 
packages. 
 
1.4.4.b The distributive effects of public sector wage cuts and changes in 
indirect taxation 
Both policies affecting original incomes, and changes in indirect taxation have 
been addressed by scholars working with microsimulation. Pre-distributive 
policies, such as public sector wage cuts, have been taken into account in these 
studies by incorporating information on individuals’ employment and changing 
the original income of those individuals in the sample by the respective wage 
cuts based on their previous incomes and the specific reforms implemented. 
With regard to the specific cases of the Economic Adjustment Programmes in 
Greece and Portugal, public sector wage cuts played a significant role in the 
overall adjustment process, making it indispensable to at least estimate the 
distributive effects of these measures. The following provides an overview of 
the prescribed measures regarding public sector pay cuts for Greece and 
Portugal (see Table 2 and Table 3). 
 
Next to an overall reduction of the number of public sector employees, the 
various reform measures entailed a reduction of public sector wages, including 
those in state-owned enterprises, mainly through the elimination of additional 
monthly holiday payments (in the case of both Greece and Portugal), as well 
as more detailed measures including direct wage reductions with a progressive 
ratio, reducing allowances for ministerial staff, and the gradual elimination of 
exemptions made from newly introduced pay structures throughout the reform 




agreed-upon and implemented reforms in Portugal were later declared 
unconstitutional by the Portuguese Constitutional Court and had to be 
reversed almost fully at the end of the EAP (this is addressed in Paper 2 of 
the thesis together with a case study of the Portuguese pension reform, which 
was also struck down by the Court). 
 
Table 2: Public sector pay cuts as prescribed in the MoU and reform 







• “[One of t]he three biggest upfront measures are an immediate 
cut in the public sector wage bill” (p. 47) 
• “launch a process to create a simplified remuneration system 
to cover basic wages and all allowances applying to all public 
sector employees and ensuring that remuneration reflects 
productivity and tasks” (p. 83) 






• “Cuts in wage bill by at least EUR 770 million in 2011, and 
additional EUR 600 million in 2012, EUR 448 million in 2013, 
EUR 306 million in 2014 and EUR 71 million in 2015, through 
the implementation of attrition beyond the rule of 1 
recruitment for 5 exits (1 for 10 in 2011); an increase in weekly 
working hours for public sector employees from 37.5 to 40 
hours and reduction in overtime payments; reduction in the 
number of remunerated committees and councils; reduction in 
other additional compensation, allowances and bonus 
schemes; reduction in contractors (50 percent in 2011 and 
additional 10 percent in 2012 and onwards); temporary freeze 
of automatic progression; the implementation of a new 
remuneration grid; the introduction of part-time public sector 
employment and unpaid leave; a reduction in the number of 
admissions to military and policy academies, the transfer of 
excess staff to a labour reserve paid on average at 60 percent 
of their wage (excluding overtime and other extra payments) 
up to 12 months, and a cut in the productivity allowance by 
50 percent.” (p. 140) 
• “Adjustments in public employee compensation (0.6 percent 
of GDP). A new wage structure will be introduced by mid-
August and phased in over 3 years. It will bring wages into 
line with private sector norms (achieving “equal pay for equal 
work”) and decompress the wage structure to better reward 
performance. Overall savings will be achieved by eliminating 
special wage regimes and allowances, and reducing automatic 











• “adjust the wage grid for special regimes effective July 1, 2012 
(including for judges, diplomats, doctors, professors, police 
and armed forces), while protecting those at lower pay scales, 
to realize permanent net savings of about 0.2 percent of GDP 
on an annual basis.” (p. 97) [went into effect August 1, 2012 







• “Adopt legislation to effectively reduce monthly wages of 
employees under special wage regimes (excluding Christmas, 
Easter and summer bonuses), effective August 1, 2012, with 
the following marginal reduction schedule: 2 percent for wages 
below €1000; 10 percent for €1000–1500; 20percent for 
€1500–2500; 30 percent for €2500–4000; and 35 percent for 
wages above €4000. 
• Adopt legislation to reduce the State wage bill by €56 million 
in 2013 and additional €27 million in 2014, including by 
further reducing fixed–term hires by 10 percent relative to the 
baseline (€38million in 2013, €25 million in 2014), 
rationalizing the allowances of Members of Parliament, and 
their staff (€2 million in 2013), reducing the wage bill for 
consultant doctors (by €11 million in 2013), and introducing 
a hiring freeze at the Ministry of Citizen Protection. 
• Adopt legislation to introduce a new wage grid for 
parliamentary staff, yielding savings of €14million in 2013. 
• Adopt legislation to eliminate the public sector seasonal 
bonuses of employees at the state and local governments, and 
at legal entities of public and private law, to produce savings 
of €431 million in 2013. 
• Adopt legislation to abolish all exemptions from the public 
sector wage grid reform introduced in 2011, excluding HFSF 
and HRADF, with savings of €8 million in 2013. 
• Adopt legislation to suspend, through 2016, the fiscal bonus 
of public sector employees, saving €78million in 2013. 
• Adopt legislation to suspend, through 2016, the performance 
bonus of public sector employees, saving €214 million in 2013. 
• Adopt legislation to reduce the local government wage bill 
with savings of €50 million (to take effect in January 2013). 
• Adopt legislation to align the wage grid for all state-owned 
enterprises in Chapter A Entities of Private law with the new 
wage grid for state employees, effective January 1, 2013. 
• Repeal the provision that provides a full pension to 
government employees with 20 years of service in case of layoff 







Table 3: Public sector pay cuts as prescribed in the MoU and reform 







• “Wage cuts in the public sector are expected to contribute to 
wage moderation in the private sector” (p. 17) 
• “Ensure that the aggregate public sector wage bill as a share 
of GDP decreases in 2012 and 2013 
• Limit staff admissions in public administration to achieve 
annual decreases in 2012-2014 of 1% per year in the staff of 
central administration and 2% in local and regional 
administration 
• Freeze wages in the government sector in nominal terms in 
2012 and 2013 and constrain promotions 
• Reduce the overall budgetary cost of health benefits schemes 
for government employees schemes (ADSE, ADM and SAD) 
lowering the employer’s contribution and adjusting the scope 
of health benefits, with savings of EUR 100 million in 2012” 
(p. 60) 
 
Action to be completed by domestic government (by 
Q2-2012): 
• “Prepare the plan ensuring that the aggregate public sector 
wage bill as a share of GDP decreases in 2012 and 2013” (p. 
109) 
 







• “The 2012 budget targets a general government deficit of 4.5 
per cent of GDP, in line with the Programme. To this effect, 
it contains bold consolidation measures, totalling 6 per cent 
of GDP, of which two thirds are on the expenditure side. Key 




• “Ensure that the public sector wage bill decreases in gross 
terms in 2012 by at least EUR 3,000 million (EUR 1,620 
million taking into account the losses of government revenues 
at the level of income taxes and social contributions); 
• reduce wages for all general government sector employees in 
2012 by (i) suspending the 13th and 14th monthly salary 
payments for those workers with monthly salaries of EUR 
1,000 or more, (ii) suspending on average and in a progressive 




workers with monthly salaries between the minimum wage of 
EUR 485 and EUR 1,000. Similar measures will apply to all 
SOEs classified inside and outside the perimeter of the 
government sector, and in any other public entity even if 
falling outside the perimeter of the government sector; 
• reduce the number of government employees by (i) limiting 
staff admissions in order to achieve annual decreases of 2% 
(full-time equivalent) in 2012-2014 in the permanent staff of 
central, regional and local governments, (ii) decreasing the 
number of temporary positions in specific areas of public 
administration. To support these objectives, binding numeric 
targets for staff reductions per main area of the administration 
will be defined by December 2011; 
• suspend all promotions in 2012; 
• reduce the overall budgetary cost of health benefits schemes 
for government employees schemes; 
• savings from the public administration restructuring.” (p. 86) 
 
The distributive effects of public sector pay cuts have been studied extensively. 
The various results presented in the literature suggest that public sector pay 
cuts, rather than changing the findings regarding the progressivity of austerity 
measures presented in this thesis, serve to reinforce them. Sutherland et al. 
(2013) find that between the Global Financial Crisis and 2013, which covers 
the First EAP and parts of the Second EAP for Greece and significant parts 
of the EAP for Portugal, public sector pay cuts in Greece and Portugal have 
had overwhelmingly progressive effects (see Figure 13). The findings are 
confirmed by Matsaganis and Leventi in a study on the distributive effects of 
the reforms in Greece, focusing specifically on public sector pay cuts (2014). 
This makes sense given that the overall reductions in public sector wages were 
most severe for higher incomes, as well as the fact that public sector employees 
tend to be situated in the top half of the income distribution in any case. 
Similar findings have been presented for public sector wage cuts in other 






Figure 13: Distributive effects of public sector pay cuts in Greece and 
Portugal, in per cent, by decile, 2008-2013 
Greece Portugal 
  
Source: Taken from Sutherland et al. 2013. 
 
Similar to public sector wage cuts, increases in indirect taxation, most notably 
VAT, were a cornerstone of the adjustment processes in both countries. In 
Greece, VAT rates were increased between 2010 and 2011 from 19% to 23% 
(standard rate), from 9% to 11% (reduced rate), and from 4.5% to 5.5% (base 
rate). This was followed by a further increase to 24% for the standard rate in 
2016. Increase in VAT rates were accompanied by increases in other excises for 
fuel, tobacco, alcohol and other products. Importantly, a number of exemptions 
were made as part of the EAPs, such as for instance a reduction of the VAT 
rate for drugs from the reduced to the base rate. Initial considerations to move 
more goods and services that were subject to the reduced rate to the standard 
rate were abandoned in favour of increasing the reduced rate. Overall, the 
envisioned savings were among the most significant of the adjustment process 
with VAT rate increases accounting for planned fiscal savings of €1.8 billion 
per year (European Commission 2010b, 54).  In Portugal VAT rates were 
increased from 21% to 23% (standard rate) in 2011 while base and reduced 
rates remained unchanged. In this context it is important to note VAT 
increases were an immensely common policy measure across the EU, and a 
number of member states increased their VAT rates as part of their fiscal 




Republic (four times between 2010 and 2015), Spain (in 2010 and 2012), France 
(in 2012 and 2014), Croatia (in 2013 and 2014), Italy (three times between 
2011 and 2016), Latvia (four times between 2009 and 2018), Luxembourg (in 
2015), Hungary (in 2012), Malta (in 2011), the Netherlands (in 2012 and 2019), 
Austria (in 2016), Poland (in 2011), Slovenia (in 2013), Slovakia (in 2010 and 
2011), and Finland (in 2010 and 2013) (European Commission 2020). In the 
same vein, the Greek government had already initiated VAT rate increases 
prior to the entry of the Troika, as had the Portuguese government. Overall, 
this calls into question whether the Troika imposed VAT increases onto the 
governments of the EAP countries entirely against their will. Nevertheless, the 
Troika expressly welcomed these measures, and in the Greek case made further 
VAT increases part of subsequent EAPs (European Commission 2010a, 13). 
 
VAT increases are widely accepted to be regressive because they 
disproportionately affect lower-income households that spend a larger share of 
their incomes on consumption, and in doing so often draw on past savings or 
take on debt (Matsaganis and Leventi 2014). The same is true for other indirect 
taxes such as excises on fuel, which were also a large part of the adjustment 
programmes. The detrimental effect of increases in excises on heating oil, which 
a large number of people especially in Greece depend on, is only one example 
of many to underscore this point and is particularly salient for low-income 
families who then turned to burning wood they found in the cities in order to 
heat their homes in the winter (Daley 2013). 
 
Measuring the precise effects of VAT hikes through microsimulation measures 
is a complex exercise that requires data on household consumption patterns. 
Recently, efforts have been made to incorporate changes in indirect taxation 
into microsimulation tool EUROMOD, although the tool is still in the testing 
phase and no comprehensive analysis has been undertaken to date (De Agostini 




possible to make the following inferences regarding the distributive effects of 
VAT hikes: (1) Overall, the distributive effect is undoubtedly regressive, 
although some efforts have been made to exclude certain non-luxury and 
essential products from VAT hikes in the EAPs; (2) with regard to the effects 
observed in Greece, this would certainly weaken the progressivity of the other 
measures. However, given the fact that especially the bottom decile received 
large relative increases in income (despite absolute losses due to the depth of 
the recession), it is doubtful whether VAT hikes would offset this trend 
completely; (3) with regard to the observed distributive effects of the reforms 
in Portugal, VAT hikes are also likely to have a distinctively regressive effect, 
although given the smaller magnitude of the increases, less so than in Greece. 
Overall, this would shift the inverted U-shaped curve observed in Figure 11 to 
the right. Further analysis would be necessary to see in how far this actually 
strengthens the observed trend of austerity being largely protective of middle-
income groups in Portugal given that excluding changes in indirect taxation 
the most protected groups are situated somewhat to the left of the middle of 
the income distribution. Incorporating the effects of VAT hikes could thus shift 
the most protected groups further to the middle. 
 
1.4.4.c The effects of austerity measures on poverty  
A further important limitation of the analysis presented here is related to the 
issues of absolute income levels, as well as relative poverty levels. However, 
this has less to do with the shortcomings of microsimulation tools themselves 
but with methodological weaknesses of inequality measures. While most of the 
scholarly literature takes income inequality to be based on relative differences 
of disposable household incomes, the case of Greece provides an excellent 
example of why this is problematic in multiple ways. Firstly, relative measures 
of inequality by definition ignore absolute levels of income. Despite this being 




To illustrate this, throughout the crisis, the Greek economy contracted by 
around 25%; naturally disposable incomes fell significantly during this period: 
Between 2010 and 2015 median equivalised disposable income fell from just 
below €12,000 p.a. to just over €7,500, while prices during the same time 
stayed at more or less the same level with only slight deflationary tendencies. 
Therefore, the observed losses in nominal incomes translated into massive 
income losses in real terms (Eurostat 2019b).  
 
To further illustrate this, the below shows at-risk-of-poverty rates for both 
Greece and Portugal throughout the crisis with an annually readjusted at-risk-
of-poverty threshold (60% of median income) and fixed poverty threshold from 
2008 (see Figure 14). While the numbers  show a slight difference for Portugal, 
the divergence between the anchored and readjusted at-risk-of-poverty rates 
for Greece are stark: When the poverty threshold is adjusted in each year, the 
share of people living on less than that threshold rises from just over 20% in 
2009 to just over 23% at its peak in 2012. With the poverty threshold fixed at 
the absolute level of 2008, the share of people who are at risk of poverty rises 
from 18% in 2009 to 48% in 2013 and fell only slightly below that in the 
following years. In other words, from 2013 onwards, almost half of the Greek 
population had an income with which they would have counted as being at risk 
of poverty in 2008. In the face of largely unchanged price levels, this signifies 





Figure 14: At-risk-of-poverty rates with annually readjusted and 2008-




‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 ‘14 ‘15 ‘16 ‘17 
PT ADJ. 17.9 18.0 17.9 18.7 19.5 19.5 19.0 18.3 17.3 
PT 2008 16.1 17.9 19.4 22.3 23.9 21.8 19.8 18.3 16.4 
EL ADJ. 20.1 21.4 23.1 23.1 22.1 21.4 21.2 20.2 18.5 
EL 2008 18.0 24.9 35.8 44.3 48.0 48.0 47.8 46.3 44.9 
 
Sources: Eurostat (EU-SILC survey [ilc_li02; ilc_li22b]). 
 
This showcases that, while relative income inequality may have gone down in 
Greece, there was ‘progressive impoverishment’ when incomes in absolute 
terms are considered. Of course, the vast drop in incomes in Greece was not a 
direct result of the reforms but of the recession and ensuing unemployment 
(although doubtlessly the procyclical reforms are likely to have worsened the 
recession). Nevertheless, considering absolute income levels is crucially 
important, particularly when evaluating the success of certain policies with 
regard to their distributive effects. On the other hand, these numbers should 
not call into question entirely the findings regarding the progressive 
distributive effects of the reforms; once the Greek economy recovers and 
incomes reach pre-crisis levels, by virtue of the reforms in the tax-benefit 
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It is important to disentangle at this point the effects of the implemented 
austerity measures on poverty from those of the wider recession. On the one 
hand, the increase in poverty is largely due to the dramatic rise in 
unemployment in Greece. On the other hand, even as employment has slowly 
picked up again in recent years, at-risk-of-poverty rates with anchored poverty 
thresholds remained at high levels through 2017, which suggests that disposable 
incomes in the bottom half of the income distribution have not recovered in 
absolute terms. While the findings presented in this paper suggest that poverty 
rates should decrease due to the more progressive tax-benefit system now in 
place once pre-fisc incomes recover from the crisis, the important question 
remains whether austerity measures have contributed to the prolonged 
depression of incomes. Based on the findings regarding the underestimation of 
fiscal multipliers presented by Blanchard and Leigh (2013), the answer to this 
question must clearly be affirmative: Austerity measures did, in fact, deepen 
the recession and by extension pushed more people below the poverty line. 
However, as Matsaganis and Leventi in their analysis of the effects of the Greek 
crisis on poverty note, a crucial – and unanswerable – question in this context 
concerns the relevant counterfactual: Given the fact that the Greek crisis had 
deep structural components centred around for instance the diminishing 
competitiveness of Greek firms in the years preceding the crisis, it is difficult 
to assess how deep and how long the recession would have been in the absence 
of the austerity measures. 
 
This paper remains agnostic as to the exact nature of this counterfactual and 
its implication for the depth of the crisis. However, relating back to the 
presentation of the political determinants of austerity measures in the EU in 
the introduction to this thesis, it is also clear that the severity of the austerity 
measures in the Eurozone periphery, including in Greece, could have been 
softened somewhat by an expansion of fiscal activity by member states in the 




alleviated some of the increases in poverty thus calling into question an entirely 
structural explanation of the causes of the dramatic increases in poverty rates 
in Greece. Conversely, however, it is also clear from the findings presented in 
this paper that a less progressive design of the changes in the tax-benefit 
system, as one part of the austerity measures, would have resulted in an even 
further increase of poverty rates. In this regard the findings presented are 
consistent with the analysis of other authors (Matsaganis and Leventi 2014; 
Sutherland et al. 2013). 
 
1.4.4.d The importance of public goods and services 
A similar limitation of the commonly used inequality measures relates to the 
notion of disposable income. While accounting for post-fisc changes in income 
pertaining to e.g. taxes or benefit payments, the notion of disposable income 
still fails to capture important elements of household expenses that are related 
to the welfare state in a broader sense. For instance, universal health care saves 
households large expenditures which would otherwise be incurred regularly. 
Similarly, publicly provided transport systems, education, or housing all have 
an immense impact on household finances but are not captured by their 
disposable income. In other words, if country ‘A’ provides the above-listed 
goods and services to its citizens, and an otherwise identical country ‘B’ does 
not, disposable household incomes would ceteris paribus be the same in both 
countries. However, households in country ‘A’ would be “richer”, in that they 
would clearly be able to spend more on non-essential items. 
 
Future research should address this limitation of the notion of disposable 
income as a measurement of households’ real income. This would also have 
important ramifications for the research of inequality and redistribution, and 
welfare state retrenchment: if the provision of public goods and services in one 




households’ real incomes and should thus be incorporated appropriately in our 
measures of income and inequality. Again, Greece is a case in point here: One 
result of the deep cuts in public budgets was that public health needs remained 
unmet over the last years, to a point where the public health system was 
pushed to a breaking point (“In the name of tough fiscal targets, people who 
might otherwise survive are dying” (Smith 2017); see also Economou et al. 
2014; Simou and Koutsogeorgou 2014; Zavras et al. 2016). Some progress has 
already been made in the direction of improving measures of income and 
inequality in this regard (see e.g. Vaalavuo 2011; Verbist, Förster, and 
Vaalavuo 2012), although a systematic analysis of different welfare regimes and 
redistributive patterns with these tools would be warranted. 
 
Overall, this section illustrates that the findings presented in this paper, while 
surprising, are not wholly positive: Less severe austerity measures, would have 
likely resulted in less adverse effects on poverty. This would have, however, 
required cooperation from the European partners of the EAP-recipient 
countries. Similarly, a different measurement of inequality that incorporates 
for instance public goods and services, such as the provision of healthcare but 
also, especially in the long-run, education, would likely yield less positive results 
regarding the distributive effects of austerity. This reveals a pervasive problem 
in how scholars and policy makers alike conceptualise inequality. It also 
illustrates that even when policy makers make a concerted effort to design 
reforms in a progressive manner, this may have dramatically negative effects 
on vulnerable groups in the population simply because variables relating to the 
above-outlined factors do not enter the models of economists and policy makers 
which still largely rely on a rather antiquated measurement of inequality based 





1.4.5 Progressive by design? Policy preferences and aims of the 
Troika institutions  
1.4.5.a The importance of policy preferences in explaining the distributive 
effects of the EAPs. What, who, and why? 
 
The empirical analysis of the distributive effects of the EAPs produced no 
evidence in support of H1. On the other hand, the analysis yielded evidence in 
support of H2. 
 
To recapitulate, H2 hypothesises that the distributive effects of austerity 
measures depend on their exact design rather than whether they are based 
more strongly on expenditure- or revenue-based measures. At its core, this 
hypothesis rests on the notion that in determining the reform design policy 
makers choose from a set of options available to them and that the choices 
they make reflect their aims and preferences. The evidence presented thus far 
in this section provides a strong empirical case for the centrality of the design 
of austerity measures in determining their distributive effects. However, further 
investigation is required to ascertain whether the observed distributive effects 
in fact match the aims and preferences of the policy makers involved in the 
adjustment process or whether they are a mere unintended outcome. In the 
particular cases of the Eurozone EAPs, the reforms were not the sole product 
of domestic political processes but were negotiated with and arguably imposed 
by the Troika, which is why the following analysis focuses on the Troika 
institutions rather than the domestic governments of the programme recipient 
countries.  
  
Importantly, the findings presented so far in this paper seem puzzling given 




an advocate for more redistribution and lower income inequality: In the past, 
the European Commission supported distinctly market-friendly economic 
policies where concerns about inequality were of little importance and 
substantive redistribution seen as problematic under the stipulations of fiscal 
conservatism enshrined in the Stability and Growth Pact (Gill 1998; Fitoussi 
and Saraceno 2013; see also Beckfield 2019). Furthermore, due to institutional 
asymmetries inherent in the European integration process, the EU has been 
characterised by what Scharpf explained as a ‘negative integration bias’ 
pushing forward deregulation at the national level without reregulation at the 
EU level (Scharpf 1999). This constitutes a structural impediment to 
introducing more strongly redistributive policies aimed at lowering inequality. 
The ECB, as the second Troika institution, is predominantly concerned with 
price stability due to its narrow mandate and thus traditionally had little to 
say about inequality and redistribution aside from pushing towards the strict 
adherence to fiscal rules so as to not jeopardise the stability of the common 
currency. Indirectly, however, this made the strengthening of redistributive 
policies difficult as they were often seen as standing in opposition to the fiscal 
prudence advocated for by the Bank. Lastly, the IMF came to be seen as a 
global champion of so-called neoliberal economic policies and particularly in 
the context of fiscal adjustment has amassed a reputation to “impos[e] austerity 
policies that have harsh social consequences” (Nelson 2014, 1; see also 
Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016; Meltzer 2004; Peet 2009). The progressive 
effects of the EAPs presented in the previous part of this section thus seem at 
odds with these conceptions of the three Troika institutions.  
 
Therefore, this section serves to identify the Troika institutions’ preferences 
regarding inequality and redistribution as laid down in the EAP-related policy 
documents, as well as secondary sources such as speeches and public statements 
by and interviews with senior officials from the Troika institutions. At the 




rather different institutions with potentially different aims and motivations. 
Moreover, the origins of these preferences are discussed in order to address the 
dissonance between accounts that ascribe the Troika institutions the role of 
neoliberal champions and the counterintuitive distributive effects of the EAPs 
presented earlier in this section. 
 
1.4.5.b What: The preferences of the Troika reflected in the EAP-related 
documents 
The analysis of the texts of the EAPs and MoU yields the following. 
Throughout the documents, the importance of designing the reforms in a 
manner that protects the most vulnerable from the most adverse effects of the 
reforms is stressed repeatedly. A passage from the first EAP for Greece states 
the following: 
“[The aim is that] the fiscal adjustment is fairly distributed across 
the society, and protects the most vulnerable […] The choice of 
the fiscal consolidation measures and structural reforms has taken 
into account the social dimension, and the government has made 
a commitment to fairness in their implementation. The lowest-
income and lowest-pension earners, as well as the most vulnerable 
and those requiring family support, will all be protected and 
compensated for the adverse impact of the adjustment policies” 
(European Commission 2010a, 33); 
And further in the MoU signed by the Greek authorities: 
“The government is committed to fairness in the distribution of 
the adjustment burden. Our resolve to protect the most 
vulnerable in society from the effects of the economic downturn 
was taken into account in the design of the adjustment policies. 
[…] With regard to the reduction in public wages and in pensions, 
the minimum earners have been protected” (ibid., 46). 
 
Moreover, throughout the documents particular measures to achieve fiscal 
consolidation while protecting the most vulnerable groups are specified in a 




section. For instance, the first EAP for Greece states with regard to pension 
reforms:  
“The elimination of the 13th and 14th pensions is compensated, 
for those receiving less than €2500 a month, by introducing a 
new flat bonus of €800 a year. The benefit reduction is weighted 
toward the higher pension earners”; 
And further:  
“minimum pensions and family support instruments will not be 
cut, and the most vulnerable will be compensated for the possible 
adverse impact of policies”; 
With regard to public sector employee salaries, the EAP reads:  
“The 13th and the 14th wage payments will be eliminated for all 
employees. To protect the lower income segment, here too, for 
those receiving less than €3000 a month, a flat bonus payment 
of €1000 a year per employee will be introduced, which will be 
financed through cutting salary allowances for higher income 
segments” (ibid., 46f.).  
 
In a similar vein, the documents outline the introduction of stronger means-
testing in order to achieve progressive fiscal consolidation specifically: 
“The scope for improvements in the targeting of social 
expenditures will be revised in order to enhance the social safety 
net for the most vulnerable” (ibid., 56), 
and further outlines the aim to 
“[introduce] a means-tested minimum guaranteed income for 
elderly people (above the statutory retirement age), to protect 
the most vulnerable groups, consistent with fiscal sustainability” 
(ibid., 69). 
 
The documents of the Portuguese EAP contain similar sections stipulating that  
“tax increases on income are designed in such a way as to protect 
the most vulnerable segments of the population” (European 
Commission 2011c, 20) 




“Fiscal policy objectives [include the reduction of] the 
Government deficit […] by means of high-quality permanent 
measures and minimising the impact of consolidation on 
vulnerable groups” (ibid., 59). 
In the MoU the Portuguese authorities specify this: 
 “In choosing fiscal measures, we have taken care to protect 
vulnerable groups. The 5 percent cut in nominal public sector 
wages and the freezing of pensions in 2011 exempt those earning 
the lowest wages and pensions. The special contribution on 
pensions will be levied only above a monthly threshold of €1,500. 
The means-testing program is being enhanced by applying unified 
and consistent selection criteria throughout the transfers system. 
In the health sector, an exemption threshold will be introduced 
to protect the more vulnerable from the proposed “moderating 
fees” (for health care) increases and the reduction in exemptions. 
The exemption threshold based on the value of the property will 
be kept.” (ibid., 43) 
 
Strikingly, the European Commission’s ex-post evaluation report for Portugal 
shows that the reform measures implemented by the government did not go 
far enough with regard to protecting the most vulnerable, especially by 
introducing means-testing elements, according to the Commission: 
“Some fiscal measures – such as the reform of the minimum 
income guaranteed scheme – were regressive and could have been 
avoided or limited in scope. The historically very high poverty 
and income inequality levels of Portugal indicated that there was 
scope for clear improvement of the social protection system. The 
efficiency of the social expenditure to ensure proper targeting to 
the most in need and adequate incentives could have been 
strengthened during the programme.” (European Commission 
2016, 13)  
 
1.4.5.c Who: Disentangling the different Troika institutions 
In the official documents signed by the Troika and the domestic governments 
prior to and during the adjustment process, the official positions of the Troika 
institutions are presented as consensus-based. However, it is theoretically 




to one institution in particular. Therefore, the different preferences of the 
Troika institutions must be disentangled beyond what can be found in the EAP 
documents.  
 
In this context it is first necessary to discuss the role of the ECB in the 
adjustment process: While the ECB was part of the Troika it filled out an 
advisory role and unlike the IMF or the EMU member states represented by 
the Commission, it did not contribute funds to the bailout programmes. 
Nevertheless, a number of commentators argue that the ECB in fact 
overstepped its mandate by interfering in policy decisions that did not directly 
concern price stability (Chopra 2015; Gros 2015; Whelan 2012), championing 
distinctly hawkish fiscal positions (Brunnermeier, James, and Landau 2016, 
335ff.; see also Woodruff 2016). This is unsurprising given that fiscal policy 
directly concerns central bankers because of its interdependence with monetary 
policy objectives (Ban and Patenaude 2018; Gabor 2016) and is in line with 
research showing that central banks’ communication on fiscal policy issues 
intensified since the GFC (Allard et al. 2013). Moreover, the ECB has recently 
begun conducting research looking at the effects of monetary policy on 
inequality (Ampudia et al. 2018; Lenza and Slacalek 2018).  
 
However, the EAPs predated this recent turn in the ECB’s attention to matters 
of inequality and redistribution. As for the period of the adjustment 
programmes, there is no evidence in the EAP-related documents, statements 
made by Bank officials, and interviews that the ECB interfered with decisions 
on policy reforms expressly with regard to how the adjustment burden is 
distributed and how reforms affect different social groups. Its primary concern 
throughout the reform process was the general success of the programmes and 
the adherence to fiscal targets. Therefore, this paper focuses on the European 
Commission and the IMF and their positions regarding the distributive effects 




Firstly, it is also important to note in this context that the IMF was brought 
on in order for the European Troika institutions to benefit from the IMF’s 
experience and expertise in matters of economic adjustment, which, at that 
point, the Commission lacked (Brunnermeier, James, and Landau 2016). Of 
course, despite the formulations in the EAP-related documents suggesting 
consensus-based decision-making, in reality there were tensions between the 
different Troika partners, and in particular the IMF on one side and the 
Commission (and ECB) on the other side, particularly with regard to the 
question of debt restructuring (ibid., 303ff.).  
 
However, there is no evidence in these documents that the dissent between 
IMF and Commission extended to the question of how the adjustment burden 
was to be distributed among different social groups. Beyond the EAPs, the 
individual positions of the two institutions can be gauged from other 
documents: The IMF published its own evaluations of the programmes after 
their conclusions which allow us to approximate the Fund’s positions on this 
question by analysing how it individually assessed the success of the 
programmes with regard to their distributive effects. Moreover, of the three 
Greek programmes, the IMF was only part of the first two until 2015. 
Therefore, gauging the distributive effects of the programme before and after 
the IMF’s departure allows for some conclusions on the impact of IMF 
involvement. Similarly, documents related to the third EAP for Greece such as 
the Commission’s Social Impact Report reflect more directly the Commission’s 
positions on inequality and redistribution. 
 
These documents demonstrate that the IMF had distinctly progressive 
positions and that it was a priority for the Fund to design the reforms in a way 
that was as socially acceptable as possible. With regard to the first two EAPs 




criticising others for lacking progressive distributive effects. For instance, 
public sector wage cuts were indeed carried out protecting lower income groups:  
“Public sector wages and pensions were cut through elimination 
of 13th and 14th monthly payments, but with safeguards 
intended to protect the most vulnerable” (International Monetary 
Fund 2013, 14) 
Conversely, reforms in the tax system were deemed insufficient with regard to 
making taxation more equitable: 
“The absence of quick progress in collecting evaded taxes came at 
the cost of any demonstrable improvement in the equity of the 
tax burden.” (ibid., 24) 
“Limited progress was made in checking tax evasion and making 
the tax burden more equitable, potentially fanning public 
opposition to the program.” (ibid., 41) 
In the same vein, the IMF establishes that too little was done to make benefit 
payments more progressive by excluding higher income groups: “programs for 
social protection remained largely untargeted and inefficient” (ibid., 16). 
 
Similar passages calling for more progressive reforms, particularly including 
more equitable taxation and stronger targeting of benefits, can be found in the 
post-programme evaluation for the second EAP for Greece, which states: 
“Directors called for rebalancing fiscal policy by broadening the 
personal income tax base and rationalizing pension spending to 
make room for targeted social assistance to vulnerable groups and 
lower tax rates. Going forward, [the] development of targeted 
social safety nets are particularly important for making 
adjustment more durable and equitable.” (International 
Monetary Fund 2017, 2) 
“In terms of the composition of fiscal adjustment, the objectives 
set out in the EFF request were not met. […] Staff argued for 
more equitable taxation (including better enforcement and a 
broadening of the tax base), improvements in the social safety 
net, and more sustainable wage and pensions expenditures.” 
(ibid., 19) 
“Contrary to the spirit of the program and despite persistent 




socially equitable, raising concerns about the political 
sustainability of the achieved fiscal consolidation. Enforcement of 
tax compliance, development of targeted social safety nets, and 
pension reform are particularly important for making the 
adjustment more durable and equitable.” (ibid., 38) 
 
As for the European Commission, after the departure of the IMF and with the 
launch of the third EAP, a report was published outlining the social impact of 
the planned reforms, which reflects more distinctly the Commission’s positions. 
The report asks three questions in particular: (1) How is the burden of 
adjustment spread across society? (2) What are the reform measures that 
would have a positive direct impact on the social situation? (3) Which measures 
would help mitigate social hardships? The existence of the report itself, as well 
as the focus not just on analysing the social impact of the reforms but 
specifically on how to mitigate adverse effects on the most vulnerable suggests 
that the Commission was mindful of the distributive effects of the reforms and 
sought to design them in a progressive manner. More specifically, the report 
states:  
“President Juncker made clear on several occasions that social 
considerations have been explicitly introduced or reinforced in the 
text of the MoU at the insistence of the Commission. This 
includes measures to support the most vulnerable and to ensure 
the fair sharing of the adjustment process – for instance through 
the phasing in of a guaranteed minimum income scheme […]; 
making sure that the efforts required from everyone are 
proportionate to their income; targeting savings in areas which 
do not directly affect the disposable income of ordinary citizens 
[…]; challenging vested interests, such as phasing out favourable 
tax treatments for ship-owners or farmers.” (European 
Commission 2015, 3) 
 
Moreover, disaggregating the observed distributive effects of the reforms in 
Greece annually reveals the following: After the departure of the IMF from the 
Troika, the effects of the reforms remained similar throughout the third EAP 




income due to the reforms. This suggests congruence of both the IMF’s and 
the Commission’s preferences regarding the distributive nature of the reform 
programmes. 
 
The evaluation of the Portuguese programme is less detailed on the part of the 
IMF and less focused on the issue of inequality and redistribution. It does 
reaffirm, however, that the IMF sought to make the reforms as progressive as 
possible, for instance by introducing stronger means-testing elements in the 
benefit system: “Directors called for a comprehensive spending review, aiming 
particularly at better means-testing of social benefits and controlling pensions 
and public sector wages” (International Monetary Fund 2016, 2). It also 
reiterates that any expenditure cuts were “designed to cushion the impact on 
vulnerable groups” (ibid., 9). The IMF’s evaluation further reveals that a 
number of reforms with potentially progressive effects such as the 2012 pension 
reform were blocked or reversed by the Portuguese Constitutional Court (ibid., 
18) much to the frustration of IMF staff. 
 
The Commission was more explicit in characterising the reform progress in 
Portugal as insufficient with regard to more effective redistribution towards 
vulnerable groups:  
“The  efficiency  of  the  social  expenditure  to  ensure  proper  
targeting  to  the  most  in  need  and  adequate incentives could 
have been strengthened during the programme” (European 
Commission 2016, 13).  
“The programme had room to improve the design of social 
protection expenditure to promote effectiveness and equity” 
(ibid., 113). 
Similarly, while attesting that some reforms such as wage and pension cuts 
were implemented in a progressive way, the evaluation report by the 




“Some other measures  (or  lack  thereof)  failed  to  ensure  
progressivity  in  the  burden-sharing  of  the  adjustment or in 
protecting the lowest income groups. Some measures were 
repeatedly negotiated and even announced  but  never  
implemented  by  the  government,  like  a  cap  on  accumulated  
social  benefits,  including those provided by local governments. 
[…] This leads to the view that not all segments of the society 
participated in the burden sharing of the needed adjustment” 
(ibid., 115). 
 
The evidence from the post-programme evaluations conducted individually by 
the IMF and the European Commission respectively, as well as the social 
impact report of the third EAP for Greece compiled by the Commission, and 
the distributive effects of the third Greek EAP after the departure of the IMF 
suggest that there was little dissent between the two institutions with respect 
to the issue of inequality and redistribution. Both institutions sought to achieve 
a progressive design of the reform measures aimed at shielding the most 
vulnerable groups from the adverse effects of the reforms. 
 
1.4.5.d Why: The aims and ideas of the Troika behind the preferences laid out 
in the EAPs  
How can this unexpected finding be explained given that none of the Troika 
institutions traditionally had a reputation for championing redistributive 
policies and prioritising the preclusion of inequality? 
 
The documents signal that the answer lies partly in purely strategic 
calculations on part of the Troika. The first EAP for Greece reads: “These 
[measures designed to protect the most vulnerable groups] are important 
conditions to ensure broad support for the programme” (European Commission 
2010a, 33). In other words, the Troika acknowledges that reform prescriptions 
that would increase inequality are more likely to trigger social unrest and thus 




frontloading the measures was a key principle of the programmes in order to 
achieve as much consolidation as possible before effective resistance to the 
reforms could form, the progressive design was partly a means to an end for 
the Troika to maximise chances of successful completion of the economic 
adjustment process, and thus ultimately to guarantee the repayment of the 
loans given to the programme recipient countries. At this point it is important 
to understand that the Troika’s somewhat unexpected approach regarding the 
distributive effects of the reforms does not impinge on the general austerity 
paradigm. While the debate around fiscal multipliers (Blanchard and Leigh 
2013) more than questioned the economic success of the austerity measures, it 
is clear from the various institutional, ideational, and political reasons (see 
introduction to this thesis) that there would be no significant divergence from 
the path of fiscal consolidation. It is vital to not confuse this with the question 
of the direct distributive effects of these measures: within the constraints of the 
austerity-heavy approach, which in itself had dramatic effects on for instance 
unemployment and poverty, there seems to have been a genuine effort to make 
the reforms that were deemed necessary by the Troika as progressive as 
possible. 
 
Even beyond this general motivation to ensure the success of the programme, 
it is, in fact, not surprising that the Troika institutions should be mindful of 
the social impact of their policy prescriptions, although different motivations 
can be identified for the European Commission and the IMF. 
 
The European Commission is arguably the most political out of the three 
institutions with the most accountability towards the peoples of the member 
states. Nevertheless, precisely its accountability towards the European peoples 
and by extension its democratic legitimacy is one of the most problematic traits 
of the European institutions in general and the Commission in particular 




legitimacy rests primarily on the Commission’s deficiency in the input 
dimension of legitimacy which is derived from the participation of the people 
(Hix 2008). Effectively, this leaves the output dimension as the Commission’s 
remaining pathway to satisfy the requirements of a democratically legitimate 
institution (Majone 1998). Implementing austerity measures, which are in any 
case painful for the populations of the respective countries, in a way that would 
also put most of the adjustment burden on lower incomes and thus more 
vulnerable households would almost certainly be perceived as a negative 
outcome for the people and thus undermine the democratic legitimacy of the 
responsible institution. Therefore, even a cynical view of European bureaucrats 
as self-interested budget-maximisers (Niskanen 1971) provides grounds for why 
the Commission would favour more progressive austerity measures: A further 
deterioration of the EU's perceived output legitimacy has the potential to 
endanger the entire European project and thus threaten the very existence of 
its institutions, as has become clear with the recent upsurge of Euroscepticism. 
 
It also needs to be noted that the European Commission faced a dilemma: On 
the one hand it needed to be mindful of the accountability it has towards all 
member states and in particular heed the powerful coalition of interests in the 
Council built around the creditor countries, most notably Germany. This 
translated into a particularly hawkish stance on austerity and the insistence 
on the repayment of the loans, while others, and most notably the IMF, 
softened their stance somewhat having accepted the inevitability of a haircut 
(Henning 2017). On the other hand, the technocrats within the Commission, 
while accepting the general austerity paradigm, had their own ideas regarding 
the specific design of the austerity measures they were imposing on the EAP 
countries, and especially their social impact. The following elaborates on this 





There is evidence that Commission officials, in fact, have a strong 
predisposition towards policies based upon a more regulated form of capitalism, 
as well as enshrining a stronger social dimension in the European integration 
project characterised by more extensive social services and higher levels of 
redistribution (Hooghe 2000; 2001; Ross 1995). At the same time, interview 
evidence shows that Commission officials express a degree of concern that the 
European social model is increasingly under pressure and that they would 
prefer a stronger orientation towards policies that ensure more equity through 
redistribution (Ross 2011, 43f.). In fact, one must not forget that the European 
social model is enshrined in the Treaties, with Article 151 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union stipulating that member states and the EU 
“shall have as their objectives the promotion of employment, improved living 
and working conditions [and] proper social protection” (Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union 2009). The Commission as per Article 17 
of the Treaty on European Union is the “guardian of the EU Treaties”, 
including the European social model, and tasked with defending and enforcing 
its principles and ensuring compliance by member states (Treaty on European 
Union 1992). 
 
The accountability towards the hawkish governments of the creditor countries 
(as well as the simple truth that any bailout would require the agreement of 
these governments, thus significantly shifting bargaining power in their favour) 
on the one hand, and the European social model enshrined in the Treaties on 
the other hand, further underscores the idea that Commission officials may 
have found themselves caught between a rock and a hard place called Berlin. 
A solution to this dilemma is offered by viewing the economic adjustment 
programmes as what Mahoney and Thelen (2010) call ‘soft spots’ in the 
historical institutionalist sense that can be utilised by agents to achieve gradual 
change (see also Streeck and Thelen 2005; Thelen 2003; 2009). Following this 




to realise changes towards more efficient redistribution and generally ensure 
the protection or compensation of vulnerable households from the most adverse 
effects of the adjustment process without jeopardising the primary goal of fiscal 
consolidation. 
 
In the following, the paper presents further evidence of the ideas of Commission 
officials regarding social Europe and inequality and redistribution in the 
particular context of the adjustment programmes. For that purpose, a corpus 
of over 250 sources, including interviews, speeches, public statements, press 
releases, as well as newspaper articles and other journalistic reports, was 
surveyed for content by European Commission officials and representatives 
relating directly to the economic adjustment reform programmes in Greece and 
Portugal. Subsequently, similar evidence is given for the IMF. The ECB, 
despite its merely consultative role, took a strong stance on fiscal policy and 
pushed for a particularly hawkish position (see also Woodruff's 
conceptualisation of the ECB 'governing by panic', 2016). However, with 
regard to the EAPs and their distributive effects in particular, the ECB did 
not communicate any particular position openly. The paper follows approaches 
used in a number of accounts of the Eurozone crisis and the economic 
adjustment process in order to gauge the preferences and ideas of the involved 
policy makers, including Henning (2017) and Ramalho (2020; see also 
Fairclough and Fairclough 2013). 
 
It is apparent from a number of statements made by the Commission’s Task 
Force for Greece that the Commission, albeit sticking to the austerity 
paradigm, sought to use the opportunity of the far-reaching reform programmes 
to ensure a fairer design of the welfare state. In 2011, after the inception of the 
programme and initial difficulties (see Paper 2 for a discussion of the tighter 
control exercised by the Troika after the year of the EAP for Greece), the Task 




consolidation and welfare state modernisation, stating that “a stronger and 
fairer tax system will make a significant contribution to fiscal consolidation 
and social equity” (European Commission 2011a). The words by the Task Force 
were echoed by then-Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, Olli 
Rehn, who outlined the Commission’s duty to “help Greece implement essential 
reforms to boost its competitiveness, create a fairer and more effective tax 
system, and generate sustainable growth and employment” (Rehn 2012) again 
exhibiting that even endorsing fiscally hawkish positions, as did Rehn, was not 
considered by the Commission to be mutually exclusive with modernising a tax 
system and making it fairer and more equitable. A good two years later, and 
after the Troika had markedly changed their approach to managing the 
adjustment process in Greece, the Task Force doubled down on this claim in 
their sixth activity report stating that the further modernisation of the tax 
system is “essential to enable Greek authorities to increase public revenues and 
to deliver a fairer, more equitable distribution of the tax burden” (European 
Commission 2014). 
 
Such statements are mirrored by the ideas and preferences voiced at the highest 
levels of the Commission. In 2012, Commission President José Manuel Barroso 
said in a speech given to the European Parliament after the Spring Council 
Meeting:  
“I also made clear that we need a perspective of social inclusion 
because there are some situations of social emergency, raising 
poverty in many of our Member States. [...] I made the point that 
structural reform must be politically, but also socially acceptable 
to our citizens. [...] This is one element in demonstrating that the 
path we are taking is a fair one, where the burden and the benefits 
are both shared” (Barroso 2012) 
 
One year later, in a speech from 2013, Barroso reiterates this point as well as 
relating it to the Commission’s fundamental responsibility and commitment to 




“From its inception, European integration was always a way to 
close gaps: gaps between its Member States, differences between 
regions, disparities between rich and poor. In the current treaty, 
the Lisbon Treaty, this goal is specified as such: 'The Union 
shall… work for… a highly competitive social market economy, 
aiming at full employment and social progress… It shall combat 
social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social 
justice and protection... It shall promote economic, social and 
territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.'” 
(Barroso 2013) 
 
Jean-Claude Juncker, during his tenure as European Commission president, 
continued on the same path. Next to the comprehensive Social Impact Report 
already mentioned in the previous section, he stated repeatedly that the 
distributive effects of the further adjustment process in Greece are important 
and that it is vital to ensure that reforms are designed in an equitable manner. 
In June 2015, he said: 
“I know the hardship [the Greek people] have been through and I 
have always said that we have to pay more attention to the social 
fairness of our programmes. [...] This is certainly a demanding 
and comprehensive package, but it is a fair one.” (Juncker 2015) 
 
The thrust in making sure that austerity measures were at least designed in a 
progressive manner received a further push when Pierre Moscovici became Olli 
Rehn’s successor as Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs. During 
his tenure as French Finance Minister, Moscovici was a vocal opponent of 
austerity measures, which he viewed as a political imposition of ‘strict financial 
orthodoxy’ that only served to crush consumption, employment and 
investment (Moscovici 2012). He emphasised distinctly that fiscal consolidation 
programme ultimately implemented under the Hollande government was more 
progressive, and cuts were not executed cutting indiscriminately and 
irrespective of their social impact (McDaniel 2019, 184f.). During his tenure as 
Commissioner, Moscovici reiterated in a speech from 2016 that as part of the 




generating prosperity must be the absolute priority” (Moscovici 2016). In the 
later stages of the adjustment process, when economic recovery was under way, 
Moscovici continuously stressed this point, saying “The European crisis is no 
more an economic crisis. It is an inequality crisis” (Bases 2018) 
 
The case is more complex for the IMF due to its lower or rather different 
accountability. At the same time it also seems less plausible that the IMF 
should promote redistributive policies with the aim of lowering inequality given 
its track record in past surveillance programmes. However, in the more recent 
past, the IMF has been subjected to heavy criticism for its handling of the East 
Asian Crisis to the point where its institutional legitimacy was under threat 
(Chwieroth 2009). Putting a stronger emphasis on prescribing socially 
acceptable reforms rather than imposing Washington-Consensus-style austerity 
measures thus may have been part of a process of institutional learning. Indeed, 
there is evidence from official documents, research papers, and public 
statements made by senior staff that this has been the case, and that the Fund 
adopted a more positive stance towards policies that are aimed at avoiding 
increases in inequality, including measures that entail higher levels of 
redistribution. However, the observable change is rather incremental and 
therefore does not necessarily require a fundamentally new understanding of 
how the IMF works; achieving economic growth still is the primary policy 
objective for IMF surveillance programmes. The important difference is that 
inequality now appears to be taken as an important factor to consider when 
designing policies best-suited to stimulate and maintain economic growth. 
 
To develop this argument it is first necessary to better understand the IMF’s 
self-conception and internal workings. The IMF as an institution understands 
itself to be apolitical, pragmatic and promoting what they take to be ‘sound 
economic policy’. What constitutes sound economic policy is in turn defined by 




departments (Ban and Patenaude 2018). A dispute between different economic 
ideas such as orthodox and revisionist understandings of economic policy is 
thus usually reflected in the IMF’s position on certain topics rather than 
promoting one or the other22. This implies a certain heterogeneity of economic 
ideas within the Fund itself. Indeed, the IMF is characterised by internal 
struggles among different ideas and subcultures that promote one or the other 
before they are formalised (Ban 2015; Chwieroth 2009). This is evidenced both 
in interviews with Fund staff (Ban and Patenaude 2018; Clift 2018), official 
documents published by the IMF (Ban 2016), and public statements made by 
Fund officials (Rodrik 2006). 
 
In the case of the IMF’s position regarding inequality and redistribution in the 
Eurozone economic adjustment programmes, this process can be traced back 
to the aftermath of the East Asian Crisis and the Global Financial Crisis as a 
critical juncture (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; Collier and Collier 2002; Thelen 
1999; Lipset and Rokkan 1967) triggering a rethinking of previously held 
beliefs. The economic orthodoxy of the pre-GFC era was questioned by 
influential economists shifting towards more market scepticism and openness 
to interventionist policies (see e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012; DeLong 
et al. 2012). At the same time, a growing body of research on the causes and 
levels of economic inequality spearheaded by economists such as Tony 
Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez gave more salience to the issue 
of economic inequality within the economics profession as a whole (Atkinson 
1997; 2015; Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2011; Piketty and Saez 2003; 2014). 
 
 
22 The fact that economic policies advocated by the IMF overlapped with neoliberal principles 
for the better part of two decades since the 1980s is thus more of a reflection of the then 
consensus in the economics profession after the turn towards neoclassical economics rather 




Research from within the IMF mirrored this development both with regard to 
a generally more market sceptic view of economic policy (Cottarelli and 
Jaramillo 2012) and the issue of inequality as an impediment to sustainable 
long-term growth. In two much-cited papers from 2011 and 2014, senior IMF 
staff argue that high levels of inequality are harmful to long-term economic 
growth (Berg and Ostry 2011; Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides 2014). Still 
cautious with regard to sweeping policy recommendations, the authors show 
furthermore that there is no empirical evidence that non-excessive forms of 
redistribution should harm economic growth, thus rebuffing the notion of a 
possible equity-efficiency-trade-off. In fact, the authors argue, sensible forms of 
redistribution can contribute to higher and more sustainable economic growth. 
 
Evidence from interviews with and speeches by senior IMF officials reveal two 
channels explaining the observed negative relationship of high inequality and 
sustainable economic growth. Firstly, higher levels of redistribution can 
facilitate growth directly: Based on lower income households’ higher marginal 
propensity to consume, redistribution towards these households has larger 
multiplier effects (Kalecki 1971). In other words, as lower income households 
spend a larger share of their income, policies that increase their income lead to 
higher consumption and thus boost economic growth. Jonathan Ostry, Deputy 
Director of the IMF’s Research Department notes that: 
“Fiscal policy, fortuitously, is more potent in periods of economic 
slack such as the aftermath of the global financial crisis, so it 
makes sense to use it. And to use it not only for counter-cyclical 
purposes, but also to facilitate redistribution, which itself can 
help to spur economic growth.” (Ostry in Clift 2018, 82).  
Ostry reaffirms that in his opinion this does not constitute a radical shift in 
the IMF’s priorities: 
“A core objective of the Fund is to come up with policy advice 
that underpins macro-financial stability. So if we can show that 
avoiding excessive inequality is in fact essential for strong, 




have been engaged in does show), then indeed there is a direct 
link between issues of inequality and distribution and issues that 
lie at the core of the IMF’s mandate.” (ibid., 21f.) 
 
Secondly, specifically in the case of fiscal consolidation, the IMF, like the 
European Commission, identifies public support as a key prerequisite for a 
successful adjustment process and by extension economic recovery through 
growth-inducing reforms. Deputy Managing Director David Lipton stated in 
his opening remarks to the IMF’s Fiscal Forum 2013: 
“Generating public support is necessary for fiscal adjustment. 
Adjustment fatigue […] undermines the gradual progress that is 
being made towards restoring fiscal sustainability. [Making fiscal 
adjustment] balanced and equitable […] is critical for building 
public support and maintaining it.” (Lipton 2013) 
 
Internally, this process was driven forward by change-agents such as 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn who pushed concerns over how policies in response 
to the GFC would affect inequality further up on the IMF’s agenda. Under 
Strauss-Kahn’s tenure as Managing Director a number of likeminded 
economists were appointed to senior positions including Olivier Blanchard as 
Chief Economist and Carlo Cottarelli as Director of the Fiscal Affairs 
Department. The importance of these individuals actors and the impact that 
their ideas had on the general direction taken by the Fund with regard to the 
distributive effects of their reforms, cannot be overstated. For Clift, who has 
worked extensively on the internal change processes within the IMF, these 
powerful change-agents, or ‘bricoleurs’, played a central role in the IMF’s novel 
appreciation of the social dimension of the reforms prescribed to programme 
countries (Clift 2018). In May 2011, the Economist wrote about the specific 
role of Dominique Strauss-Kahn in this process:  
“Before his fall, Mr Strauss-Kahn had done more than any other 
recent managing director to restore the IMF's reputation. A few 
years ago the fund's very relevance was being questioned. But his 




crisis was taken seriously and acted upon. […] His championing 
of the need to insulate the poor from the effects of fiscal austerity 
has, many believe, led the fund to become kinder and gentler” 
(The Economist 2011) 
 
It is no coincidence that one of the proponents of progressive austerity in the 
European Commission, Pierre Moscovici, had close ties to Strauss-Kahn who 
had been a political mentor of his up until Strauss-Kahn’s sexual assault 
charges came to light. Having been one of his students at the French elite ENA 
civil service academy, Moscovici later became president of the group à gauche 
en Europe, which Strauss-Kahn had founded together with former socialist 
Prime Minister Michel Rocard, and would go on to work for Strauss-Kahn for 
a number of years including during his unsuccessful bid for the French 
Presidency in 2007 (Flynn 2012). 
 
Christine Lagarde, having succeeded Dominque Strauss-Kahn as IMF 
Managing Director, continued to facilitate the process of change begun under 
her predecessor and asserted in a speech at the Conference on Inclusive 
Capitalism in 2014:  
“One of the leading economic stories of our time is rising income 
inequality. […] Fundamentally, excessive inequality makes 
capitalism less inclusive. It hinders people from participating fully 
and developing their potential […] Redistributive policies always 
produce winners and losers. Yet if we want capitalism to do its 
job – enabling as many people as possible to participate and 
benefit from the economy – then it needs to be more inclusive.” 
(Lagarde 2014) 
 
The new-found appreciation of excessive inequality as an obstacle to long-term 
economic growth as well as a valid target for government intervention through 
redistributive efforts is reflected even in flagship IMF publications such as the 




“Though inequality has always been perceived to be a central 
issue, until recently it was not believed to have major implications 
for macroeconomic developments. This belief is increasingly 
called into question. How inequality affects both the 
macroeconomy and the design of macroeconomic policy will likely 
be increasingly important items on our agenda.” (Blanchard 2014, 
xiii) 
 
Similarly, in a much-noticed article from 2016 tellingly titled Neoliberalism: 
Oversold? (Ostry, Loungani, and Furceri 2016), senior IMF researchers 
reiterate the argument that inequality is harmful for long-term growth and 
state that even those that subscribe to a neoliberal view of how the economy 
should work and are only concerned with achieving economic growth, “still need 
to pay attention to the distributional effects.” The article even goes so far as 
to question a whole economic paradigm and calls for “a more nuanced view of 
what the neoliberal agenda is likely to be able to achieve”. In reaction to the 
article, then-IMF Chief Economist Maurice Obstfeld stated revealingly:  
“[this article] does not signify a major change in the Fund's 
approach. […] We are in favor of fiscal policies that support 
growth and equity over the long term. […] Our job is to advise 
how governments can best manage their fiscal policies so as to 
avoid bad outcomes. Sometimes, this requires us to recognize 
situations in which excessive budget cutting can be 
counterproductive to growth, equity, and even fiscal 
sustainability goals.” (Obstfeld 2016) 
 
Therefore, this gradual change within the IMF and its policies can be conceived 
of as follows: First, a set of newer ideas (or rather ideas different from the 
orthodoxy) – such as a more critical stance towards markets and the view that 
inequality needs to be tackled through redistributive measures in order to 
ensure economic growth – takes hold. Second, through ideational struggle 
within the Fund, this set of ideas supersedes previously dominant ones, often 
catalysed by critical juncture events such as the GFC calling the validity of 




different sets of ideas to be empowered they require the legitimation through 
credible research, usually from top economics departments in the US and 
around the world, as well as in-house research by the IMF. This process can 
be accelerated and shaped substantially by powerful change-agents within the 
institution by giving out policy directives or appointing similarly-minded 
agents to influential positions within the institution. Third, given the 
hierarchical nature of the IMF, new ideas, once they have taken hold, are 
diffused swiftly and translate into concrete policies (Clift 2018; Copelovitch 
2010; Momani 2007). Ultimately, this interplay of ideational struggle on the 
one hand, and the top-down organisational form of the IMF on the other hand, 
led to these new ideas regarding the centrality of inequality as an important 
issue for the Fund shaping the policy prescriptions found in the EAPs in the 
Eurozone crisis. 
 
In conclusion, both the European Commission and the IMF thus advocate for 
a progressive design of the reforms, as is evidenced in the Troika documents 
and the individually compiled post-programme evaluations. This is due to 
strategic considerations on the part of both institutions given that a progressive 
design of the programme is most likely to maintain public support for the 
reforms and thus ensure the success of the programme. Moreover, there is 
evidence that the IMF in particular underwent a gradual change characterised 
by a reorientation of what the Fund holds to be ‘sound economic policy’ 
towards a more positive view of redistribution due to research pointing to 
negative effects of high levels of income inequality on economic growth. 
 
1.4.6 Discussion of the findings 
This section produced a number of findings. Firstly, the analysis of EU-SILC 
data show that inequality did not increase throughout the duration of the 




show that the reform prescriptions actually had inequality-reducing effects. 
Considering that both Greece and Portugal were not only plagued by high 
public debt when the economic adjustment programmes were implemented, but 
also by a severe economic recession, this is all the more puzzling. During the 
recession in the programme countries, the respective economies had low 
economic growth rates and at times shrank considerably, while unemployment 
rose which was expected to put an upward pressure on income inequality, and 
which is illustrated by the increases in market income inequality observed in 
this section (see Figure 5 and Figure 6). At the same time, the level of 
redistribution, i.e. the difference between market and disposable household 
income inequality, increased noticeably. This is somewhat common during a 
recession as automatic stabilisers kick in and increase government spending on 
certain benefit programmes that have redistributive effects. However, in the 
two observed cases, the entirety of the increases in market income inequality 
was absorbed through redistributive measures as illustrated by the fact that 
disposable income inequality remained stable throughout the crisis.  
 
This is especially remarkable for the Greek case as the EAPs relied heavily on 
expenditure-based measures, which were expected to exacerbate inequality 
increases through cuts in the social budget. This should have undermined the 
welfare state’s capacity to mitigate upward pressures on inequality levels, 
stemming from higher unemployment, by means of redistribution. As this 
evidently did not occur, based on the findings presented in this section, this 
suggests that the fiscal consolidation measures outlined in the economic 
adjustment programmes were in fact progressive in their distributive impact 
and thus able to offset the upward pressure on inequality levels induced by the 
economic recession and rising levels of unemployment, as validated by the data 





The a priori expectations for the Portuguese programme were less clear-cut due 
to the weaker empirical case of revenue-based programmes causing inequality 
levels to move in one particular direction. The empirical analysis in this section 
showed that, at the aggregate level, much like in the Greek case, inequality 
remained stable throughout the adjustment process with only minor 
fluctuations, and that this was due to the progressive direct effects of the 
reforms, as evidenced through the simulations presented in Figure 11. However, 
one key difference between the Greek and the Portuguese cases, despite 
aggregate inequality indicators such as the Gini coefficient and the S80/S20 
ratio showing similar results, is revealed when decomposing the direct 
distributive effects of the reforms by deciles: In the Greek case, the bottom 
decile of the income distribution in fact saw substantive increases in their 
incomes due to the reforms vis-à-vis the simulated non-reform scenario while 
the top decile saw the largest losses. In the Portuguese case, it was the middle 
income groups that were somewhat protected from the adverse effects of the 
adjustment process, while both the bottom and top income deciles saw the 
largest aggregate income losses due to the reforms. Neither the Gini coefficient 
nor the S80/S20 ratio would have picked this up, as the Gini coefficient is in 
any case rather insensitive towards changes at the tails of the income 
distribution, and the S80/S20 ratio only looks at the relative ratio between the 
two top and bottom deciles, thus not capturing the above-outlined changes in 
the income distribution as long as the ratio between top and bottom deciles 
remains stable in relative terms. 
 
On the basis of these findings, H1 (that austerity measures have predetermined 
effects depending on their composition, i.e. the degree to which they are 
expenditure- or revenue-based) must be rejected: Firstly, both the Greek and 
Portuguese EAPs were not accompanied by increases in inequality. In fact, in 
both cases the reforms served to make the countries’ tax-benefit system more 




expenditure-based programmes for Greece had more progressive distributive 
effects than the relatively more revenue-based Portuguese programme. 
Conversely, there is strong evidence in favour of H2: Austerity measures seem 
to have no predetermined distributive effects. Instead whether austerity 
increases or lowers inequality simply depends on the exact design of the 
reforms. Measures such as tax increases can be progressive, i.e. lower inequality, 
if they target higher incomes. Similarly, cuts in social expenditure can have 
inequality-reducing effects if lower income groups are exempt from the cuts 
thus compressing the distribution of disposable incomes. 
 
Moreover, the exact design of the reforms is naturally determined by policy 
makers preferences who have a certain degree of freedom in choosing from a 
number of available policy options. In the case at hand, the constraints of these 
options arose from the need for fiscal consolidation. In turn, this means that 
as long as fiscal consolidation is achieved, policy makers’ preferences regarding 
inequality and redistribution are reflected in both the design of the prescribed 
reforms and the observed distributive outcomes. In the case of Greece, there is 
a remarkable congruence of the observed effects and the aims of the policy 
prescriptions laid out in the EAPs and Memoranda of Understanding. For 
instance, the introduction of stronger means-testing for benefit payments was 
prescribed in order to shield lower income groups from adverse effects of the 
reforms. For Greece, the EUROMOD data confirm that these reforms had 
precisely the desired effect. In Portugal on the other hand this was not the case 
and changes in means-testing benefits were regressive. However, spending data 
suggest that means-tested benefits in Portugal were simply cut rather than 
being expanded as envisioned in the EAPs. The European Commission’s post-
programme evaluation for Portugal corroborates this as is evidenced by the 
Commission’s critique of insufficiently implemented reform prescriptions aimed 
at stronger means-testing of benefits. This suggest that there was some 




implemented and that further research is necessary to explain the reasons for 
this departure from the originally agreed-upon reforms, which would have likely 
resulted in similarly progressive distributive effects as those in Greece.  
 
Despite the deviation of the reforms in Portugal from the desired distributive 
effects, the originally agreed-upon reform prescriptions and formulated aims 
are in line with the preferences of European Commission and IMF both of 
which showed a predisposition towards making the reforms as progressive as 
possible. This is partly because regressive reforms would jeopardise the overall 
success of the programme – the key priority for the Troika institutions – by 
undermining public support for the reforms. In addition, both the Commission 
and the IMF had good reasons to advocate for more socially acceptable reforms: 
For the Commission this firstly constituted a way to protect its democratic 
legitimacy by producing positive outcomes for the people (or at least limit the 
negative outcome in crisis-ridden countries like Greece). Secondly, the EAPs 
presented an opportunity for Commission bureaucrats to achieve the realisation 
of at least some elements of a stronger European social model within the 
confines of harsh austerity. For the IMF, the departure from its previously 
unconcerned stance towards the issue of inequality was the result of a gradual 
change originating in the learnings from the East Asia Crisis and the GFC 
leading to a more positive view towards redistributive policies: Aside from 
generating public support, recent IMF research finds such measures support 
economic growth more directly through larger fiscal multipliers by 
redistributing income towards households at the lower end of the income 





1.5 Conclusion and Avenues for Further Research 
This paper aimed to establish the distributive effects of fiscal consolidation 
measures in the Eurozone crisis based on a comparative case study of the Greek 
and Portuguese Economic Adjustment Programmes. While the Greek EAPs 
were heavily expenditure-based, the Portuguese EAP was revised in its 
composition and ultimately relied more on revenue-increasing measures rather 
than expenditure-cuts. Previous studies have found that fiscal consolidation 
leads to higher levels of income inequality, which is exacerbated when the 
consolidation is largely based on expenditure measures. Against this 
background, the paper has shown evidence that this was not the case in either 
the Greek or the Portuguese EAPs. 
 
In fact, inequality of disposable household income is found to stagnate 
throughout the duration of the EAPs rather than increasing. In addition, 
inequality of market income increased substantially in both Greece and 
Portugal, suggesting that the redistributive capacities of the countries’ welfare 
states have remained intact or even been strengthened. Based on data created 
through simulations with tax-benefit microsimulation tool EUROMOD, the 
paper has found that, in addition to this general development of inequality 
indicators, the fiscal consolidation measures themselves had inequality-
reducing direct effects in both countries. 
 
While, based on the findings of previous studies,  the revenue-based programme 
of Portugal was expected to be less inequality-increasing from the outset, it 
was the progressiveness of the Greek programme that was particularly 
puzzling. In explaining this puzzle, the paper has shown that expenditure-based 
fiscal consolidation is possible without crippling the welfare state’s 
redistributive capacities. An analysis of the impact of different classes of 




making large parts of formerly non-means-tested benefits means-tested. In 
doing so, higher income groups were excluded from receiving these benefits, 
while lower income groups were compensated. At the same time, expenditure 
on non-means-tested benefits for high income groups tends to be higher than 
for low income groups, which makes this approach not only more progressive 
but also more effective in achieving fiscal consolidation. 
 
On this basis the paper rejects the notion of an automatic relationship between 
austerity or its composition (expenditure- versus revenue-based) and its 
distributive effects for the cases of Greece and Portugal. Acknowledging that 
austerity can take on different forms, the paper finds that the exact design of 
the reforms is crucial in determining their impact on income inequality. This 
gives policy makers room for manoeuvre despite the general need for fiscal 
consolidation. The way in which policy makers decide to use this room in turn 
depends on their preferences regarding inequality and redistribution. 
 
The paper showed that the Troika expressed a strong interest in keeping 
inequality increases limited and making the programmes as socially acceptable 
as possible. This was partly due to strategic considerations: Regressive reforms 
would have likely jeopardised the success of the programmes through losing 
public support and creating even stronger opposition to the reforms. This is 
evidenced by the Troika’s policy objectives outlined in the various documents 
of the EAPs. Moreover, a progressive reform design is in line with the European 
Commission’s need to derive its democratic legitimacy from producing positive 
outcomes for the peoples of the member states. As for the IMF, the paper 
presented evidence that the institution underwent an incremental change in its 
stance on inequality, which the Fund now views as an obstacle to economic 
growth. Incorporating in the EAPs policies that tackle inequality, such as 





The evidence presented in the paper raises a number of important questions to 
be addressed in future research. Firstly, despite the fact that both the Greek 
and the Portuguese EAPs are similar in the progressiveness of the originally 
prescribed reforms, the observed outcomes are different along one important 
dimension. While both programmes led to lower inequality if measured by 
aggregate indicators such as the Gini coefficient, decomposing the effects by 
income deciles revealed that in Greece lower income groups were most 
protected, meanwhile in Portugal middle income groups were protected and 
both lower and higher income groups lost the most. This divergence in the 
observable distributive effects suggests that there were deviations from the 
originally prescribed reform design. 
 
Granted that this warrants closer scrutiny in its own right, it also leads to a 
further question concerning the responsibility of the policy makers in charge: 
We know that matters of redistribution are at the core of democratic politics. 
However, the Troika technocrats are unelected and are therefore not guided in 
their actions by the desire to be re-elected. The question is therefore whether 
these dynamics had a bearing on the design of the implemented reforms in the 
two cases at hand. This is salient given that the reforms were originally imposed 
by unelected technocrats that can all but ignore electoral politics, but had to 
be implemented by elected governments that are exposed to electoral 
retribution and therefore need to cater to important electoral groups. Paper 2 
of this thesis addresses this issue. 
 
A further question that the paper did not address concerns other dimensions 
of distributive effects of the reforms. Fiscal policy reforms constituted a major 
part of the economic adjustment programmes. However, they were underpinned 
by far-reaching structural reforms that potentially followed different dynamics. 
One question is therefore whether changes in e.g. labour market regulation had 




principles of deregulation and privatisation with adverse distributive outcomes 
for more vulnerable groups. Paper 3 of this thesis expands the analysis to the 
distributive effects of labour market reforms. 
 
In a similar fashion, the paper did not address possible issues with the 
measurement of inequality more generally. Most indicators measure inequality 
in relative terms. Therefore, it is possible to see reductions in inequality even 
if everybody becomes worse off as long those at the upper end of the 
distribution lose relatively more than those at the lower end. This is true both 
for income inequality and labour market inequality or any other dimension. 
Future research therefore needs to address the issue of ‘equality in 
precariousness’ or ‘progressive impoverishment’, as well as incorporating other 
sources of wellbeing – such as access to public services – that are not taken 





––––– Paper II ––––– 
Sound economic policy and the median voter: The 
democratic constraints to progressive policy making 
 
ABSTRACT 
Building on the work of the previous paper, this paper zooms further in on the 
distributive effects of the reform programmes in Greece and Portugal. Using 
microsimulation techniques, the paper computes the distributive effects of the 
reforms decomposed by income deciles as well as over time. The key findings 
that the paper presents are the following: (1) Whilst overall reducing inequality 
when measured in aggregate terms, the composition by decile reveals that the 
reforms in Greece were largely protective of the lowest income earners; (2) 
conversely, in Portugal, the reforms protected middle income groups; (3) In an 
endeavour to explain these divergent distributive outcomes, the paper finds 
evidence that the Troika controlled the reform process much more strongly in 
Greece than in Portugal. The reform effects thus matched more closely the 
preferences of the unelected technocratic Troika policy makers in Greece, whilst 
they matched more closely the preferences of the elected government in 
Portugal. This is because the Troika aimed at redistributing towards lower 
income groups in order to stimulate economic growth and ensure a minimum 
degree of public support. The Portuguese government on the other hand 
displayed preferences ordinarily associated with office-seeking politicians, i.e. 
the aim to protect the median voter as such policies are understood to be most 
likely to secure support for the government’s re-election. This argument is 
corroborated further by zooming in on distributive changes per year, which 
reveals that the Greek EAPs only became progressive, in the sense that they 
shielded low income earners, from 2012 onwards. This matches the evidence 







In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and ensuing sovereign debt 
crisis, several Eurozone member states required government bailouts. In turn, 
the Troika of International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Commission, and 
European Central Bank (ECB) administered comprehensive Economic 
Adjustment Programmes in Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus. The EAPs 
of the Eurozone entailed large-scale austerity measures aimed at consolidating 
public budgets by cutting expenditure or increasing revenues through taxes. 
Inevitably, the EAPs thus triggered distributional conflicts over how the 
adjustment burden was to be shared. In the previous paper I have shown by 
the examples of Greece and Portugal that the austerity measures implemented 
as part of the EAPs are (1) not associated with a general increase in inequality 
levels, and (2) can vary across countries, both with regard to their exact design 
and by extension their distributive effects. In other words, there is no 
automatism between austerity measures as such and certain distributive 
outcomes. Instead, these outcomes depend on how policy makers choose to 
distribute the adjustment burden. 
 
In this paper, I analyse the politics of distributive conflicts arising from fiscal 
consolidation pressures in Greece and Portugal, thus exploring an important 
question raised by the findings presented in the previous paper. The central 
aim of the paper is to answer the following question: What explains the 
differences in the distributive effects that can be observed as a result of the 
EAP austerity measures? The paper’s key hypothesis is that the nature of the 
distributive effects depends on the preferences of the policy makers 
administering the adjustment process – and, more importantly, which policy 
makers had the strongest influence over the reform process. Whilst much has 
been written about how elected policy makers typically solve such distributive 




supranational technocrats were heavily involved in the adjustment process. The 
preferences of elected policy makers and unelected technocrats are, however, 
motivated by radically different factors.  
 
Understanding the distributive effects of the EAPs thus requires a two-part 
analysis: (1) the preferences of each set of policy makers regarding the 
distribution of the adjustment burden must be explicated; (2) the interaction 
between elected policy makers of domestic governments with the unelected 
technocrats of the Troika must be disentangled, to unpick to which degree the 
reform process was controlled by one or the other. In a second step, the 
preferences of the different policy makers and the degree of control they 
exercised over the reform process must be linked to the distributive effects of 
the EAPs observed in each country. 
 
Building on the work of the previous paper, this paper hypothesises that 
adjustment programmes that are more tightly controlled by the Troika are 
more protective of lower income groups. By virtue of being technocratic as 
opposed to elected policy makers, Troika officials favour policies whose 
soundness is backed up by empirical evidence and high-level research. On this 
basis, a gradual ideational shift observable within the economics discipline from 
a generally more market-oriented economic policy consensus to an increasingly 
market-sceptic, interventionist economic policy consensus, which originated in 
the lessons drawn from the Global Financial Crisis, ultimately filtered through 
to institutions such as the three Troika bodies and shaped their policy 
preferences (Clift 2018). One important manifestation of this ideational shift is 
that excessive inequality is increasingly viewed as a hindrance to long-term 
sustainable growth (Berg and Ostry 2011; Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides 2014). 
Simultaneously, more progressive redistributive policies are increasingly seen 
as effective and valid tools in boosting economic growth by stimulating 




to consume. Thus, avoiding regressive distributive outcomes became an 
important element in the Troika’s strategy to ensure economic recovery. 
  
Conversely, adjustment programmes that are less tightly controlled by the 
technocratic policy makers of the Troika leave well-known political dynamics 
of re-election-seeking officials unconstrained. In other words, reforms 
implemented by elected officials are likely to reflect to some degree their desire 
to cater to important voter groups in order to minimise electoral punishment. 
In this regard, the established literature offers two possible patterns of how 
such policy makers would distribute the adjustment burden when faced with 
fiscal consolidation pressures that are relevant to the analysis at hand: The 
first posits that governments design reforms in a way that protects their own 
voters from the most adverse effects (Walter 2016). The second, resting on a 
Downsian understanding of democracy, hypothesises that governments will 
seek to protect the median voter, i.e. voters in the middle of the income 
distribution. The median voter theorem postulates that this is because the 
middle of the income distribution constitutes the decisive voters around which 
powerful electoral coalitions form with which office-seeking policy makers seek 
to gain favours (Downs 1957; Iversen and Soskice 2006). 
 
Using data produced with tax-benefit microsimulation tool EUROMOD, this 
paper finds that the distributive effects of the reforms in the Greek EAPs match 
the expectations associated with a Troika-controlled programme more closely: 
Throughout the adjustment process, the lowest income group remained mostly 
shielded from reform-induced income losses. In fact, the paper presents 
evidence that those in the lowest income groups in Greece were compensated 
through the expansion of benefits and thus saw relative income increases 
compared to the pre-EAP tax-benefit system. In Portugal, the observed 
distributive effects suggest that the programme was less tightly controlled by 




benefit cuts and tax increases while both lower and higher income groups 
registered the largest income losses. A closer analysis of the observed effects 
further yields that there is no statistically significant correlation between 
support for the government and the degree to which voters were shielded from 
adverse effects of the reforms. This suggests that the Portuguese programme 
was both less in line with the preferences of the Troika, and that the guiding 
principle of the reforms was median voter alignment rather than direct voter 
responsiveness. 
 
In the second part of the analysis, the paper presents evidence for the degree 
to which each programme was controlled either by the Troika or the domestic 
government. The evidence corroborates that the Greek adjustment process was 
closely controlled by the Troika. Moreover, there is evidence suggesting that 
the Troika only took stronger control over the Greek reform process from 2012 
onwards after an initially more hands-off approach in the first two years – 
which is congruous with the observed distributive effects, as they show a 
marked upward trend of incomes in lower deciles after the second year of the 
reform process. Conversely, the Portuguese government retained relatively 
more control over the reform process, which is evidenced by the frequent and 
successful alterations of Troika reform prescriptions prior to their 
implementation. The early return of the country to the long-term bond market 
contributed to restricting the control of the Troika over the reform process by 
limiting the leverage represented by the prospect of withholding bailout funds. 
 
The paper makes three contributions: Firstly, it provides annual data on the 
direct distributive effects of the austerity measures implemented as part of the 
EAPs in the Eurozone crisis. The data are decomposed by income decile 
allowing a more fine-grained analysis than the use of aggregate indicators such 
as the Gini coefficient. Secondly, it contributes to our understanding of the 




On the one hand, it thus formulates the argument that austerity measures 
controlled by technocratic policy makers have more room for progressive 
reforms than those implemented by elected policy makers. On the other hand, 
it contributes to the literature on the median voter and the political power of 
the middle class (Iversen and Soskice 2019). This also advances the argument 
that the democratic processes involved in the preference formation of elected 
policy makers may in fact present an obstacle to progressive reforms. Thirdly, 
it enhances our understanding of the economic adjustment processes in the 
Eurozone, particularly with regard to the interaction of the Troika and 
domestic governments by showing that the control of the Troika over the 
reform process varies substantially across countries and over time. 
 
2.2 Literature review 
2.2.1 The political economy of adjustment: austerity as a trigger for 
distributive conflict in the Eurozone 
When faced with a balance of payment crisis, countries can typically decide 
between broadly two23 different strategies to solve this crisis (Webb 1991): 
Countries can opt for external or internal adjustment (or a combination of the 
two). External adjustment refers to restoring competitiveness by devaluating 
the currency and thus boosting exports and limiting imports and through that 
the outflow of capital. Internal adjustment refers to restoring competitiveness 
by means of policies aimed at reducing prices domestically, in practice often 
through a combination of structural reforms and fiscal consolidation measures. 
Both options are painful and therefore unattractive for governments: external 
adjustment leads to higher prices on imports, which hurts consumers and firms, 
 
23 This excludes various forms of financing budget deficits that do not address underlying 
macroeconomic or structural problems and thus are only appropriate for liquidity crises but 




particularly in heavily import-dependent economies (Frieden 2014). At the 
same time, the debt burden increases for debt denominated in foreign 
currencies (Walter 2013). Internal adjustment on the other hand is costly 
because it inevitably causes conflicts over how the burden of spending cuts, tax 
increases, and the often painful structural reforms that ordinarily involve 
policies for flexibilising labour markets are distributed among different groups.  
 
Faced with this difficult decision, policymakers tend to choose the least costly 
strategy, based on their country’s individual vulnerability profile (Walter 
2013). However, membership of a currency union such as the Eurozone 
significantly constrains countries in this choice: having relinquished control 
over their currency to the ECB, Eurozone member states had virtually no 
means of external adjustment without leaving the currency union, which in 
turn would have likely triggered an exit from the EU altogether. As this 
increases the costs of external adjustment exponentially, policy makers in the 
debtor countries were effectively left with internal adjustment as the only 
option. Similarly, in the language of bargaining games (Cline 1995; Eichengreen 
1996; Frieden 2015; Simmons 1994), the high costs associated with an exit from 
the Eurozone on the part of debtor countries, which a default on public debt 
would have likely resulted in, left creditor countries with virtually all the 
bargaining power. This allowed creditors to insist on repayments of the debt 
and the implementation of internal adjustment measures in the debtor 
countries to achieve this aim. The unique institutional setup or ‘design failures’ 
of the Economic and Monetary Union (De Grauwe 2013), such as the absence 
of a lender of last resort central bank to calm markets, exacerbated this (see 
also De Grauwe and Ji 2015; Iversen and Soskice 2018). 
 
Having established that Eurozone member states were left with internal 
adjustment and immediate austerity measures as the only policy option 




solve the distributional conflicts arising from the need to implement structural 
reforms, cut public expenditure, and increase taxes. 
 
2.2.2 Distributive conflicts: elected governments 
The issue of redistribution is a key competence of governments and as such one 
of the most central topics in the study of democracy. We can therefore build 
on a vast literature on the politics of redistribution as a basis for the 
propositions formulated in this paper regarding the distributive effects of the 
austerity measures observable in the Eurozone crisis. There are a number of 
different accounts in the literature on the preferences of elected policy makers 
regarding the redistribution of income, particularly when faced with internal 
adjustment pressures. However, they are united in the key assumption that 
officials will go with whichever option is least costly to them in terms of 
electoral punishment. The reform process thus becomes a deeply political issue 
as governments aim to shield those groups from the most adverse effects of the 
reforms that they perceive as decisive for their re-election or ability to govern 
successfully (see also Hibbs 1977; Garrett 1998). The central question in this 
context, therefore, is which groups exactly are the ones that governments 
perceive as decisive and would thus aim to shield in the painful economic 
adjustment process. 
 
One highly influential strand in the literature on redistribution is based on the 
median voter theorem (Downs 1957), which, in simple terms, stipulates that 
redistribution is determined by the hypothetical voter in the middle of the 
income distribution. Based on a right-skewed distribution of pre-fisc incomes, 
the median voter has an income below the mean and will push governments 
for ever more redistribution from higher to lower incomes until equilibrium is 
reached at the point where the costs of work disincentives through taxation are 




Meltzer and Richard (1981) show that the median voter theorem can thus be 
applied to explain increasing levels of redistribution through taxes and benefits.  
 
Of course, it should be noted that the model operates under several restrictive 
assumptions24, one of which is that the logic only applies to majoritarian 
electoral systems: In proportional representation (PR) systems, on the other 
hand, coalitions can technically form regardless of representing the median 
voter. Iversen and Soskice (2006) make an important contribution adding the 
dimension of different electoral systems. Their findings, however, show 
convincingly that PR systems in fact tend to produce higher levels of 
redistribution. This is because it is more attractive for middle income groups 
to form electoral coalitions with lower income groups rather than higher income 
groups, which in turn favours centre-left governments that tend to redistribute 
more. In the same vein, Huber and Powell (1994) show that whilst Majoritarian 
systems directly produce governments that are committed to policies that 
correspond with the preferences of the median voter, legislative bargaining in 
PR systems ultimately too results in policies that are closely aligned with 
median voter preferences (see also Lijphart 2004). Therefore, although the 
original logic of the median voter theorem applies only to Majoritarian systems, 
we can ascertain that through the formation of electoral coalitions and the 
process of legislative bargaining, the policies produced in PR systems are as or 
even more closely aligned with the preferences of the median voter. 
 
At this point, it is worth discussing a major implication of this argument for 
our understanding of how democracies work that is often overlooked or reduced 
to a footnote in the vast literature on redistribution: While there is strong 
evidence for democratic processes leading to more redistribution, thus keeping 
excessive inequality at bay if measured in aggregate terms, this logic does not 
 




dictate that lower income groups specifically benefit in this system if we 
decompose our measures of inequality. Indeed, all that the above-cited 
literature predicts is that the groups closest to the middle of the income 
distribution are politically the most powerful. Iversen and Soskice in their 
recent work Democracy and Prosperity call this the ‘fundamental equality of 
democracy’ arguing: 
“the winners from advanced economies are typically the decisive 
voters – they choose policies to re- and in some measure also 
predistribute; they may or may not make those choices to 
compensate the losers; and in particular they may choose not to 
compensate the poor. […] the essence of democracy is not 
redistribution or equality, as so commonly assumed, but the 
advancement of middle class interests.”  
(Iversen and Soskice 2019, 19f.) 
 
An alternative interpretation of the voter responsiveness argument is based on 
the notion of economic voting, i.e. that voters reward governments for positive 
economic conditions (Anderson 2000; Lewis‐Beck and Stegmaier 2007; Powell 
and Whitten 1993). When applied to the issue of internal adjustment and how 
governments solve distributive conflicts arising from it, this argument 
stipulates the following: it is not the position on the income distribution that 
is relevant for whether governments choose to protect certain voter groups, but 
whether or not they voted for the incumbent government. In other words, 
governments care less about the potential importance of voters denoted by how 
close they are to the hypothetical median voter and more about whether or not 
they have voted for the current government, assuming that they would reward 
the government for protecting them from potential adverse economic effects 
(such as painful reforms targeting their income) by re-electing them. According 
to this interpretation, when faced with internal adjustment pressures 
governments prefer putting the bulk of the adjustment burden on non-voters 
or opposition-voters rather than their own voters. Indeed, Walter shows that 




where voters of the government fared better than opposition- and non-voters 
in Estonia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland (Walter 2016).  
 
2.2.3 Distributive conflicts: non-majoritarian institutions 
Whilst re-election-seeking policy makers in one way or another implement 
policies that cater to certain voter groups, this logic does not apply in the same 
way to unelected non-majoritarian institutions as their incentives are markedly 
different. In the absence of voters pressuring policy makers in non-majoritarian 
institutions to adopt certain redistributive policies, their policy objectives are 
driven more by long-term goals the realisation of which in turn rests on ideas 
regarding the ideal design of economic policies. 
 
For the case of the Troika, these ideas can vary between the different 
institutions. For instance, the IMF’s primary objective in their involvement 
with domestic politics is clearly to achieve long-term economic growth by 
prescribing fiscal and structural reforms (Clift 2018). The primary policy 
objectives of the European Commission are more complex and less narrowly 
defined than those of the IMF. However, it is clear that the European 
Commission, whilst generally being a guardian of the Treaties, is also both an 
agent of the member states (Hawkins et al. 2006) and an agenda setter in her 
own right (Schmidt 2000). As such, the Commission is committed to driving 
forward the European project and achieving deeper integration (see also 
Hooghe 2001). Conversely, the ECB, as the third member of the Troika, has 
an extremely narrow mandate, its prime objective being ensuring price stability 
(De Grauwe 2018). However, all three institutions in their function as members 
of the Troika are also agents of creditor countries in the particular context of 
the Eurozone crisis. As such, all three institutions were committed to achieving 
economic recovery in the debtor countries in order to ensure that they would 




What can be deduced from these diverse policy objectives regarding the 
institutions’ preferences on inequality and redistribution? On the one hand, 
one could readily assume that inequality is not a central issue for these 
institutions, particularly because of the absence of electoral pressures forcing 
policy makers to make redistribution a policy priority. In fact, there is extensive 
evidence that throughout the second half of the 20th century, intervention from 
the IMF in countries with supranationally administered economic adjustment 
programmes was associated with rising levels of inequality (Ball et al. 2013; 
Furceri and Loungani 2016; Woo et al. 2013). This is in line with the then-
prevailing orthodoxy in the economic discipline built around the principles of 
the Washington Consensus (Williamson 1990). Following this, the IMF mostly 
advocated for policies predicated on a strong trust in markets and a limited 
role for governments (Stiglitz 2008). Substantive redistribution for the sake of 
increasing equality within an economy was clearly of secondary importance, 
and even viewed as harmful to achieving economic growth due to an alleged 
trade-off between equality and efficiency (Okun 1975). In fact, any potential 
efforts to advocate for higher levels of redistribution fell behind the Fund’s 
strong focus on price stability and austerity as necessary preconditions to 
achieve long-term economic growth (Babb and Buira 2005; Boughton 2001). 
 
However, as demonstrated in greater detail in the previous paper, the Troika 
institutions, particularly the IMF and the Commission, had an interest in 
making the EAPs as socially acceptable as possible and to eschew increases in 
inequality. 
 
For the IMF, this was the result of a longer process of gradual institutional 
change, partly motivated by lessons drawn from the East Asian crisis of the 
1990s (Chwieroth 2009) and partly by the GFC (Clift 2018) triggering a 
considerable rethinking of the prevailing economic orthodoxy. As a technocratic 




economic policy’ (Ban 2015; Clift 2018). As such, it followed shifts within the 
economics profession towards more market-scepticism (see e.g. Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko 2012; DeLong et al. 2012) with a growing focus on the issue of 
economic inequality (Atkinson 1997; 2015; Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2011; 
Cingano 2014; Piketty and Saez 2003; 2014). Internal research by the IMF 
corroborates both trends in the economic literature (Cottarelli and Jaramillo 
2012), emphasising the negative effects of inequality for sustainable long-term 
economic growth (Berg and Ostry 2011; Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides 2014). 
 
This is particularly true during recessions and phases of economic adjustment 
and is based on two important insights: Firstly, in order to be able to 
implement far-reaching economic reforms ultimately aimed at ensuring 
economic recovery and a return to economic growth, it is crucial to retain the 
support of the public and thus to minimise resistance. This in turn necessitates 
a balanced and equitable design of the reforms that distributes the adjustment 
burden fairly (Lipton 2013). Secondly, due to lower income households’ higher 
marginal propensity to consume, redistributing towards them results in a more 
marked boost for aggregate demand and by extension for economic output 
(Ostry in Clift 2018, 82). 
 
We know from extensive interview evidence that internally this process was 
consciously driven forward by change-agents such as Dominique Strauss-Kahn, 
Olivier Blanchard, and Christine Lagarde, who put economic inequality and 
the social impact of IMF-prescribed reforms at the top of the agenda (Clift 
2018). Ultimately, the hierarchical, top-down organisational form of the IMF 
(Copelovitch 2010; Momani 2007) allowed these ideas to quickly translate into 
actual policy prescriptions. It is important to note that whilst the shift in the 
IMF’s stance on inequality was substantial, it would be somewhat hasty to 
describe it as a paradigm shift as theorised by Hall (1993): the IMF’s primary 




nations remains unchanged. However, excessive levels of inequality are now 
simply viewed as an impediment to this objective. By extension, more 
redistributive policies compensating lower income groups were incorporated 
into the IMF’s existing repertoire of instruments constituting ‘sound economic 
policy’ to achieve economic adjustment. 
 
The European Commission’s preferences regarding inequality and 
redistribution are less straightforward. However, as outlined in the previous 
paper, we can infer that on the one hand the Commission had little interest in 
being associated with regressive economic policy reforms in the member states 
that punish the weakest members of society. This rests on the notion that the 
Commission must necessarily derive its democratic legitimacy through its 
output dimension to compensate for what it lacks in input legitimacy (Beetham 
and Lord 1998; Hix 2008; Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002). On the other hand, 
there is evidence that Commission bureaucrats favour an economic model that 
incorporates a stronger social dimension, rejecting the more market-oriented 
model of liberal market economies (Hooghe 2000). Instead, they seek to 
promote a stronger European social model (Hooghe 2001; Ross 1995). 
Regressive cuts to the welfare state would seriously undermine this project.  
 
Further to this, there is evidence that EU bureaucrats have recognised that 
the European social model has come under pressure and that they would prefer 
a stronger orientation towards policies that ensure greater equity through 
redistribution (Ross 2011; see also Garand, Parkhurst, and Seoud 1991 for a 
more general analysis of redistributive preferences of bureaucrats). In this 
regard one can conceive of the austerity measures in the EAPs as an example 
of a 'soft spot' that opens up different policy options for agents to choose from 
and thus achieve institutional change (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). The 
Eurozone crisis can be taken as an instance where Commission bureaucrats 




regarding inequality and redistribution by incorporating redistributive 
elements in otherwise harsh austerity programmes in the Eurozone periphery. 
 
The ECB, as the third Troika institution, was arguably the most hawkish of 
the three and it is the most difficult to gauge its preferences regarding 
inequality and redistribution. However, despite being a highly independent 
central bank with a singular focus on price stability, it cannot ignore the 
implications of fiscal policy for its own objectives. In practice matters of fiscal 
policy are often as important to central banks as monetary policy as the two 
are closely linked and interdependent (Ban and Patenaude 2018; Gabor 2016). 
This is illustrated by the fact that since the GFC central banks' communication 
on fiscal policy issues has intensified significantly (Allard et al. 2013). With 
regard to inequality in particular, the ECB has recently begun conducting 
research into the effects of monetary policy on the distribution of incomes 
(Ampudia et al. 2018; Lenza and Slacalek 2018) indicating that even central 
banks are far from impervious to this issue. However, the evidence suggests 
that this turn in the ECB’s attention towards the issue of inequality occurred 
after the conclusion of the EAPs. In fact, the thesis finds no evidence that the 
ECB pushed for any one position during the adjustment processes in the 
Eurozone crisis with regard to the distributive effects of the reforms other than 
ensuring fiscal prudence. 
 
In conclusion, regardless of whether one assumes a pessimistic view of non-
majoritarian institutions in the tradition of Niskanen’s self-interested budget-
maximisers (Niskanen 1971), or a more optimistic view resting on the notion 
that unelected bureaucrats have stronger predilections to altruism than persons 
in other professions or indeed elected officials (Chang 2002; Etzioni 1988), we 
can conclude the following: Within the confines of the austerity paradigm and 
without impinging upon the need for fiscal adjustment, the Troika institutions 




was a result of gradual institutional change and a shifting interpretation of 
what constituted ‘sound economic policy’ with increasing levels of inequality 
now being seen as a threat to sustainable economic growth. For the European 
Commission, being associated with regressive reform programmes was seen as 
a threat to the European integration project, and incorporating elements of 
redistribution and compensation for the most vulnerable members of society 
constituted a way for Commission bureaucrats to mould the EAPs according 
to their own preferences. Moreover, as is evidenced in the EAP-related 
documents, both institutions seem to view a progressive design of the overall 
painful reforms as instrumental to maintain public support and thus to ensure 
the successful conclusion of the programmes. It is important to note here that 
the above applies to the area of fiscal policy, whilst e.g. labour market reforms 
follow a somewhat different logic as winners and losers from reforms are less 
obvious and effects less immediately visible as with fiscal reforms.  
 
2.2.4 Research question and hypotheses 
This paper explains the variation in the distributive effects of austerity 
measures in different countries. The literature showcases that elected policy 
makers and Troika technocrats have substantially different motivations with 
respect to how they choose to distribute the reform burden in times of economic 
adjustment. Elected governments are in one way or another responsive to the 
interests of important voter groups in pursuit of securing their re-election. 
Depending on different strands in the literature, these decisive voters are either 
the governments’ own voters, or the median voter. Troika technocrats on the 
other hand seem unconstrained by the need to cater to certain voter groups’ 
interests, aside from the general aim of preserving a basic level of public support 





We also know from the literature on economic adjustment and balance of 
payment crises that the nature of adjustment strategies is not predetermined 
or necessarily dictated by one party only, i.e. either the creditor side or the 
debtor side. Instead, this depends on which side wields most of the bargaining 
power. Historically, these dynamics have played out very differently: In the 
1930s debt crisis for instance, debtors held all the bargaining power due to the 
very credible threat of defaulting and the low costs associated with a possible 
default after the breakdown of international financial markets (Eichengreen 
1996; Simmons 1994; Frieden 2015). During the 1980s recession on the other 
hand, financial markets remained intact, thus making a default much more 
costly and painful to debtors and leaving creditors with most of the bargaining 
power (Cline 1995). 
 
For the case of the Eurozone EAPs this suggests that different degrees of 
influence over the reforms process by either the domestic governments or the 
Troika are possible. Therefore, who decides on the specificities of the reform 
measures’ design depends on each country’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
Troika – whether it is ultimately the elected officials of the domestic 
governments or the unelected technocrats of the Troika institutions. 
Importantly, this should not be conceived of as a dichotomous variable 
implying either full control over the reforms exercised by either the Troika or 
the domestic government. Instead, the operationalisation of this variable used 
in this paper is on a continuous spectrum, accommodating possible changes 
over time. In other words, the exact degree of control over the reform process 
exercised by the Troika can vary both across countries and over time within 
countries. 
 
Combining these insights, the paper hypothesises that the distributive effects 
of the reforms depend crucially on where the locus of decision-making power 




Troika or the domestic governments. Specifically, the following hypotheses are 
derived regarding the distributive effects of the EAP reforms depending on who 
is in charge of the programme: 
 
H1: Programmes that are more tightly controlled by the Troika 
display a stronger focus on redistribution towards lower 
income groups. 
 
As the literature is more ambiguous on programmes that are mainly controlled 
by the domestic government and its elected officials, two competing hypotheses 
are offered:  
 
H2: Government-controlled programmes will shield government 
voters from the most adverse effects of the reforms, 
distributing the adjustment burden towards opposition- or 
non-voters. 
 
H3: Government-controlled programmes will seek to protect the 
decisive voters in the middle of the income distribution due to 
their higher potential electoral importance because of their 
ability to form powerful electoral coalitions. 
 
2.3 Research design 
2.3.1 Approach  
The aim of this paper is to test for and explain the variation in the distributive 
effects of the Economic Adjustment Programmes across countries. In doing so, 




measures of inequality but more on the effects on different income groups 
specifically. Thus, rather than uncovering how inequality has developed more 
generally as a result of the reforms, the aim here is to pinpoint which groups 
bore the bulk of the adjustment burden. 
 
As the reforms almost inevitably involved the reduction of some incomes in 
order to achieve fiscal consolidation, we are thus able to describe and explain 
in greater detail how the distributive conflicts arising from adjustment 
pressures have played out. Crucially, this in turn allows us to infer whether a 
programme is more likely to have been controlled by the Troika or by the 
domestic government due to the different preferences regarding the 
redistribution of income. Following from this, for programmes whose 
distributive effects match more closely the preferences of either the Troika or 
the domestic government, the paper scrutinises additional evidence to test 
whether there are signs of stronger control over the reform process by one or 
the other. Where the domestic government is found to have retained stronger 
control over the reform process the paper tests different hypotheses regarding 
the responsiveness to certain voter groups in the government’s design of the 
reforms. 
 
2.3.2 Case study design 
I construct a comparative case study of Greece and Portugal in a Most Similar 
Systems Design (MSSD, see Seawright and Gerring (2008) for a detailed 
discussion of MSSD and other case study designs). The dependent variable I 
am interested in explaining is the variation in the progressivity of the EAPs in 
question, which is measured by how the burden of the adjustment process is 
distributed across different income quantiles. A more progressive programme 
will seek to protect lower incomes, distributing the bulk of the adjustment 




in a narrow sense referring only to the way in which the adjustment burden is 
distributed among different income groups, whilst we know from the previous 
paper that, in aggregate terms (e.g. if measured by the Gini coefficient), both 
the Greek and the Portuguese EAPs were progressive in the broader sense that 
they lowered the overall level of inequality vis-à-vis the tax-benefit system in 
place prior to the reforms. The crucial independent variable the paper tests in 
terms of its explanatory power for the variation in the progressivity of the 
EAPs is the degree of Troika involvement, as the paper has shown that policy 
objectives of the Troika institutions are different from those of elected 
governments, suggesting that Troika-controlled programmes would reflect 
more strongly these institutions’ preferences regarding inequality and 
redistribution. 
 
The remainder of this section substantiates that Greece and Portugal are 
indeed reasonable cases for an MSSD, presenting evidence that (1) both 
countries are sufficiently comparable along a number of other independent 
variables and thus can justifiably be labelled as most similar systems, and (2) 
why potential other independent variables on which the cases differ are 
inadequate in explaining the variation in the outcome. Firstly, Greece and 
Portugal are two similar cases with regard to a number of both general 
demographic, institutional, and economic factors, as well as more specifically 
regarding the determinants of fiscal consolidation. They are of comparable size, 
both in population and economic activity; in their current form they are both 
young democracies that emerged from autocratic regimes in the 1970s; and 
they became part of European Communities in the 1980s as part of the 
Mediterranean enlargement and joined the Economic and Monetary Union in 
2000 and 1998 respectively. Especially compared with other EU member states 
both economies are heavily reliant on small and micro businesses, many of 




suggesting that both countries should be hit in a similar fashion by economic 
shocks and follow broadly similar strategies of economic adjustment. 
 
Aside from these more general parallels, both countries are comparable with 
regard to factors more closely related to determining the exact nature and 
design of the Economic Adjustment Programmes (Zartaloudis 2014). The 
argument here is that pressure to consolidate public budgets, in essence only 
achievable by cutting government expenditure or increasing revenues, 
inevitably impacts how the welfare state redistributes incomes through taxes 
and benefits. An MSSD is thus only sensible if the countries in question are 
similar with regard to how they tax and spend. We know from the comparative 
welfare state literature (Esping-Andersen 1990; Hemerijck 2013) that both 
Greece and Portugal display marked similarities in this regard and can in fact 
both be classified under the Southern European Model of welfare (Ferrera 1996; 
2005; Rhodes 1996). Furthermore, both countries belong to the same 
‘Mediterranean variant’ of ‘social systems of innovation and production’ 
(Amable 2003). 
 
Zooming in more closely, the exact composition of welfare spending adds 
another facet to which form fiscal adjustment is likely to take. Breunig and 
Busemeyer (2012) show that, during phases of fiscal consolidation, entitlement 
spending such as unemployment benefits and pensions is much less likely to be 
retrenched than discretionary spending such as public investment (see also 
Clayton and Pontusson 1998). This rests on the notion that governments will 
seek to take the path of least resistance, which in this case means avoiding cuts 
in entitlement spending as this would require the backing of a parliamentary 
majority, as well as creating more obvious and concentrated losers that would 
protest against this form of retrenchment more effectively (see also Pierson 




cutting back on discretionary spending are rather low whilst the benefits in 
terms of fiscal consolidation are substantial and immediate. 
 
An analysis of the composition of public spending with regard to entitlement 
spending and investment respectively yields the following: At the onset of the 
sovereign debt crisis (2009 for Greece, 2010 for Portugal), entitlement spending 
taken as the sum of spending on pensions and unemployment benefits was at 
12.1 per cent of GDP in Greece (pensions: 11.2; unemployment: 0.9) and 11.5 
in Portugal (pensions: 10.3; unemployment: 1.2; see OECD 2019). Public 
investment, taken as government gross fixed capital formation (Keman 2010), 
was at 5.7 per cent of GDP in Greece and 5.3 in Portugal (Eurostat 2019a). 
Given these similarities in the composition of public spending, fiscal 
consolidation measures should take a similar form in both countries.  
 
Further to this, electoral institutions briefly need to be addressed here as they 
typically play an important role in determining patterns of public spending and 
by extension also its retrenchment (Iversen and Soskice 2006; Persson and 
Tabellini 2004). Whilst majoritarian systems favour targeted types of spending, 
PR systems tend to generate more encompassing benefits with broad 
constituencies (see also Beramendi et al. 2015). Faced with fiscal consolidation 
pressures, it is therefore reasonable to expect governments in majoritarian 
systems to avoid cuts to discretionary spending which can be used to gain 
political influence in important areas through geographic targeting. 
Governments in PR systems on the other hand will seek to avoid cuts in 
entitlement spending due to closer linkages between them and their 
constituencies (Breunig and Busemeyer 2012). For the purpose of the analysis 
at hand we can consider both Greece and Portugal as PR systems: Although 
the Greek electoral system incorporates a majority bonus of 50 additional seats 
to the party winning the relative majority, the fundamental logic of how 




design austerity measures is not impaired by the majority bonus as it has little 
bearing on the linkages between legislators and broader national constituencies. 
The lack of variation between Greece and Portugal along this variable suggests 
that, in the case at hand, electoral institutions cannot explain the variation in 
the distributive effects of the EAPs. 
 
Next to these institutional factors, the likely design and by extension the 
distributional impact of austerity measures is ultimately a partisan issue. It is 
well-known that parts of cross-country variations in levels of inequality and 
redistribution can be traced back to government partisanship  (Boix 1998; 
Bradley et al. 2003; Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm 2006). We also know that 
austerity per se does not necessarily lead to increases in inequality through cuts 
in benefits for lower incomes. In fact, austerity can be inequality-reducing if 
expenditure is cut by limiting the access to benefits for higher income groups 
or introducing certain forms of means-testing, whilst leaving benefits for lower 
income groups intact or even expanding their coverage (see also Alesina, 
Favero, and Giavazzi 2019). This opens up room for manoeuvre for 
governments to distribute the adjustment burden according to their partisan 
preferences.  
 
Combining these two insights, it is reasonable to expect that in choosing the 
exact design of austerity measures, centre-left parties are more concerned with 
austerity-induced increases in inequality than centre-right parties. Indeed, 
recent research presents evidence that austerity measures implemented by 
Social Democratic parties tend to be anchored in distinctly New Keynesian 
economic ideas with a strong emphasis on delivering equality through 
redistribution and social investment while realising the general goal of fiscal 
consolidation (Bremer and McDaniel 2019). Based on this, we can expect 
austerity measures implemented by centre-left governments to be more 




(PASOK) and Portugal (Socialist Party) were governed by centre-left parties 
at the onset of the sovereign debt crisis. The Portuguese and the first Greek 
EAPs were thus negotiated between the Troika and centre-left parties, 
suggesting that the reforms in their original form should display substantial 
similarities. 
 
However, the Portuguese socialist government was replaced in 2011 by a 
centre-right coalition under Prime Minister Coelho and the Social Democratic 
Party25 that oversaw the largest part of the adjustment process. Thus, the 
actual implementation of the reforms was left to a centre-right government, 
which could have altered the reforms according to their preferences. The 
political landscape of Greece shifted more frequently and dramatically and saw 
a number of different governments during the adjustment process following 
Papandreou’s PASOK government, ranging from caretaker governments to a 
New Democracy-PASOK grand coalition with changing junior partners and 
finally two coalition governments under Prime Minister Tsipras and the far-
left SYRIZA. Therefore, whilst the reform measures were indeed initially 
negotiated by centre-left governments in both Greece and Portugal, the two 
countries become less comparable throughout the adjustment process. 
Partisanship is therefore a possible explainer for any observed variation in the 
distributive effects of the EAPs and as such will be addressed in the empirical 
section of this paper. 
 
Lastly, both Greece and Portugal were hit by the sovereign debt crisis in similar 
fashion. Instead of hitting through the banking sectors as it did in countries 
like Ireland, the crisis in Greece and Portugal laid bare deeper structural 
weaknesses that contributed to government deficits soaring (Armingeon and 
 
25 Despite its name, the Portuguese Social Democratic Party of today can be classified as a 
centre-right liberal-conservative party and is a member of the conservative European People’s 




Baccaro 2012). Nevertheless, the crisis in Greece was ultimately much deeper 
with higher government deficits and public debt and a greater reduction in 
economic output compared to Portugal. This was facilitated by years of 
misreporting data on public finances by the Greek authorities, which hid the 
true depth of the financial difficulties the country had been in for some years 
prior to 2009 (De Grauwe 2013). 
 
Overall, this review shows that, firstly, Greece and Portugal are indeed 
reasonable cases for an MSSD comparative case study as they display sufficient 
similarities along a number of independent variables that could have a bearing 
on the distributive effects of the reforms. Secondly, aside from a possible 
different degree of Troika involvement, which the paper will test for in section 
4, the only independent variable along which Greece and Portugal differ and 
which could thus explain different distributional outcomes is partisanship of 
the government in power. 
 
2.3.3 Methods and Data 
The hypotheses noted in section 2.4 will be tested by first assessing the effects 
of the reforms that were implemented as part of the EAPs on different income 
quantiles over time. In a second step the observed distributive effects are 
analysed according to whether they match either of the three redistributive 
patterns that the hypotheses rest on: Programmes that shield lower income 
groups are associated with a higher degree of control exercised by the Troika 
(H1). Programmes that either shield the voters of the respective government in 
power (H2) or middle income groups (H3) are associated with a higher degree 
of control exercised by the domestic government and its elected officials. The 
analysis is augmented in a further step with an assessment of empirical evidence 
regarding the degree of control exercised by either the Troika or the domestic 




programme reviews are analysed in order to identify possible changes in the 
reform strategy that match the preferences of the Troika or the domestic 
government more closely. Similarly, patterns of conflict between the two 
involved parties are analysed as well as the impact of these conflicts on the 
implementation of the reforms. 
 
For the first part of the analysis, it is important to note that in view of the 
depth of the recession and the increases in unemployment levels in both 
countries, incomes will inevitably change substantially even without any 
reforms. It is therefore necessary to isolate the effects of the reforms on incomes. 
This is done by using microsimulation tools that construct detailed 
counterfactuals. These counterfactuals allow us to calculate how incomes at 
the individual or household level would have developed in the absence of any 
given reform holding all else equal. Comparing these counterfactuals with how 
incomes actually developed under the reforms allows us to isolate the exact 
effects of any reform on each income. This paper uses microsimulation tool 
EUROMOD, which is the most widely used tool for analyses of EU member 
states, and has been validated on both the micro and macro level and tested 
in various applications (Bargain 2006; Figari et al. 2012; Sutherland and Figari 
2013). EUROMOD uses European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) microdata, which provides detailed survey data on 
incomes at both the individual and household level. EU-SILC is available for 
all years of the adjustment process except for 2018 due to time lags in data 
collection. The data produced with EUROMOD is used to calculate the effects 
of the Troika reforms in each year of the adjustment process on disposable 
incomes at the household level, aggregated as income deciles. The analysis 
therefore shows which income groups bore the bulk of the adjustment burden 
and which were shielded or even compensated, thus revealing whether the 
redistributive patterns of the reforms match more closely the preferences of the 




For the cases where the patterns of the distributive effects match the 
preferences of elected governments and thus suggest that they were more in 
control than the Troika, the paper tests the second and third hypotheses. H3 
can be tested using the same means, i.e. analysing which income groups 
remained shielded from income reductions observed in the EUROMOD data. 
The paper tests for H2 by testing for a statistically significant correlation 
between the type of voter (government-, opposition-, or non-voter) and the 
average change in incomes due to the reforms. For this purpose, the paper uses 
voting and income data from the European Social Survey (ESS). ESS data 
show the party for which individuals voted in each election year as well as the 
party to which they feel closest. Whilst no individual level incomes are provided 
in the ESS data, incomes are described as the decile of the income distribution 
each individual is located in. The paper therefore approximates whether voters 
of the government in power were more shielded from the most adverse reform 
effects than voters of opposition parties or non-voters by calculating the 
likelihood and statistical significance of each voter group to be located in a 
relatively more or less protected income decile. 
 
2.4 Results and discussion 
2.4.1 The distributive effects of the reforms in Greece and Portugal 
This section presents the data produced with EUROMOD to simulate the 
effects of the reforms in the EAPs in both Greece and Portugal for the duration 
of the programmes. The results show the following: Firstly, the effects of the 
programme in Greece were overall progressive in the sense that the lowest 
income decile of households was shielded from possible adverse effects of cuts 
in public expenditure such as unemployment or other benefits (see Figure 15 
and Table 4). In fact, households in the lowest income decile seem to have been 




income group that saw relative increases in their incomes due to the reforms. 
At this point it should be stressed that EUROMOD isolates the effects of the 
reforms and excludes any effects of the recession such as increased 
unemployment. The income increases in the lowest decile of households are 
thus to be understood as relative increases vis-à-vis a hypothetical scenario 
where no reforms would have been implemented. This does not contradict the 
fact that throughout the Great Recession incomes in Greece have suffered 
markedly and virtually all income groups are now much worse off than they 
were before the crisis began. In other words, the lowest decile of households are 
better off by the percentages noted below only compared with what they would 
have been without the reforms, leaving all else equal (i.e. the effects of the 
recession). Whilst the lowest decile saw relative increases in disposable 
household incomes, all other deciles saw income reductions, albeit in a 
progressive manner, with the smallest income reductions in the second to fifth 
deciles and largest reduction in the top decile (see Table 4). 
 
The data on Greece reveal another fact when we consider changes in incomes 
over time. Whilst disposable household incomes moved downwards more or less 
in unison in the first years of the adjustment process, there is a break in this 
trend after 2012. After that point the lowest three deciles saw relative income 
increases. The new trend was, however, only sustained for the lowest decile, 
which subsequently saw continuous income increases, whilst incomes for the 
second and third decile fluctuated for the remainder of the adjustment process, 
albeit above 2012 levels. This suggests that the distributive effects of the Greek 
EAPs match the preferences of the technocratic policy makers of the Troika as 
outlined in section 2.3 and H1 from 2012 onwards. This in turn suggests that 
from that point the Troika exercised stronger control over the reforms and 





The data also shed light on the explanatory power of government partisanship, 
which was identified as a possible independent variable to explain the 
programmes’ distributive effects along which Greece and Portugal differed 
throughout the reform process. The data for Greece show, however, that 
partisanship of the respective governments cannot have had any major bearing 
on the progressivity of the design of the reforms and by extension their 
distributive effects. Since 2012 Greece has had five rather different 
governments: two non-party caretaker governments, one coalition government 
under the centre-right New Democracy, and two coalition governments under 
the far-left SYRIZA. Yet, there seems to be little to no variation in the 
distributive effects of the reforms throughout the remainder of the EAPs since 
2012. 
 
There are two possible explanations for this: (1) the Troika indeed seems to 
have been in control of the reform process and deciding on the exact design of 
the reforms from 2012, thus rendering government partisanship irrelevant to 
the reforms’ distributive effects (see H1,); (2) in designing austerity measures 
governments are driven less by party affiliation than the preferences of certain 
voter groups (see H2 and H3). However, as these preferences are unlikely to 
have shifted substantially from before and after 2012, the evidence for Greece 
suggests that the Troika’s control over the reform process has the most 
explanatory power for the observed distributive effects. 
 
Nevertheless, in order to conclusively accept H1, further evidence of Troika 
control is necessary. In particular, it is important to assess whether there is 
indeed evidence for a shift in how the Troika managed the Greek EAPs and 
whether the degree of control changed throughout the adjustment process and 
is congruous with the observed distributive effects, in particular the break in 





Figure 15: percentage change in income due to the reforms in the 
EAPs, per decile: Greece (cumulative effects 2009-2017; original 
income=100%) 
 
Table 4: percentage change in income due to the reforms in the 



















1 -3.16 -4.77 -1.98 4.45 9.49 0.85 3.40 16.18 24.46 
2 -4.24 -4.30 -2.12 -2.43 5.84 -2.70 -1.66 -0.21 -11.80 
3 -3.68 -5.13 -2.23 -3.62 3.29 -0.72 -1.80 0.20 -13.69 
4 -4.12 -5.60 -2.23 -3.68 1.27 0.23 -1.87 -0.38 -16.37 
5 -4.25 -5.51 -2.40 -3.80 1.68 0.97 -2.10 -0.34 -15.75 
6 -4.06 -6.30 -2.17 -3.43 0.67 1.81 -2.44 -0.79 -16.70 
7 -3.50 -6.65 -2.52 -3.94 0.31 1.32 -2.47 -0.61 -18.07 
8 -3.12 -6.76 -2.63 -3.69 -0.14 0.99 -2.50 0.29 -17.58 
9 -3.53 -6.69 -2.45 -3.58 0.11 0.89 -1.64 -0.26 -17.16 
10 -4.54 -5.34 -2.93 -2.71 0.04 0.34 -2.47 -1.16 -18.78 
 





Secondly, the data for Portugal show that, whilst all incomes were reduced as 
a result of the EAP reforms, incomes in the middle of the income distribution 
were protected the most from the adverse effects of spending cuts and tax 
increases (see Figure 16 and Table 5). Households from the third to the sixth 
decile saw the smallest reductions in disposable income, whilst both the lowest 
and the highest decile saw the largest reductions. This suggests that (1) the 
Troika had less control over the Portuguese EAP, as the observed distributive 
effects do not match their preferences; (2) assuming that the domestic 
government was indeed in charge of the reform process, it seems to have been 
primarily interested in protecting the decisive voters in the middle of the 
income distribution. These points require further testing in two ways. 
 
Firstly, evidence is needed on whether or not the Portuguese government 
indeed retained more control over the reform process vis-à-vis the Troika. 
Secondly, the paper needs to test whether there is a statistically significant 
correlation between those groups that were most protected from reform-
induced income reductions and whether or not they voted for the government 
in power. In the first step, H1 can be confirmed if it is found that the Troika 
had little control over the reform process, which would be compatible with 
their preferences regarding redistribution. The second step of the analysis 
allows us to discriminate between H2 and H3, i.e. whether the government – if 
found to be the controlling party – was more interested in protecting the 
median voter, or their own voters regardless of their position on the income 
distribution. 
 
Overall, it needs to be noted that the magnitude of the income reductions is 
lower in Portugal than in Greece, with the exception of the first and tenth 
deciles in Portugal. This is likely due to the worse economic situation of Greece 







Figure 16: percentage change in income due to the reforms in the 
EAPs, per decile: Portugal (cumulative effects 2010-2014; original 
income=100%) 
 
Table 5 percentage change in income due to the reforms in the EAPs, 
per decile: Portugal (yearly effects 2010-2014) 
DECILE/YEAR ‘10-'11 ‘11-'12 ‘12-'13 ‘13-'14 TOTAL 
1 -8.08 0.44 -8.11 0.07 -15.67 
2 -4.37 -0.24 -1.57 -0.05 -6.22 
3 -2.94 -0.99 -0.81 0.16 -4.58 
4 -2.29 -1.31 -1.06 0.01 -4.65 
5 -1.99 -1.62 -1.19 0.06 -4.73 
6 -1.88 -1.84 -1.31 -0.14 -5.18 
7 -2.0 -2.08 -2.20 0.01 -6.27 
8 -2.55 -1.94 -2.88 0.03 -7.34 
9 -2.90 -1.37 -4.33 0.0 -8.61 
10 -3.66 -2.10 -6.37 -0.02 -12.16 
 





2.4.2 Troika control over the reform process 
Assuming that H1 and either H2 or H3 are correct, i.e. that Troika-controlled 
austerity programmes display different distributive effects than those 
controlled by domestic governments, the data presented in the previous section 
would suggest that the Greek EAPs were Troika-controlled and the Portuguese 
EAP was government-controlled.  
 
This section therefore serves to present evidence for these two 
operationalisations of the paper’s general hypothesis that the distributional 
effects of economic adjustment programmes are determined by where the locus 
of decision-making power lies with regard to the specific design of the reform 
measures. It does so using a two-pronged approach. Firstly, it provides reasons 
for why the Troika might find it necessary to take stronger control over the 
reform process in either of the two countries. Secondly, the paper presents 
empirical evidence as to whether or not the Troika did in fact tighten its grip 
on the reform process in either Greece or Portugal.  
 
2.4.2.a Reasons for Troika having to exercise more control in Greece than in 
Portugal 
With regard to the former, the following question needs to be answered: Is 
there evidence for why the Troika would deem it necessary to control the 
reform process more strongly in Greece than in Portugal? Indeed, there are 
three reasons for why this would be the case, which will be laid out in detail 
in the following. 
 
Firstly, Greece and Portugal are different regarding their public administration 
capacity to implement reforms, particularly when necessitated by external 




rather poor track record in the timely implementation of EU law and have 
been classified in the literature as members of the ‘world of neglect’ (Falkner 
et al. 2005, see also Hartlapp 2005). However, whilst public sector efficiency is 
low in both countries when compared to other EU member states and 
particularly those that joined in and before 1995, there are important 
differences between Greece and Portugal, particularly with regard to the 
capability to implement reforms (Sotiropoulos 2004; Van de Walle, Van 
Roosbroek, and Bouckaert 2008). Public sector efficiency in Portugal has in 
fact been found to be improving (Hartlapp 2005). Greece, on the other hand, 
has been described as a failing state going into the sovereign debt crisis 
(Featherstone 2011), with a historically weak implementational strength in the 
public sector (Sotiropoulos 1993; Spanou 1996) and a political culture 
characterised by rent-seeking and corruption (Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis 2011). 
 
Here, Afonso et al. provide two important insights for the specific cases of 
economic adjustment in Greece and Portugal: Firstly, clientelistic linkages are 
a major factor in determining how successful governments are in implementing 
austerity measures. The stronger they are, the less willing are governments to 
agree to fiscal retrenchment, which would limit their own capacity to preserve 
these linkages by continuing to trade material favours for votes. Secondly, 
clientelistic linkages are much stronger in Greece than in Portugal (Afonso, 
Zartaloudis, and Papadopoulos 2015). In fact, there is a long history of parties 
handing out favours, or ‘rousfetia’, to voters in Greece (Lyrintzis 1984), which 
is less the case in Portugal. Governments in Greece should therefore be less 
willing and prepared to go through with fiscal consolidation measures than 
those in Portugal. 
 
These issues in Greece have deep historical roots. In fact, a seminal report was 
authored already in 1952 by Greek economist Kyriakos Varvaressos the 




administration system (1952). Varvaressos cites among some of the key causes 
of this problem a major organisational mismanagement, including an imbalance 
of resources and staff apportioned to different arms of the state (ibid.); a legacy 
of legalistic and formal interpretation of rules and regulations, impeding the 
quality of public service delivery, flexibility and innovation inside the public 
sector; and lastly – and arguably most saliently for current purposes – an 
established tradition of patronage, clientelism, and corruption, including a 
disregard for meritocratic norms in appointments and promotions. 
 
Greek public sector administration has, furthermore, historically been 
described as having low institutional capacity, being home to a bloated and 
malfunctioning apparatus. This is diagnosed cogently in a recent historical 
evaluation by Makrydemetres et al. (2016) of structural reforms inside Greek 
government departments: 
The capacity deficit forms more certainly a kind of root cause for 
maladministration in Greece. […] The state apparatus, including 
the size of the personnel approximating 650.000 public employees 
in the wider public sector and the direct involvement in the 
economy, is nonetheless very weak and ill-equipped with the 
requisite professional and strategic capacity and authority to 
function as an instrument and rational agent for reform and 
modernisation. Despite the over-inflated size and role of the state 
bureaucracy, it has failed to acquire distinct and appropriate 
developmental features which would enable it to act as the engine 
and driving force for intelligent service and advancement of the 
society as a whole. Instead of designing and shaping the strategy 
and the overall policy for rational and long-term development, 
state bureaucracy in Greece undertook usually the backward and 
traditional role of satisfying the short term clientelist needs and 
expectations at the expense of a creative and flexible role and 
function. Administrative bureaucracy took on a top-heavy and 
grotesque shape of gargantuan proportions ill-structured and ill-
equipped for the complexity of the tasks and the challenges of the 





The limited state capacity thus gives sufficient reason to believe that the 
Troika felt compelled to micromanage more greatly in terms of oversight of 
reform implementation. This limited state capacity in Greece is also evidenced 
by the Troika’s apprehension of the stumbling blocks the country would 
encounter in the process of reform-implementation. The Troika emphasised the 
separate additional need for large-scale administrative reforms to the 
bureaucracy, including in basic areas such as introducing a uniform pay-scale 
for all state employees (Christopolou and Monastiriotis 2014). In its review of 
the second Economic Adjustment  Programme  for  Greece, the European 
Commission stressed that bureaucratic overhaul would be crucial to bolstering 
fiscal reform implementation capacity (European Commission 2012c). The 
Troika, in fact, acknowledged in retrospect that one of the reasons for Greece’s 
less than stellar reform implementation record had been due to its inadequate 
administrative capacities (Henning 2017, 123). 
 
Another reason for why the Troika might have deemed it essential to control 
the reform process more strongly in Greece than in Portugal is the difference 
in the severity of the crisis between the two countries. This is evidenced by the 
fact that Portugal had succeeded already in April of 2014 to “forego a 
precautionary programme and opt instead for a ‘clean’ exit” (ibid., 130), more 
than four years prior to Greece. Conversely, Greece faced the prospect of state 
bankruptcy, defaulting on its debt, and the threat of having to leave the 
Eurozone and thus likely the EU altogether, which would have likely had a 
number of severe contagion effects on the rest of the Union.  
 
2.4.2.b Evidence that the Troika did exercise more control in Greece than in 
Portugal  
The reasons for the need for more Troika control in Greece as opposed to 




administrative capacity with a highly clientelistic historical tradition in Greece, 
the magnitude of the sovereign debt crisis was also much more severe. In the 
following, the paper presents evidence for how the Troika did in fact exercise 
more control in Greece through a much more hands-on approach than in 
Portugal. 
 
An analysis of the interaction between the Troika and the respective national 
authorities of Greece and Portugal shows the following. Firstly, it is possible 
to observe a change over time in how the Troika monitored the reform progress 
in Greece that is apparent from the various EAP-related documents. Initially 
following a more hands-off approach, the Troika formulated general fiscal 
targets for Greece which are laid out in the Memorandum of Understanding of 
the first EAP for Greece, as well as the first programme reviews. These targets 
failed to be met in the first two years of the crisis, not least because the salience 
of fiscal multipliers in the face of large-scale austerity measures during a deep 
recession had been massively underestimated on the part of the Troika 
(Blanchard and Leigh 2013).  
 
After this, whether justified or not, the Troika adopted a more hands-on 
approach monitoring the reform process closely: In addition to formulating 
general fiscal targets the Troika now required the Greek authorities to outline 
concrete reform proposals to achieve these targets in each of the regular 
programme reviews, of which there were two to three per year. In the newly 
introduced ‘medium-term fiscal strategies’ the Greek authorities were required 
to specify in detail particular policy reforms, precise projected savings through 
each reform, and a timeline for their implementation. The Troika would sign 
off on the particular reforms laid out in each review and monitored whether 
they had been implemented by the specified date in the following reviews. The 
Troika enforced this approach by threatening to withhold funds that the Greek 




reform prescriptions. Similarly, by that point the Troika tolerated practically 
no pushback against these requirements. This culminated in the 2015 
referendum, where the majority of Greek voters spoke out against the 
continuation of the austerity programmes, which the Troika all but ignored, 
continuing to push for the unimpeded implementation of the austerity 
programmes. 
 
Based on the EAP-related documents, the situation in Portugal was different. 
Troika reform prescriptions remained rather general and revisions of the 
originally agreed-upon reforms were more frequent as is evidenced in the EAP 
and the subsequent reviews. This is true both for single reform proposals and 
the nature of the EAP in its entirety. To illustrate this, Portugal went from 
an initially expenditure-based programme following the same template as 
Greece to a much more revenue-based programme prioritising tax increases 
over spending cuts. This happened against the prescriptions of the Troika who 
only reluctantly abandoned the expenditure-based approach officially in 2013 
towards the end of the EAP. Similarly, several of the reforms that were 
implemented under the pressure of the Troika were reversed shortly thereafter 
due to intervention from the Portuguese Constitutional Court which had been 
invoked in different instances by several parties and the President of the 
Republic (Magone 2014). At the same time, the speedy return of the country 
to the long-term debt market in early 2013 constituted a substantial shift in 
the distribution of bargaining power towards the Portuguese authorities as the 
country became less dependent on the loans administered by the Troika. 
 
In the following, the paper presents a more granular process-tracing exercise of 
how the Troika exercised greater control. As a result of the deeper severity of 
the crisis in Greece and of the real risk of default at the time, a potential 
‘Grexit’ became a real possibility. The country was per definition heavily 




oversight and control. By comparison, the state of affairs were much more 
subdued in the Portuguese case, as demonstrated by the country’s 
comparatively much more rapid return to the bond markets in 2013, several 
years before Greece, allowing it to avoid the Troika intrusion and intervention 
to which Greece was to be exposed (Kowsmann 2013; Hirai and Ainger 2019).  
 
Randall Henning cogently explicates the process of creeping increase in 
authority and control of the Troika over Greece’s handling of the EAPs (2017). 
In late 2014, it fully came to light that Greece would not be able to follow in 
the footsteps of other bailout countries Ireland, Portugal and Spain and “exit 
smoothly” from the programme, instead going into a tailspin (ibid., 203). 
During the review of Greece’s second programme in 2014, it became apparent 
that a spate of programme benchmarks in structural reforms and labour market 
policies had not been met, leading to the Troika demanding as a pre-condition 
for the payout of the next tranche that further pension system reforms and tax 
raises be implemented. It became apparent that shunning Troika demands 
would give potential way to Greece defaulting, much to then-Prime Minister 
Samaras’ dismay, who objected to the pre-condition demands and was soon to 
be replaced by Tsipras (ibid., 203). 
 
The far-reaching arm of Troika control in Greece is observable throughout the 
tenure of the Tsipras administration. Prime minister Tsipras enjoyed a 
comfortable electoral victory receiving approximately 36% of the popular vote 
in January 2015, on the back of a campaign dominated almost entirely by 
bringing austerity to and end and unshackling Greece from the grips of the 
Troika. Early in his term as prime minister, Tsipras exclaimed that the “Troika 
was over”, refused to negotiate with creditors, and expelled the Troika missions 
from Greece in an attempt to kill the EAP agreements (Jacobsen and Fleming 
2015). Bitter strife ensued between Athens and the European partners. With 




Troika’s priorities, there existed a “bitter atmosphere and yawning gap between 
the positions of the [Greek] government and the Troika”, igniting intensified 
speculation about Grexit (Henning 2017, 205). A number of factors contributed 
to Tsipras finally capitulating and giving in to the Troika. First, the Greek 
government failed to persuade its creditors to scrap the EAP agreements in 
favour of newly negotiated replacement agreements. Secondly, Tsipras became 
increasingly estranged in the Euro area and shunned by other member states, 
which refused to circumvent the Troika or bargain directly with the Greek 
administration within the setting of the Eurogroup. Lastly, the menacing 
prospect of potential default became increasingly likely, ultimately forcing the 
Greek Prime Minister to invite the Troika back onto the scene, agree to 
relaunch talks with the creditor institutions, and permit technical visits from 
their staff for data collection purposes again. The only victory in the faceoff 
with the Troika was the official abandonment of its name, now being referred 
to simply as the ‘Institutions’ in official correspondence, but otherwise carrying 
on with its work as before. The unfolding of events in 2015 will be explicated 
further in the following. 
 
By 2015, the Troika continued to invoke its control over the reform process 
through, among other things, holding the payment of the outstanding tranches 
over the Greek government’s head as leverage to induce the country to comply 
with reforms that had been stipulated in the agreements. One such example of 
the authority the Troika wielded was that the ECB suspended in January 2015 
the purchase of Greek bonds from its quantitative easing programme, and was 
now in a position where it had power over both the country’s banking system’s 
liquidity and thereby the Greek government’s access to finance, as well as being 
in charge of regulating its largest banks with a prospect of assuming further 
far-reaching supervisory powers over other banks in the nation (Henning 2017, 




administration and impelled it to ask its European partners for a programme 
extension.  
 
The decline in Greek bargaining power and thus the rise in Troika control and 
influence over the reform implementation process is particularly noticeable in 
the lead-up to and agreement of the third EAP bailout. The weakening of the 
Greek side’s hand was intensified in the summer of 2015: Greece, on the same 
day in June 2015, both defaulted on a €1.55 billion debt repayment to the IMF 
and witnessed the expiration of its second bailout programme, disqualifying it 
from further funding until it had paid its outstanding arrears (Steinhauser, 
Dendrinou, and Stamouli 2015). Subsequently, Tsipras announced a national 
referendum on the future of the EAPs, with the aim of bolstering his bargaining 
power vis-à-vis Greece’s creditors and in the hopes of obtaining concessions, 
such as a restructuring of or haircut on Greek debt. Despite winning the 
referendum with a resounding 61% of the population voting “oxi” or “no”, the 
strategy backfired fiercely. Although hoping to use it as leverage with creditors, 
the triumph of the referendum win would not bear fruit or help create the 
outcomes Tsipras had envisioned. Trust and rapport between the creditor 
parties and the Greek government had been frayed arguably beyond repair, 
which would only spell mounting trouble for the next programme agreement. 
At the same time the economic conditions in Greece further declined, 
drastically pushing up the amount of financing that Greece would now need in 
its third programme (Henning 2017). The impasses in negotiations with the 
Commission, IMF and ECB culminated in more talk of the threat of ‘Grexit’ 
again. 
 
The Troika wished to avoid, at all costs, Grexit. However, it did not take the 
threat of it off the table, choosing instead to leverage its prospect as a pressure-
inducing bargaining chip. This was a tremendous blow to Tsipras’ hopes. Even 




strongly against Grexit but I can’t prevent it if the Greek government is not 
doing what we expected […] We have a Grexit scenario prepared in detail”  
(Sheffield 2015). Then-Council President Donald Tusk concurred, saying: “Our 
inability to find agreement may lead to the bankruptcy of Greece and the 
insolvency of its banking system […] For sure, it will be most painful for the 
Greek people” (Lewis and Macdonald 2015). What ensued was a departure of 
the more contrarian finance minister Yanis Varoufakis, who was replaced by 
Euclid Tsakalotos. 
 
The reach of the Troika’s influence over the reforms in Greece is crystallized 
by the fact that, shortly after the referendum, the Greek government came 
back to the negotiating table with the Troika and set out a proposal which was 
almost identical to the offer the Troika had made a short period earlier, one 
which had been rejected unequivocally by the popular vote in the referendum 
(Henning 2017, 214). Eventually, the new programme details were a far cry 
from what Tsipras had been reaching for in his referendum campaign and were 
settled on very strict terms (ibid., 213). Due to intra-party tumult within 
Syriza and a rupture with its left-faction, Tsipras announced a snap general 
election to solidify the democratic legitimacy of the newly agreed programm.  
 
The details and composition of the third EAP are a further exposition of the 
power and control of the Troika eclipsing the aspirations and wishes of the 
Greek government, which had begun in earnest towards the end of the first 
programme. Despite protest and resistance, Tsipras’ administration agreed to 
a comprehensive pension reform, VAT hikes, further expenditure cuts and tax 
raises to the value of 4% of GDP by 2018. Moreover, they agreed to introduce 
further labour market and product market reforms, and to restructure the 
banking system, with the four most important banks in the country being 
obliged to undergo a new round of stress tests (Henning 2017, 217f.). For the 




had in the prospect of Greece managing to implement the stipulated reforms, 
these policy measures had to be adopted as prerequisites ahead of the 
disbursement of the first payment (ibid.). This was yet another signal of the 
extensive power and control the Troika had over the process in Greece. 
 
In conclusion, it can be said that this constitutes clear proof of the Troika’s 
stricter oversight and tighter control over the EAPs in Greece. Despite Tsipras’ 
urge to expel the Troika from Athens at the start of his incumbency, and his 
strategy of calling a referendum on the austerity measures, Syriza was unable 
to escape the fate of previous Greek governments. The Troika’s clout in fact 
only progressively increased over the life cycle of the EAPs beginning in early 
2012 based on the document review, as their faith in Greece’s capabilities or 
willingness to execute the policy measures dwindled.  
 
Overall, stronger control over the Greek programme on the part of the Troika 
may have been warranted due to Greece’s lower capacity to follow through on 
externally prescribed reforms, as evidenced by their poor track record of 
implementing EU law, as well as the strong clientelistic linkages that have the 
potential to obstruct the reform progress. Based on the evidence presented in 
this and the previous section, I infer the following. Firstly, the degree of control 
over the reform process exercised by the Troika was higher in Greece than in 
Portugal. Moreover, the evidence shows a shift in the Troika’s approach in 
handling the Greek adjustment, with the Troika tightening its grip on the 
reform process from 2012 onwards. This clearly matches the distributive effects 
presented in the previous section in that lower income groups fared better from 
2012 onwards and were compensated after initial income losses between the 





This provides evidence in favour of the first hypothesis of the paper: Troika-
controlled programmes, as evidenced by the Greek example, indeed display 
more progressive distributive effects, paying particular attention to the 
compensation of the lowest income groups. Moreover, the less tightly controlled 
reform process in Portugal yielded less progressive reforms. However, in order 
to conclusively accept or reject the first hypothesis, further evidence is needed. 
The paper presents three cases of clashes between the Troika and the domestic 
authorities and the distributive effects produced by the accepted or rejected 
reform prescriptions respectively. 
 
The first example is the pension reform in Greece. Historically, the Greek 
pension system has been one of the most regressive and unfair systems in 
Europe (Matsaganis 2020). A number of efforts have been made in the past to 
reform and modernise the system as well as making it more progressive and 
less protective of classic insiders such as public sector employees who enjoyed 
immense privileges under the old system. However, all efforts, most notably 
those by socialist modernisers around Costas Simitis who served as prime 
minister between 1996 and 2004, ultimately failed due to large-scale protests 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Featherstone 2005). This failure to reform 
despite the fact that economic conditions under the high growth rates of the 
time were more than conducive for welfare state modernization (Ferrera and 
Hemerijck 2003) illustrates how deeply entrenched and institutionalized 
inequalities in the Greek tax-benefit system were and how resilient to reform 
the overall Greek welfare state was.  
 
A comprehensive pension reform, unsurprisingly, was one of the cornerstones 
of the Greek Economic Adjustment Programmes. The Troika pushed for a 
proposal that would modernise the pension system modelled after the 
Scandinavian examples (Matsaganis and Leventi 2011). With introduction of 




sudden stop to the efforts to modernise the Greek pension system. Adamantly 
opposed to the austerity measures imposed by the Troika, Syriza repealed the 
reform and promised to reverse cuts that had already taken place. The Troika 
pushed back against this and the ultimately introduced reform resembled the 
original proposal, although with some qualifications that can be traced back to 
the interference of the Syriza government: The Syriza system reinstated the 
sharp discrimination between workers with long-term work histories and those 
without that the reform had sought to do away with. Under the Syriza reform, 
individuals with less than 15 years of contributions now only qualified for a 
minimum means-tested national pension of less than €400 per month, i.e. the 
same as those who never paid into the pension system (Matsaganis 2020). Not 
only does this provide a clear example of how Troika reforms were more 
progressive than the policies that national authorities pushed for, it also calls 
into question once more the validity of the partisanship argument regarding 
the distributive effects of austerity measures: If the progressivity of the Greek 
austerity measures could, in fact, be traced back to the partisan colours of the 
government in power, then the far-left Syriza government should surely not 
have opposed the more progressive original pension reform. 
 
The second and third example tackle the issue from the other end. Rather than 
providing instances of the Troika pushing for progressive reforms and 
overruling, at least to some degree, the domestic authorities, I give two 
examples of how Troika proposal were entirely reversed through the 
interference of domestic institutions after implementation in Portugal. This 
concerns the reversal of the Portuguese pension reform, and the reversal of 
public sector pay cuts, both of which had clear progressive effects. To illustrate 
the latter point for the pension reform, Figure 17 shows the distributive effects 
of changes in the pension system in Portugal in the years 2012-13 and 2013-14. 
Using EUROMOD following the methodology outlined in Paper 1, the data 




solely for changes in the pension system. With the introduction of the pension 
reform following the pressure by the Troika in 2012, incomes were reduced 
markedly for households at the top end of the income distribution, although 
there were minor decreases across the board. When the Portuguese courts 
rejected the measures one year later, triggering an almost complete reversal of 
the reform, the observed distributive effects point in the opposite direction. 
However, even this reversal seems to have been regressive beyond going back 
to the original system given that the bottom income deciles saw no income 
increases, at all. 
 































Similar conclusions can be drawn from the reversal of the public sector pay 
cuts that had been mandated by the Troika in the same year. Figure 18 below 
shows the distributive effects of the public sector pay cuts instigated by the 
Troika, displaying clear progressive effects based on the ordinarily high incomes 
of public sector employees (see also section 1.4.4.b in Paper 1 of this thesis). 
Interestingly, the rejection of the public sector pay cuts by the courts also 
happened based on equality considerations, albeit to somewhat perverse effects 
considering the distributional outcomes of the court decision. The post 
programme report of the Troika reads the following:  
“In the view of the Court, the constitutional principle of equality 
contains the notion of equality of burden sharing which requires 
that all citizens should contribute in an equal manner to the 
public burdens according to their ability to pay. As a 
consequence, fiscal consolidation cannot be based on budgetary 
measures affecting only civil servants. The Court nevertheless 
accepted a certain degree of differentiation in treatment between 
public and private sector employees and accepted, within limits, 
wage cuts in the public sector due to their exceptional and 
temporary character in the Budget Laws. However, the 
suspension of both the holiday and the Christmas allowances for 
civil servants and pensioners was not considered to be 
proportional and thus rejected” (European Commission 2016). 
 
Figure 18: Distributive effects of public sector pay cuts in Portugal 
before reform reversal 
 





On this basis, I conclude that there is enough evidence to accept the first 
hypothesis posited in the paper and that Troika-controlled reforms indeed 
showed more progressive effects. Secondly, the evidence presented here suggests 
that, conversely, the Troika had less control over the reform process in 
Portugal. This broadly matches the hypotheses made regarding the distributive 
effects of government-controlled austerity programmes in that it is not 
necessarily lower income groups that are shielded from benefit cuts and tax 
increases but either those in the middle of the income distribution or those that 
voted for the incumbent government. 
 
At this point, the argument of the thesis needs to be explicated further. As the 
Portuguese and Greek cases illustrate, the influence of the Troika on the 
reforms was, in fact, progressive. However, the less progressive impact of the 
domestic authorities is not necessarily due to the government directly shielding 
certain voter groups. In the case of the rejection of the Portuguese pension 
reforms and public sector pay cuts, it was not the elected government that 
brought the case to the Portuguese Constitutional Court (although they did 
push back against the programme in general), but the opposition parties and 
the President of the Republic (Magone 2014). However, this does not invalidate 
the argument presented in this thesis. This is because it is necessary to 
understand policy making as a product of both the demand and supply side of 
politics, as illustrated in Beramendi et al.’s model of constrained partisanship: 
Governments tend to follow the will of important voter groups, but they are 
constrained significantly by for instance the legacies of past policy making 
rounds, which at that point are institutionalised and enshrined in law 
(Beramendi et al. 2015; see also Hall 2016). The institutionalised products of 
past policy making round show the same resilience as all institutions making it 
difficult to retrench or outright repeal them (Pierson 2001). Nevertheless, the 
clash that the thesis observes here remains between the technocrats of the 




through the direct influence of elected governments trying to shield certain 
groups (as seems to have been the case with the Syriza opposition to the Greek 
pension reform), or institutional legacies from past policy making rounds 
shielding these groups in the form of national legislation and their enforcement 
through the courts (as was the case with the rejection of the Portuguese pension 
reform and public sector pay cuts, both of which had been progressive). 
 
The next section serves to provide evidence to distinguish whether the domestic 
government in Portugal sought to shield their own voters or rather voters in 
the middle of the income distribution. 
 
2.4.3 Voter responsiveness 
In order to test whether the Portuguese government aimed to protect mainly 
middle income groups, or their own voters in the reform process, i.e. 
discriminate between the paper’s second and third hypotheses, the paper 
combines the data produced with EUROMOD with data on partisan 
preferences of voters from the seventh round of the European Social Survey 
(ESS) in 2014. The year of the survey is chosen because during the adjustment 
process, Portugal only had one election at its very beginning. Therefore, voters 
were left with the same coalition government of the Social Democratic and the 
People’s Party for the great majority of the reform process. At the same time, 
2014 marked the official completion of the EAP and is therefore an accurate 
time point to measure household incomes. 
 
In a first instance, individuals that are eligible to vote are grouped in the three 
different categories: Voters that voted for the Social Democratic Party or the 
People’s Party (i.e. the two coalition partners of the subsequent government) 
in the 2011 election are coded as government voters and voters of all other 




stated that they had voted but values were missing in the ESS data with regard 
to the question who they had voted for, party affiliation was approximated 
using a question in the survey that asked which party voters felt closest to. 
Next, those that voted for an opposition party and those that were eligible but 
did not vote were grouped together as neither of the two groups support the 
incumbent government and thus warrant similar treatment for the purposes of 
this study.  
 
In order to gauge whether government voters remained relatively more 
protected from the adverse effects of the reforms than opposition- or non-
voters, each individual is then assigned a value of 0 or 1 depending on whether 
they are located in one of the more protected income groups or not. Based on 
the previously presented data produced with EUROMOD, individuals whose 
disposable household incomes are located in deciles three to six are coded as 
relatively more protected, with reductions of disposable household income due 
to the reforms ranging from 4.58 to 5.18 per cent. Individuals whose disposable 
household income is located in the bottom two or top four deciles are coded as 
relatively less protected, with income reductions due to the reforms ranging 
from 6.22 to 15.67 per cent (see Table 5). Next, the likelihood and statistical 
significance of weighted individuals who voted for the government being 
located in a relatively more protected income group is calculated. The results 
show that there is indeed a higher likelihood of government voters being located 
in a more protected income group (49.36 per cent) vis-à-vis opposition- or non-
voters (44.92 per cent; see Figure 19). It is clear, however, that whilst 






Figure 19: Likelihood of government-voters (opposition- or non-
voters) to belong to protected (not protected) income group: Portugal 
 
   




No 55.08% 44.92% 
Yes 50.64% 49.36% 
Total 53.98% 46.02% 
 
Pearson: 
    Uncorrected   chi2(1)         =    1.3324 
    Design-based  F(1, 1)         =  2.87e+13      
    P = 0.0000 
 
Sources: Calculations with EUROMOD version H1.0+ and European Social Survey Round 
7, 2014. 
 
In fact, in a further step each weighted individual in the ESS data is assigned 
the corresponding reduction in disposable income based on the data produced 
with EUROMOD, and the mean income reduction of government voters and 
opposition- and non-voters is calculated. The results of this exercise show that 
whilst mean disposable income reductions for government voters are indeed 
smaller, the difference vis-à-vis mean disposable income reduction of opposition 
or non-voters is minimal (see Figure 20). Moreover, regressing voter types on 
the aggregate change of incomes due to the reforms throughout the EAPs, 
rather than whether different voter types belonged to a relatively more or less 
protected income group as presented in Figure 19, shows that the difference 
between government voters and opposition- or non-voters is statistically not 



















Figure 20: Average change in disposable household income due to the 
EAP reforms for government-voters and opposition- or non-voters: 
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Reforms 









*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Sources: Calculations with EUROMOD version H1.0+ and European Social Survey Round 
7, 2014. 
 
Overall, the results show that whilst there is some evidence of voters of the 
Portuguese government being more likely to be located in income groups that 
were relatively more protected, this evidence is weak as the difference between 
voter groups are practically negligible. Moreover, the statistical significance 
disappears when voter groups are regressed on average income changes rather 
than their belonging to certain income groups. On this basis, H2 can be rejected. 
 
In light of this evidence, with regard to H3, i.e. governments protecting voters 
in the middle of the income distribution, the data presented in Table 5 and 
Figure 11 suggest that H3 is true. The distributive effects of the Portuguese 
EAP are such that voters closer to the middle of the income distribution see 
the lowest income reductions, whilst those at the tails of the income 
distribution see the highest income reductions. This seems to confirm that 
governments are responsive to the needs of the median voter and seek to 
protect these potentially decisive voter groups in order to ensure their re-
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election. It should be noted, however, that this rests on a somewhat broader 
definition of the hypothetical median voter as the group of more protected 




This paper set out to explain the variations in the distributive effects of 
austerity measures in the Eurozone crisis. The overarching claim made is that 
the distributive effects of austerity measures are determined by where the locus 
of power lies, or in other words by who is in charge of administering the 
adjustment process. Based on the empirical and theoretical contributions of 
the previous paper, I hypothesised that austerity programmes administered by 
the unelected technocrats of the Troika should display more progressive effects. 
They are more likely to protect lower income earners than middle or high 
income earners. This is not due to an intrinsic interest of the Troika 
bureaucrats in the issue of inequality, but because reforms that differ from this 
principle are deemed as contradicting the Troika institutions’ understandings 
of what constitutes sound economic policy for sustainable growth. The IMF 
views excessive inequality as harmful to economic growth, and the European 
Commission sees being association with regressive reforms as a threat to the 
European integration project. The preferences of the ECB regarding fiscal 
policy are necessarily less clear cut, but the paper finds no evidence in the 
literature that the ECB should advocate for policies that entail regressive 
reforms based on e.g. a potential equality-efficiency trade-off, inferring that it 
is neutral or at least non-resistant toward more progressive policy design. 
 
Elected governments on the other hand follow a different logic in that they are 




important voter groups such as their own voters or voters located in the middle 
of the income distribution due to their ability to form powerful electoral 
coalitions, as opposed to opposition- or non-voters. Austerity programmes that 
are primarily controlled by elected officials should therefore display distributive 
effects in accordance with these preferences. 
 
Using data created with tax-benefit microsimulation tool EUROMOD, the 
paper finds that the Greek EAPs protected those in lower income groups, whilst 
the Portuguese EAP protected middle income earners. This is generally in line 
with the expectations formulated at the beginning of the paper regarding a 
Troika-controlled programme on the one hand, and a government-controlled 
programme on the other hand. Further analysis yields that the Greek 
programme was indeed more strongly controlled by the Troika than the 
Portuguese programme. This is the result of a shift in the Troika’s approach 
regarding the Greek EAPs and a tightening of its grip on the reform process 
from 2012 onwards. This shift in the Troika’s strategy is congruous with a 
break in the trend observable regarding the distributive effects of the reforms: 
Whilst the reforms led to uniform reductions in disposable household income 
across the income distribution prior to 2012, lower income groups and in 
particular the lowest income decile fared better after that point. 
 
Moreover, with regard to the distributive effects of the Portuguese programme, 
there is stronger evidence for the government aiming to protect middle income 
earners than their own voters. This is illustrated on the one hand by middle 
income groups remaining mostly protected from potential adverse effects of the 
reforms in Portugal, particular in comparison to households located at either 
tail of the income distribution, which saw larger income reductions due to the 
reforms. On the other hand, the statistical evidence for governments seeking 
to protect their own voters is rather weak suggesting that their position on the 




coalitions in the future is more important to governments than who they voted 
for in past elections. 
 
The paper concludes that, in general, variation in the distributive effects of 
austerity programmes indeed depends on who is in charge of the reform process. 
It has identified two most similar cases whose only relevant differing variable 
is the degree to which the reform process was controlled by the Troika as 
opposed to the national government. It has also found that the concrete 
observed distributive effects are in line with the expectations associated with 
such programmes. 
 
One major avenue for further research regards the question of whether the 
political dynamics illustrated in this paper play out similarly in other policy 





––––– Paper III ––––– 
Technocracy inside out. The distributive effects of the 




This paper complements and completes the preceding analysis of the effects of 
the fiscal policy reforms in the previous papers by studying the outcomes of 
the structural labour market reforms in Greece and Portugal. This is done to 
uncover whether the consequences of the labour market reforms were similar 
to those of the fiscal reform measures, i.e. more progressive, in contrast to 
expectations. The central question the paper answers is whether the stronger 
involvement of the Troika in Greece led to a different reform trajectory than 
in Portugal, and how this affected workers in both labour markets. Building 
on Thelen’s Varieties of Liberalisation framework and the burgeoning 
dualisation literature, the paper first assesses the reform trajectories as agreed-
upon in the EAPs. Utilising data from the European Commission’s LABREF 
database the paper then evaluates whether the reform prescriptions have been 
followed in the implementation stage. It finds that reform trajectories indeed 
diverged, following a wholesale deregulatory path in Greece, and more dualising 
principles in Portugal. This divergence from the EAPs is corroborated in the 
ex-post evaluations of the EAPs conducted by the Troika. Using a status-based 
operationalisation building on Rueda (2007), the paper then evaluates concrete 
outcomes for workers. It finds that dualisation fell in Greece but persisted in 
Portugal. Greek labour market insiders thus became more vulnerable while 
those in Portugal were able to retain some of their privileges. On the other 
hand, unlike in the case of fiscal reforms, the Troika involvement, while 
technically equalising, did not incorporate any compensatory elements for 
vulnerable groups and thus did not contribute to improving employment 





On August 20, 2018, Greece concluded its third Economic Adjustment 
Programme (EAP), following the largest government bailout in history. Greece 
was the last of four countries, after Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus, to conclude 
a comprehensive reform programme largely designed not by elected 
governments but by technocratic policy-makers. While the majority of accounts 
in the field of economic and political sciences have focused on assessing whether 
Greece and the other three programme recipient countries have in fact 
managed the economic turnaround, much less attention has been paid to the 
distributional impacts of the reform programmes.  
 
This paper seeks to contribute to closing this gap by providing an analysis of 
the labour market reforms in Greece and Portugal and their distributional 
impacts. The analysis rests on a number of insights from the labour market 
reform and dualisation literature. One key assumption it makes based on this 
literature is that labour market reforms implemented by office-seeking 
politicians tend to shield those workers from the most adverse effects of such 
reforms that constitute important voter groups. Historically, this has led to the 
cementation of dualised labour markets with a core of protected insiders and a 
growing number of more insecure outsiders in atypical forms of employment. 
 
Building on the findings of the previous papers of this thesis, this paper further 
theorises that this prioritisation of already protected groups does not 
materialise when policy is designed by unelected technocrats, who in turn are 
mainly governed by their ideas of what constitutes good economic policy. In 
the field of fiscal policy reform, this was found to have an equalising effect, as 
evidenced by progressive tax-benefit reforms in the economic adjustment 
programmes for Greece, which was strongly controlled by the Troika of IMF, 




The paper tests whether the same dynamic can be observed for labour market 
reforms, which constituted a significant part of the EAPs next to the strict 
fiscal consolidation measures. It does so by first providing an analysis of the 
reform trajectories observable in Greece and Portugal. Drawing on Thelen’s 
Varieties of Liberalisation framework (2014), the paper analyses the reform 
prescriptions in the EAPs according to whether they can be classified as wholly 
deregulatory, i.e. decreasing both the degree of coverage and coordination of 
labour market regulations, or merely dualising, which pertains to the 
flexibilisation of employment conditions mainly for labour market outsiders 
while leaving the protective legislation for labour market insiders intact. This 
is triangulated with an analysis of the implemented reforms using data from 
the European Commission’s LABREF database. 
 
In a further step, the paper approximates the effects of the reforms for each 
labour market group by analysing group-specific outcomes for insiders and 
outsiders throughout the reform process. It does so by employing a widely-used 
status-based quantitative measure of labour market dualisation (Rueda 2007) 
as well as tracing individuals throughout various labour market transitions in 
order to assess whether, during the reform process, different labour market 
groups have followed different trajectories. In particular, the paper asks 
whether the reforms implemented in response to the deep recessions in Greece 
and Portugal have targeted insiders as well as outsiders, or whether the 
privileges of labour market insiders have remained in place, untouched by the 
structural reform efforts. 
 
The paper finds that labour markets have indeed become less dualised in 
Greece, but not in Portugal. This is echoed in the ex-post evaluations of the 
programmes compiled by the Troika institutions, attesting that labour market 
dualisation has remained stronger in Portugal, despite the reform efforts. 




LABREF database reveals that those implemented in Greece were by a large 
majority aimed at lowering the extent of dualisation in the labour market, 
albeit by attacking insider privileges rather than reregulating labour markets 
for outsiders, while the evidence is more mixed for Portugal. 
 
These findings are particularly noteworthy as the analysis of the original reform 
prescriptions in the Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) shows that tackling 
labour market dualisation through structural reforms was a priority for the 
Troika, aimed at making labour markets more flexible and efficient through 
all-out deregulation. However, the programme reviews and the post-programme 
evaluations of the Troika show that compliance with the reform prescriptions 
was higher in Greece than in Portugal. This raises the question of what lay 
behind the lower success of the reform programmes in tackling labour market 
dualisation in Portugal. The paper finds evidence that this can be attributed 
to the national authorities pushing back against the Troika’s reform 
prescriptions more effectively in Portugal than in Greece, where domestic 
authorities were unable to counter the Troika’s tight grip on the reform process. 
The central argument is as follows: As labour market dualisation is more often 
than not a product of government legislation rather than purely structural 
factors such as the tertiarisation of the economy, comprehensive labour market 
reforms designed by technocratic institutions have a greater scope to 
successfully tackle labour market dualisation. This is because technocratic 
institutions are not bound by the same political dynamics that led elected 
governments to pursue policies that cemented labour market dualisation in the 
first place. It is vital to note in this context that the paper finds that, while 
labour market inequality indeed decreased throughout the duration of the 
EAPs in Greece, where the impact of unelected technocrats was largest, this 
clearly followed a downward trend. In other words, equalisation was achieved 
by making everybody worse off, but employment conditions for the labour 




The paper is structured as follows: The first part provides an overview of the 
existing dualisation literature, outlining the origins of labour market 
segmentation, as well as presenting a framework to understand and 
conceptualise different trajectories of labour market reforms, and presenting 
the case studies. The second part introduces the sources for the paper’s 
empirical analysis, including documents from the Economic Adjustment 
Programmes and their evaluations, and information on implemented reforms 
from the European Commission’s LABREF database. It also introduces a 
status-based operationalisation of labour market groups used in this paper. The 
third part provides the empirical analysis based on the EAPs, LABREF data, 
and EU-SILC data. The last section of the paper concludes, outlining some 
limitations and areas of possible future research. 
 
3.2. Theoretical Considerations and Case Selection 
3.2.1 The origins of labour market dualisation 
Since the late 1970s, workers in advanced capitalist democracies have been 
subject to growing pressures resulting in increasingly unequal wages and forms 
of employment, and overall evermore dualised labour markets. Indeed, this is 
reflected along a number of different facets, all of which constitute different 
elements of dualisation, including political representation, citizenship, access 
to benefits, or the degree of job protection (Davidsson and Naczyk 2009). For 
the purpose of this paper, dualisation is understood as the differences in the 
vulnerability of workers to the possibility of becoming unemployed. By that 
definition, insiders are in secure forms of employment with little exposure to 
unemployment risks or the negative effects associated with it. Outsiders, 
conversely are employed informally or have little job protection and lower 
employment rights, thus being overall more exposed to the risk of 




Parts of this development of growing dualisation across the advanced capitalist 
democracies can be attributed to structural changes in the economy: In the 
context of an increasingly integrated world economy, growing competition from 
low-wage countries has resulted in the displacement of low-skilled workers in 
advanced economies (Rodrik 1998). By a similar logic, shifts from an 
industrialised to an increasingly tertiarised economy in the advanced nations 
have led to growingly unequal forms of employment, as well-paid and well-
protected jobs in the highly organised industrial sector have been displaced in 
favour of less organised employment in the service sector (Iversen and Cusack 
2000; Iversen and Wren 1998). This trend was reinforced by sizeable increases 
in the share of female labour market participation, both as female workers tend 
to work largely in the service sector (Oesch 2006), and are generally more likely 
to interrupt their professional careers in order to tend to their families than 
men (Estévez-Abe 2005). Furthermore, one strand of the literature argues that 
technological change has led to displacement, particularly in the case of low-
skilled and/or routine workers (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003; Autor, Katz, 
and Kearney 2006). 
 
At the same time, these structural changes in the economy have caused and 
been accompanied by growing pressures on the welfare state, thus limiting its 
capacity to mitigate adverse effects of structural changes on workers (Pierson 
2001). This development was arguably more pronounced for member states of 
the European Union, with European integration contributing to national 
governments being increasingly limited by e.g. the fiscal rules of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (Hemerijck and Ferrera 2003). The latter was exacerbated 
further through increased tax competition stemming from the 






However, there is consensus in the literature that while such structural 
pressures do indeed contribute to the deterioration of employment conditions, 
this has not been the case across the board. In other words, labour markets 
have become more dualised, with some workers becoming increasingly exposed 
to the above-described pressures and at the same time less protected by the 
welfare state (Palier 2010), while other workers have retained more favourable 
employment conditions. One key insight from the dualisation literature in this 
regard is that the growing divide between labour market insiders and outsiders 
is not exclusively brought about “naturally” by the above-described structural 
factors but is more often than not the direct product of political processes 
(Emmenegger et al. 2012). 
 
This is because preferences regarding labour market regulation are markedly 
different for insiders and outsiders: Labour market insiders favour stricter 
employment protection legislation, which to some degree shields them from job 
loss by minimising labour turnover as well as improving their bargaining 
position vis-à-vis employers (Emmenegger 2009). At the same time, such 
legislation constitutes higher entry barriers for labour market outsiders, such 
as temporary workers or the unemployed (Saint‐Paul 2002), thus translating 
into diametrically different political preferences between the two groups. As 
insiders usually outnumber outsiders and are better organised and easier to 
mobilise, governments tend to side with insiders on issues where preferences 
differ (Saint-Paul 1996), thus cementing already existing disparities in labour 
market statuses. 
 
In fact, as shown in Rueda’s seminal work (Rueda 2005; 2006; 2007), it is 
particularly and somewhat counterintuitively Social Democratic parties and 
centre-left governments that cater mostly to labour market insiders, whom they 
perceive as their core constituents (Botero et al. 2004; Saint‐Paul 2002; Siegel 




have argued that labour market policies enacted by left or Social Democratic 
party-led governments are decisively responsive to the interests of the specific 
composition of their voter base. Due to the recent increase in fragmentation of 
the voter base of Social Democratic parties in post-industrial societies, these 
interests have become less straightforward and more varied. They find that 
Social Democratic parties in government commanding more support from 
labour market outsiders will be likelier to champion policies benefitting 
outsiders and vice versa. This calls into question the aforementioned assertion 
that left parties are unidirectionally predisposed to catering to insider needs 
only, arguing instead that they are responsive to whoever they perceive as their 
most crucial voter base, which in turn depends on which group constitutes the 
greatest mass of voters and can reasonably be expected to participate in 
politics. They do agree, however, on the general premise that governments are 
responsive to particular voter groups, which can result in the further 
dualisation of labour markets if those groups are predominantly made up of 
labour market insiders. 
 
Overall, we can maintain that, in the past, elected, i.e. office-seeking, 
governments contributed to a growing dualisation of the labour market through 
various pieces of legislation. By catering to the interests of labour market 
insiders, which traditionally wield greater influence over governments in power 
due to both sheer numbers and a higher degree of organisation, such legislation 
further protected their privileged status, thus fortifying and exacerbating 
labour market dualisation (Rueda 2007; Iversen and Soskice 2009; Häusermann 
and Schwander 2012; Emmenegger 2009; Ebbinghaus 2006). 
 
The following section outlines a theoretical framework that serves to classify 
different forms of liberalising labour market reforms, accommodating both 





3.2.2 Varieties of Liberalisation: A framework to understand 
different forms of labour market reforms 
In order to conceptualise the different types of labour market reforms in the 
Eurozone crisis, this paper draws on the theoretical framework provided by 
Thelen (2014) dubbed Varieties of Liberalisation (see also Picot and Tassinari 
2017). Building on earlier work (Hall and Thelen 2009, 22ff.), Thelen argues 
that, while labour market reforms since the 1980s generally followed the 
liberalisation principle as posited in the work of Streeck (2010; 2011), the term 
liberalisation itself is too encompassing to adequately explain the nuanced 
differences persisting in labour market reforms throughout the advanced 
capitalist democracies (Thelen 2014, 11).  
 
Thelen devises a two-dimensional framework resting on the notions of 
‘coordination’ and ‘coverage’ to accommodate these differences. Coordination 
refers to Hall and Soskice’s interpretation of the term in the Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) literature (2001). Coordination is thus understood as the 
strategic interaction of economic actors through non-market institutions to 
facilitate economic activity. A high degree of coordination in the five spheres 
described in the VoC literature is typically characterised by strong and 
centralised wage bargaining institutions and long job tenure underpinned by 
strong employment protection legislation. This rests on firms’ significant 
investments in employees developing industry-specific skills, which in turn 
necessitates the coordination between firms and the protection of such workers 
to secure a high return of such investments by retaining skilled workers in the 
company. 
 
In an advancement of the VoC literature, Thelen raises the question of coverage 
in addition to coordination, arguing that a high degree of coordination in and 




these coordinative processes and thus cover the majority of workers. Whether 
coordination covers only a small core portion of the workforce or indeed larger 
numbers typically depends on either the ability of coordinating institutions, 
such as trade unions, to force firms to adhere to such rules that would 
ordinarily not participate voluntarily, or the state – an actor purposely left out 
in the firm-centred VoC literature – imposing adequate legislation (Thelen 
2014, 12). 
 
In an age where liberalisation has been the chief principle for changes in the 
institutional setup of labour markets, this leaves three ideal-type reform 
trajectories: (1) embedded flexibilisation; (2) deregulation; and (3) dualisation 
(see Figure 21). 
 
Figure 21: Varieties of Liberalisation 
 

























Embedded flexibilisation in this context refers to a reduction in coordination 
without restricting coverage. More generally, this involves policies aimed at 
making labour markets more flexible and workers mobile, thus increasing their 
exposure to market forces. However, this ideal-type reform process retains a 
certain degree of “supply side solidarity” (Baccaro and Locke 1998) aimed at 
reducing individual risks and protecting the most vulnerable. Typically, reform 
trajectories of this type follow the flexicurity principle of protecting individual 
workers but prying open labour markets to make them more flexible, and can 
be observed in the Scandinavian countries. 
 
Deregulation denotes reforms that retrench both coordination and coverage. 
This type of reform typically involves policies that expressly dismantle labour 
market institutions such as collective bargaining arrangements, and often 
target labour unions as a vehicle of coordination. Not only do such informs 
increase the exposure of workers to market forces, they also entail a higher 
individualisation of risk (Hacker 2019). Such reforms constitute the most direct 
assault on all forms of worker protection and tend to be found more commonly 
in the Anglophone liberal market economies. 
 
Lastly, dualisation refers to retrenching coverage but otherwise leaving 
coordination mechanisms among firms intact. Unlike embedded flexibilisation 
or outright deregulation such reforms thus do not constitute a direct 
impingement on labour market institutions. Instead, these reforms aim at 
narrowing the number of workers covered by the coordinating institutions. 
Effectively, this leads to a relatively stronger protection of those that are part 
of the core of protected workers in the face of a growing number of outsiders 
(Emmenegger et al. 2012). In fact, coordination between those firms left inside 
the core often intensifies, thus further exacerbating the divide between insiders 
and outsiders (Rueda 2007; Thelen and Van Wijnbergen 2003). Typically, 




per se, but constrict the number of jobs and workers that these types of 
legislation cover, for example by introducing different rules for new labour 
market entrants or by relaxing rules for temporary and forms of informal 
employment. Dualisation-focused reforms have been prevalent in especially 
Germany and France (Palier and Thelen 2010; Thelen and Kume 2006). 
 
In the following section, the paper will unpack further the types of changes in 
labour market legislation to be expected in the context of the Eurozone crisis 
in Southern Europe in order to formulate testable hypotheses with regard to 
the design of the reform measures. 
 
3.2.3 Labour market reforms in the Eurozone crisis 
While the origins of dualised labour markets and the growing divide between 
labour market insiders and outsiders are well-documented, researchers have 
more recently turned to the issue of labour market dualisation in the face of 
economic crises and ensuing pressures to reform labour markets (Rueda 2014). 
In the particular context of the Eurozone crisis, countries in the currency 
union’s periphery were faced with distinct challenges at the onset of the crisis 
which arose from the unique institutional structure of the EU, the incomplete 
architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union, and political dynamics 
between EMU member states revealing a dramatic misdiagnosis of the crisis: 
On the one hand, the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact substantially 
inhibited governments’ room for fiscal manoeuvre and ruled out further 
financing of budget deficits to stimulate the economy. On the other hand, 
domestic governments’ lack of control over the common currency foreclosed 
any possible ways of external devaluation to tackle the crisis. The ECB’s 
inability to serve as a lender of last resort under the rules of the Maastricht 
Treaty further aggravated the situation (De Grauwe 2013; De Grauwe and Ji 




Effectively, governments of the Eurozone periphery were left with internal 
adjustment measures as the only way of tackling the crisis, thus ushering in an 
‘age of austerity’ (Armingeon and Baccaro 2012). Next to severe and immediate 
fiscal consolidation measures this entailed far-reaching structural reforms 
aimed at increasing economic competitiveness. This is entirely in line with the 
misdiagnosis of the crisis dominant among the political elites in the creditor 
countries as a crisis solely rooted in competitiveness problem. That means that, 
if a crisis is attributed to a lack of competitiveness of the domestic economic, 
regardless of whether this is an adequate view, deep structural reforms would 
be required to tackle the crisis. This argument is also closely connected with 
the pervasive view among the creditor countries, most notably Germany and 
the Netherlands, that current account deficits need to be addressed, while 
current account surpluses are perceived as signs of the competitiveness of their 
respective economies (Stockhammer 2011). The nature of such reforms over 
the past decades has conventionally taken the form of more or less 
unidirectional liberalisation (Streeck 2010; 2011), thereby gradually 
undermining the position of labour (Heyes, Lewis, and Clark 2012). Specifically, 
labour market reforms under the liberalisation paradigm typically entail 
deregulatory measures such as laxer employment protection legislation (EPL), 
as well as measures aimed at decentralising or reducing the scope of collective 
wage bargaining institutions. 
 
Marrying the above-outlined insights on labour market dualisation and its 
origins, with the liberalisation paradigm observable in labour market reforms 
over the past decades, the particular case of Southern Europe warrants closer 
scrutiny. In many Southern European economies, labour market reforms prior 
to the crisis reflected the liberalisation paradigm only to some extent: While 
deregulatory measures affected large numbers of labour market outsiders in 




employment often remained shielded from such measures (Bentolila, Dolado, 
and Jimeno 2012; Dubin 2012). 
 
Indeed, the Southern European countries have been characterised in the 
literature as displaying distinct features of dualised labour markets with a well-
protected core workforce with access to generous benefits, and a large number 
of poorly protected workers employed in atypical work (Ferrera 2010). These 
accounts are clearly compatible with Thelen’s theoretical framework, denoting 
predominantly dualising rather than wholly deregulating reforms in the 
Southern European context. In other words, labour market dualisation 
persisted throughout periods of liberalising reforms in Southern Europe.  
 
The context of the crisis could in turn be interpreted as a window of 
opportunity to implement reforms with the aim of equalising long-standing and 
entrenched structural imbalances in Southern European labour markets and 
welfare states and break the trend of further dualisation (Hemerijck 2013; 
Petmesidou and Guillén 2014). The ensuing question is therefore whether the 
crisis constituted sufficient external pressure to force the Southern European 
governments’ hands to lift some of the protective measures shielding the core 
workforce, or whether the crisis-induced reforms followed the familiar pre-crisis 
principle of dualising liberalisation, thus leading to a further deterioration of 
employment conditions for outsiders and leaving labour market insiders more 
or less untouched. 
 
3.2.4 The involvement of the Troika and its impact on varieties of 
liberalisation in Southern Europe – the cases of Greece and Portugal 
Virtually all of Southern Europe underwent more or less extreme phases of 




the Eurozone crisis. Together with severe fiscal consolidation measures, labour 
market reforms accounted for a significant part of the structural reform side of 
the economic adjustment process in the Eurozone periphery (Armingeon and 
Baccaro 2012; Schmidt 2012). However, there is a considerable difference 
between those countries that enacted such reforms more or less on their own 
account and the countries placed under surveillance of the Troika of IMF, 
European Commission, and ECB. Certainly the former group of countries faced 
immense pressures to reform both from within, as well as externally through 
the bond markets, which led some commentators to speak of ‘implicit 
conditionality’ (Sacchi 2015). They are, nevertheless, distinct from the Troika 
programme recipient countries in that they retained a certain degree of 
independence with regard to choosing the exact reform design. As illustrated 
in the previous papers of this thesis in the context of fiscal reforms, the degree 
to which governments are independent from interference by supranational 
actors (even if that does provide significant limitations with regard to the larger 
reform strategy) has a substantial impact on how governments choose to 
distribute the adjustment burden of the reforms.  
 
Labour market reforms with the aim of liberalisation and flexibilisation follow 
the same logic in that they invariably produce winners and losers: Regardless 
of any possible long-term improvements of growth prospects stemming from 
less rigid labour markets, those affected by liberalising reforms will at the very 
least in the short-run see their employment conditions worsen, while those that 
remain exempt from such measures will ultimately enjoy a higher degree of 
protection vis-à-vis those adversely impacted by the reforms. As illustrated in 
the dualisation literature, the design of labour market reforms and the choice 
between the different varieties of liberalisation posited by Thelen thus involve 





Given that the countries under Troika surveillance were markedly – although 
to differing degrees, as illustrated in Paper 2 of this thesis – constrained by the 
Troika conditionality in how they were able to design reform measures, the 
overall trajectory of labour market reforms may follow different logics. The 
Troika-controlled Southern European countries thus provide unique case 
studies that warrant closer scrutiny. In order to explain labour market reforms 
in these countries it is therefore necessary to go beyond the previously observed 
reform efforts in these countries and analyse specifically the likely impact of 
the Troika policy makers on the reform trajectories. 
 
Firstly, the European integration process has been characterised as pushing for 
distinctly market liberal transformations (Scharpf 1999). On the one hand, this 
relates to structural factors in the architecture of the EU. In that sense, 
European integration has displayed a bias towards negative integration, i.e. 
deregulatory measures, with positive integration, i.e. re-regulatory measures at 
the European level, having proven to be difficult (Scharpf 2006). Furthermore, 
the European Court of Justice’s “integration through law” (Scharpf 2010) has 
been identified as one key component in driving forward market liberal reforms 
(see also Beckfield 2019). Similarly, the European Commission, as guardian of 
the Treaties, has championed such market-liberal policies based on the 
ordoliberal model (Feld, Köhler, and Nientiedt 2015). 
 
The Treaties ultimately reflected these principles and enshrined both strict 
rules under the Stability and Growth Pact as well as more recently the Fiscal 
Compact on the fiscal policy side (De Grauwe 2018; Fitoussi and Saraceno 
2013) and a tremendous emphasis on price stability and political independence 
of the ECB (Treaty on European Union 1992, Art. 104(1), 105(1), 107), thus 
solidifying the market liberal direction of the European integration project 
(McNamara 1998). In the way that the EU economic policy consensus impacts 




Commission and the ECB as two of the three Troika institutions, it can be 
expected that the reforms reflect the same principles of fiscal prudence and 
market liberalism (Fitoussi and Saraceno 2004). 
 
In the same vein, the IMF as the third Troika institution has in the past 
championed reforms that aimed to flexibilise markets and limit the role of the 
state more generally in countries under Fund surveillance. In devising the likely 
nature of the reforms advocated for by the Troika in the Varieties of 
Liberalisation framework, all three institutions are likely to push for 
deregulatory measures rather than reforms resulting in dualisation or 
embedded flexibilisation. 
 
In fact, technocratic institutions such as the IMF understand dualised labour 
markets as an inefficiency and impediment to employment growth, and are 
therefore opposed to reforms that would further exacerbate the degree of 
segmentation in the labour market. In the past the Fund has on numerous 
occasions advocated to change or remove policies and regulations that 
contribute to the dualisation of labour markets, such as rigid employment 
protection legislation for workers on permanent contracts (Blanchard and 
Wolfers 1999; Di Tella and MacCulloch 2005; International Monetary Fund 
2003; Lindert 2004; Nickell 1997; Siegel 2007). As to the dualisation framework, 
technocrats criticise such policies in particular when they create barriers to 
entry for the long-term unemployed or discriminate against certain labour 
market groups and thereby intensify market failures (Blanchard and Portugal 
2001). 
As a result, many IMF reform proposals in the past endorsed the ‘flexicurity’ 
model of highly flexible and deregulated labour markets on the one hand and 
the protection of the individual through the welfare state by expanding active 




as the countries under Troika surveillance simultaneously faced extreme 
pressures to rapidly consolidate public budgets, such reforms were likely to 
take the form of outright deregulation, a more far-reaching approach, rather 
than embedded flexibilisation. 
 
We can conclude from this that labour market reforms designed by technocratic 
policy-makers would not only be expected to be less responsive to the interests 
of labour market insiders than would be the case if such reforms were designed 
by democratically elected governments. They are, in fact, likelier to target the 
privileges of labour market insiders head-on in order to eradicate inefficiencies 
and impediments to employment growth. This dynamic can be expected to be 
particularly strong in cases where deep recessions necessitate comprehensive 
structural reforms. 
 
3.2.5 Greece and Portugal as examples of highly dualised economies 
in deep recessions 
In evaluating labour market reforms in the Eurozone crisis this paper homes in 
on the cases of Greece and Portugal. This is due to a number of reasons: Firstly, 
it allows for an ample comparison of the findings detailed in the previous papers 
on fiscal policy reforms and their effects on inequality with the issue of labour 
market inequality. Secondly, Greece and Portugal have already been identified 
as two most similar systems in a comparative case study design displaying a 
number of sufficient commonalities, most importantly in the setup of their 
welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990; Hemerijck 2013; Ferrera 1996; 






Third, Greece and Portugal both experienced severe economic crises with 
prolonged periods of negative economic growth as well as high unemployment 
in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis and the ensuing sovereign 
debt crises in the Eurozone periphery (see Figure 22). Greece was profoundly 
hard-hit, with the economy contracting by 25% throughout the duration of the 
crisis and unemployment rates increasing beyond 20% of the active population 
since 2012. Portugal experienced negative growth rates between 2011 and 2013 
and unemployment rates over 12% between 2010 and 2015. The deterioration 
of public finances ultimately led to both countries requesting financial 
assistance and became part of comprehensive Economic Adjustment 
Programmes (EAPs) outlining fiscal and structural reforms, the fulfilment of 
which were conditions for the financial assistance provided by their European 
partners and the International Monetary Fund. 
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It is also clear that the crisis hit Greece and Portugal in a similar fashion 
revealing deep structural weaknesses exacerbated by a steep fall in demand (as 
opposed to for instance Ireland where the crisis hit through the banking system; 
see Armingeon and Baccaro 2012, 175). Importantly, however, there was a 
difference in the magnitude of these structural weaknesses, which were much 
starker in the case of Greece and combined with years of unsustainable 
government spending held afloat only through fraudulent accounting (De 
Grauwe 2013; OECD 2010) leading to contagion effects that exacerbated the 
crisis in the rest of the Eurozone periphery including Portugal. 
 
Fourth, both Greece and Portugal are examples of extremely dualised labour 
markets going into the adjustment process. Historically, the dualisation of 
labour markets began in earnest with increasing pressures stemming from 
employers demanding more flexibility in non-wage labour costs in an 
increasingly globalised world economy (Esping-Andersen 1985). In the 
Southern European countries in particular these pressures were combined with 
a predisposition for allowing capital and organised labour to share the exploits 
of protectionism in the formerly import substituting countries. For labour, this 
had meant high employment protection legislation as well as high wages in the 
protected (and uncompetitive) industries in exchange for labour peace which 
had set these countries on a path of labour market dualisation already by the 
1960s and 1970s before opening up to world trade (Rueda, Wibbels, and 
Altamirano 2015, 94). Deindustrialisation gave these dynamics a further push 
as trade unions conceded to what was essentially the creation of a secondary 
labour market with cheap and more insecure employment in order to protect 
their constituents in the core of the industrial workforce (Palier and Thelen 
2010). Again, this dynamic was more pronounced in the Southern European 
countries given that trade union density is significantly higher among labour 
market insiders compared to for instance the Continental welfare states (in 




between insiders and outsiders grew further, illustrating that labour market 
dualisation in Southern “translates into a clear power resources dualism” 
(Häusermann and Schwander 2012). 
 
There a number of ways to show these developments empirically. Rueda, 
Wibbels, and Altamirano (2015) in the work on the origins of dualism provide 
the following quantitative measures illustrating the high degree of labour 
market dualisation in Southern Europe and particularly Greece and Portugal. 
Figure 23 maps the patterns of employment protection for labour market 
insiders in a comparative fashion. The upper graph depicted in Figure 23 shows 
the costs for employers to initiate layoffs by combining severance pay, notice 
periods, and mandatory penalties enshrined in collective bargaining agreements 
or national legislation for workers with three years of job tenure in the 
respective firm. The data, based on Botero et al. (2004), provide two important 
insights: (1) costs for laying off labour market insiders are at a very high level 
in Greece and Portugal when compared to other countries in the sample in the 
2000s. In fact, the only countries where labour markets were more protective 
of insiders when measured through this indicator were Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, 
and Argentina. The EAPs for Greece and Portugal would later mark this rather 
extreme protection of insiders as one of the key factors for the low levels of 
competitiveness going into the crisis (European Commission 2010a; 2011c); (2) 
There has been very little change in this regard between the 1980s and the 
2000s. In fact, there was no change whatsoever observed for Portugal (indicated 
by the dotted line) and only some deregulation in Greece, where the costs for 
laying off labour market insiders were only slightly lower in the 2000s than in 
the 1980s. It should be noted that this appears to be a prevalent phenomenon 
across countries, although most other, especially European, countries register 






Figure 23: Measures of employment protection for labour market 
insiders 
 
     
     
Notes: The upper graph is based on data from Botero et al. (2004) that combines the costs 
of lay-offs for firms through the sum of the notice period, severance payments, and 
mandatory penalties stemming from e.g. collective bargaining agreements for workers with 
three years of job tenure. The lower graph is based on OECD data on procedural costs for 
employers intending to lay off workers (Venn 2009). 






The lower graph in Figure 23 uses data from the OECD that go beyond the 
pure costs of layoffs in order to construct a measure protection for labour 
market insiders. Specifically, the measure includes: “(i) procedural 
inconveniences that employers face when starting the dismissal process, such 
as notification and consultation requirements; (ii) notice periods and severance 
pay, which typically vary by tenure of the employee; and (iii) difficulty of 
dismissal, as determined by the circumstances in which it is possible to dismiss 
workers, as well as the repercussions for the employer if a dismissal is found to 
be unfair (such as compensation and reinstatement)” (Venn 2009, 6). From this 
data we can conclude that (1) Portugal is the country with the highest degree 
of labour market insider protection in the sample, and in fact by a large margin 
(although there has been some trend for convergence towards the other 
European countries in the sample); (2) Greece, although slightly below 
Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, also registers far up on the scale of insider 
protection going into the crisis (with a very minor decline between the 1980s 
and 2000s). 
 
As EAP-recipient countries, both Greece and Portugal were forced to 
implement wide-scale reform programmes with extensive impacts on labour 
markets. Drawing on the dualisation literature, and the trends shown in Figure 
23  with little to no change in the degree of protection of labour market insiders, 
we would ordinarily infer that such reforms in the two countries would work 
to further entrench the disadvantages of labour market outsiders while leaving 
the privileges of labour market insiders mostly in place, since the political 
processes from which dualisation originates do not change substantially in a 
recession. However, the EAP conditionality meant that policy-making 
competences had essentially been transferred in full or at least to a substantial 
degree to the technocratic policy-makers of the Troika. Therefore, as outlined 
in the previous section, the structural reforms of the EAPs can, in fact, be 




and legislation that contribute to the high degrees of dualisation in the Greek 
and Portuguese labour markets as inefficiencies and impediments to sustainable 
employment growth. The reform prescriptions designed by the Troika are, 
therefore, likely to tackle these policies head-on and mainly target the privileges 
of labour market insiders in order to create more flexible and less dualised 
labour markets. 
 
However, we also know from Paper 2 of this thesis that the reform process was 
not controlled to the same degree by the Troika in both countries. Due to 
stronger clientelistic linkages in Greece (Afonso, Zartaloudis, and 
Papadopoulos 2015; Hopkin 2015; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Lyrintzis 
1984) and weaker state capacity to implement far-reaching reforms (Falkner et 
al. 2005; Featherstone 2011; Hartlapp 2005; Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis 2011; 
Sotiropoulos 1993), the Troika took stronger ownership of the reform process 
and all but micromanaged the Greek reforms while issuing more general reform 
targets for Portugal, the exact design of which was left more to the discretion 
of the domestic government. This greater room for autonomy was facilitated 
by stronger veto points in Portugal, such as the Constitutional Court, which 
was instrumentalised repeatedly by both the President and different opposition 
parties to halt a number of Troika reforms (Cisotta and Gallo 2014; Moury 
and Standring 2017). 
 
For these reasons, stronger deviations from the thrust of the assumed 
deregulatory reforms induced by the Troika are possible in the case of Portugal, 
while in Greece this line of labour market reform prescriptions is likely to be 
followed more closely. In other words, labour market insiders in Portugal are 
likely to be affected less detrimentally by the labour market reforms under the 





3.2.6 Research question and hypotheses 
This paper’s aim is to extend the analysis of the previous two papers to the 
realm of labour market reforms. It therefore sets out to show firstly which 
trajectories in the sense of Varieties of Liberalisation (Thelen 2014) the labour 
market reforms in Greece and Portugal follow. From the dualisation literature 
we know that, if a recession is deep enough to trigger large scale structural 
reforms, governments are likely to respond to such pressures by further 
flexibilising employment conditions of outsiders rather than retrenching the 
privileges of labour market insiders. However, in cases where technocrats 
determine policy prescriptions, their distributive effects can be radically 
different as technocrats are not subject to the same political processes as elected 
governments and can afford to upset groups that are considered key to a 
government’s re-election. It is expected that in the case of Greece and Portugal, 
the Troika pushed for deregulatory reforms, specifically to retrench the 
privileges of labour market insiders in order to do away with the high degree 
of labour market dualisation in the two countries. This is because segmented 
labour markets are seen as an impediment to economic growth in the economic 
orthodoxy dominant in the Troika institutions. The different degrees of control 
over the reform process can, however, impact the reform trajectories 
substantially. On this basis, the paper formulates the first set of competing 
hypotheses:  
 
H1: Given the Troika’s predisposition to champion market liberal 
reforms and the absence of electoral pressures for the 
unelected technocrats of the Troika that would otherwise 
result in the protection of important groups of labour market 
insiders, the labour market reforms in Greece and Portugal 
are expected to follow deregulatory principles, and specifically 




H2: Given the higher degree of control exercised by the Troika in 
Greece, the Greek reforms are expected to be deregulatory. 
Conversely, labour market reforms in Portugal are expected 
to contribute to further dualisation due to the lower degree of 
control exercised by the Troika, which leaves in place the 
political dynamics that engendered labour market dualisation 
in the first place, such as office-seeking governments shielding 
electorally important groups of insiders. 
 
However, aside from the reform prescriptions negotiated between the Troika 
institutions and the respective domestic governments on the one hand and the 
reforms ultimately implemented in practice on the other, it is also necessary to 
consider concrete labour market outcomes for both labour market insiders and 
outsiders throughout the crisis and the reform process. As labour market 
insiders enjoy a higher degree of job protection and thus lower risk of becoming 
unemployed than labour market outsiders, it is reasonable to assume that 
during times of economic recession, outsiders will be hit first by ensuing 
increases in unemployment. In fact, we know from the dualisation literature 
that labour market outsiders function as a form of buffer, protecting insiders 
from unemployment (Rueda 2007; 2014). This is due to firms reacting to 
economic downturns primarily by either terminating those workers that are on 
more flexible contracts first, i.e. workers that can be labelled as labour market 
outsiders, or slashing their work hours (Eichhorst, Feil, and Marx 2010). 
 
Therefore, the severe recessions and high levels of unemployment that both 
countries experienced can be expected to have led to labour market outsiders 
being displaced in larger numbers. However, as a result of the reform measures, 
insiders should become increasingly less secure and thus approach similar levels 




this basis, the following competing hypotheses building on the previously 
outlined ones are formulated: 
 
H3: As a result of uniformly deregulatory labour market reforms, 
both labour market insiders and outsiders experience a higher 
risk of unemployment in Greece and Portugal. In relative 
terms, the differences between the two groups are expected to 
shrink as predominantly labour market insiders’ privileges are 
retrenched. 
 
H4: As a result of deregulatory labour market reforms in Greece 
and dualising ones in Portugal, labour market insiders in 
Greece are expected to experience an increased risk of 
becoming unemployed, while remaining relatively more 
shielded from the recession in Portugal. Labour market 
outsiders in Portugal retain their buffer function shielding 
labour market insiders from exposure to unemployment. 
 
3.3 Research design 
3.3.1 Analysing labour market reforms through the Varieties of 
Liberalisation lens 
The analysis of labour market reforms in Greece and Portugal and classification 
as either deregulatory or dualising involves three steps. Firstly, the documents 
of the Economic Adjustment Programmes for both Greece and Portugal are 
dissected according to the outlined reform measures. Specifically, the 
documents will be scanned for passages that reveal the Troika’s aims with 




evaluations of the EAPs for Greece and Portugal conducted individually by 
both the IMF and the Commission are analysed in order to gauge whether the 
reforms have been implemented according to the prescriptions of the Troika. 
 
Thirdly, the Troika’s views of the reform success in the two countries are 
juxtaposed with the implemented reform measures throughout the years of the 
EAPs. For this purpose, the paper makes use of the European Commission’s 
LABREF database, which maps all labour market reforms in EU member 
states until 2016 (Turrini et al. 2015). In order to test the paper’s hypotheses 
and classify the reforms according to Thelen’s framework as either deregulatory 
or dualising, it is necessary to explain the operationalisation of the two 
dimensions ‘coordination’ and ‘coverage’. Utilising the LABREF database the 
analysis focuses on the following policy areas of labour market reforms: 
employment protection legislation (especially pertaining to dismissal rules), 
wage setting, and working time. All reforms in these areas implemented 
throughout the duration of the EAPs are then categorised according to whether 
they serve to deregulate or dualise26. 
 
3.3.2 Measuring labour market dualisation 
In addition to the analysis of the reforms by content, the paper takes two 
distinct steps in measuring labour market dualisation: First, it uses a 
quantitative measure of labour market outcomes for different groups, which 
offers significant insights as to how the degree of dualisation has developed 
throughout the crises in Greece and Portugal and the ensuing adjustment 
processes. In the second step, the paper captures transitions of individuals 
between different labour market groups, such as from insider to outsider, or 
from insider/outsider to unemployed, which in turn allows us to assess the 
 
26 For the sake of completeness, the reforms will also be analysed according to whether they 




unemployment risks associated with belonging to a specific labour market 
group. 
 
For the purpose of the analysis in this paper, we are specifically interested in 
(1) quantifying different labour market groups, and (2) transitions between 
those labour market groups. Researchers have developed a number of different 
measures to determine an individual’s affiliation with a labour market group 
at a particular point in time. 27  This analysis uses a status-based 
operationalisation of insiderness based on Rueda (2007), which understands 
labour market insiders as those in secure forms of employment and outsiders 
as those in atypical forms of employment. This operationalisation is one of the 
most widely used in the literature and adopted here because it is best-suited 
to meet its analytical purpose of mapping labour market processes as well as 
picking up the effects of structural reforms (Schwander and Häusermann 2013; 
see also Marx and Picot 2020 for an in-depth discussion of the 
operationalisation). 
 
Using the cross-sectional panel of EU-SILC data, the paper follows academic 
convention as laid out in Rueda (2007) and restricts the sample to individuals 
of working age (i.e. between 15–64 years old). Following convention, the 
following individuals are coded as insiders: 
(1) Individuals with long-term employment contracts; 
(2) Voluntary part-time workers, if they work at least 20 hours per week; 
(3) The self-employed, if they have employees working for them. This is 
a particularly noteworthy qualification as the share of the self-
employed is high in Southern Europe but differences in labour 
 
27 For a detailed account of different operationalisations of labour market insiders and outsiders 




market vulnerabilities among the group is large (e.g. self-employed 
lawyers and pharmacists, vs. shopkeepers). 
 
Conversely, the following individuals in the sample are coded as outsiders: 
(1) Individuals with temporary or fixed-term employment contracts; 
(2) Involuntary part-time workers; 
(3) Part-time workers working less than 20h per week; 
(4) Self-employed individuals if they do not have employees working for 
them; 
(5) Family workers.  
 
Additionally, individuals are coded as unemployed in a separate group from 
labour market outsiders if their self-reported economic status labels them as 
such, and inactive if they are in training or unpaid work, military or community 
service, retirement, if they are permanently disabled, fulfilling domestic tasks, 
or if they are otherwise inactive. The empirical analysis thus allows us to 
aggregate individuals who are either insiders, outsiders, unemployed or inactive 
and trace changes in the total number of individuals of each status over time 
and, in particular, through the crisis and the structural reform process. 
 
In addition to this first status-based operationalisation, the paper traces 
individuals throughout different years, detecting labour market transitions, 
following the approach utilised in Ray and Schwander (2018). In particular, 
the status-based operationalisation founded on cross-sectional EU-SILC data 
in each year is unable to show whether the group of newly unemployed 
individuals is comprised of formerly atypically employed individuals i.e. labour 
market outsiders, or insiders. This gap is bridged by employing the longitudinal 
panel of EU-SILC data, which traces individuals through four years, thus 




groups. For the purposes of this second part of the analysis, inactive individuals 
are excluded, and insiders, outsiders and unemployed coded as above, i.e. using, 
again, the status-based operationalisation to determine which labour market 
group each individual is classified to be part of. Based on the availability of 
data, this step in the analysis makes one deviation from the approach outlined 
above: Since the longitudinal panel does not contain information on the reasons 
for being in part-time work, individuals in part-time employment are all 
labelled as outsiders. In the original contribution by Rueda (2007), who uses 
cross-sectional data, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary part-
time workers is sensible. However, a large number of other studies, even when 
using cross-sectional data which allow for this distinction, has omitted this 
variable and categorised part-time workers generally as labour market outsiders 
(Marx and Picot 2020). 
 
This analysis sheds light on whether the expectations based on the dualisation 
literature can be confirmed, i.e. whether the group of labour market outsiders 
has in fact served as a buffer during the recessions in Greece and Portugal, and 
secondly, whether this buffer function has remained unchanged throughout the 
structural reform process. A negative answer to this question would imply that 
labour market insiders were in fact not shielded by the buffer of labour market 
outsiders, and suggest that the structural reforms of the Economic Adjustment 





3.4 Empirical Analysis and Findings 
3.4.1 The Troika prescriptions: Uniform blueprint or country-
specific reforms? 
The EAP-related documents reveal the following priorities governing the 
Troika’s reform prescriptions. The first EAP for Greece emphasises specifically 
that (1) the Greek labour market is deemed to be too rigid, pointing to high 
levels of employment protection, stating that “reforms are, in particular, needed 
to […] render product and labour markets more efficient and flexible” 
(European Commission 2010, 15). Furthermore, the EAP shows that (2) this 
constitutes an impediment to a return to economic growth: “Unless tackled in 
earnest, structural rigidities may undermine the Greek economy’s capacity to 
adjust to the current situation” (ibid., 10), making the flexibilisation of the 
Greek labour market a key priority of the reform programme.  
 
Tackling labour market dualisation specifically is not mentioned by name in 
the first EAP for Greece, although the problematisation of the very high degree 
of job protection for key groups in the labour market in the EAP suggests that 
the Troika was aware of this issue and sought to address it. The overall 
trajectory of the planned reforms, however, seem to follow a generally more 
unconstrained deregulatory thrust rather than targeting labour market insiders 
exclusively. 
 
In its more specific diagnosis of the features of the Greek labour market that 
are deemed problematic by the Troika, the first EAP identifies three core 
issues, all of which point to a high degree of coordination for (at least) a core 
workforce, thus leaving others at the margins: 
“Firstly, Greece’s high employment protection legislation for 




permanent white-collar workers hinders young workers’, women 
and long term unemployed entry and re-entry into the labour 
market as well as their transition into permanent contracts. 
Secondly, specific characteristics of the wage bargaining system 
(such as the extension of collective agreements to all enterprises, 
including those not involved in the negotiations) prevent wage 
moderation and put pressure on inflation. Moreover, wage 
bargaining processes have also resulted in setting relatively high 
minimum wage levels, thereby hindering labour demand of young 
workers, who are also affected by the lack of proper links between 
formal education and training and the needs of the labour market. 
Thirdly, Greece has a substantially higher rate of in-work poverty 
risk compared to the EU, though, given the high share of 
undeclared work, this figure needs to be treated with caution.” 
(ibid., 28) 
 
It is clear from this passage that the Troika reform prescription would 
constitute nothing less than a direct attack on coordinating institutions with 
the aim of flexibilising the labour market. It also evident from the mention of 
in-work poverty that the Troika deems such reforms as necessary preconditions 
for a more efficient labour market, subscribing to the neoliberal view that 
ultimately all workers would benefit from such deregulatory reforms. Troika 
policy makers also and somewhat uncritically accept the view that such reforms 
would ultimately result in higher equity by reducing inefficiencies: 
“Labour market reforms will spur job creation and increase wage 
flexibility. Other than efficiency aspects, reforms are also needed 
to improve equity, therefore increasing job opportunities for the 
young and long term unemployed and improving access to 
services.” (ibid., 25) 
 
The Troika issued concrete reform prescriptions to address the rigidity of the 
labour market, all of which are aimed at across the board flexibilisation, 
outlining that: 
“Government amends employment protection legislation to 
extend the probationary period for new jobs to one year, to reduce 




severance payment conditions apply to blue- and white-collar 
workers, to raise the minimum threshold for activation of rules 
on collective dismissals especially for larger companies, and to 
facilitate greater use of temporary contracts and part-time work.” 
(ibid., 73) 
 
The reform prescriptions also contained more direct attacks on wage 
coordination institutions, requiring the government to: 
“adopt legislation to reform the wage bargaining system in the 
private sector, including local territorial pacts to set wage growth 
below sectoral agreements; introduce variable pay to link wages 
to productivity performance at the firm level; […] adjust 
legislation to introduce annual time accounts and reduce overtime 
pay.” (ibid., 85) 
 
In the second EAP, signed after two years of deep economic recession and 
painful fiscal and structural reforms in 2012, the Troika reaffirmed its position 
with regard to the prescribed flexibilisation of the Greek labour market. In fact, 
despite the reform efforts, the Troika seemed to depict the prevailing rigidity 
of the labour market as one contributing factor to the depth of the crisis. At 
the same time it acknowledged the distributive conflicts induced by the 
reforms, although the Troika reasserted its view that reforms that are painful 
for some are necessary to achieve higher overall equality (in other words, the 
Troika subscribed to the view that higher equality cannot only be achieved by 
improving the situation for the more vulnerable but also simply by making 
those at the top worse off): 
“Despite a considerable reduction in per capita income, downward 
rigidities in wage-setting systems have prevented the necessary 
adjustment of private sector wages; this has contributed to a 
sharp increase in unemployment. The government has adopted 
several measures in relation to collective bargaining, so as to 
reduce the downward rigidity on wages and facilitate 





Unsurprisingly, given this diagnosis, the prescribed reforms in the second EAP 
can be clearly labelled as ‘more of the same’, although the reform progress was 
increasingly pressing in the face of the crumbling Greek economy. Specifically, 
the Troika stated in the second EAP: 
“In a context of a sharp decline in employment, emergency action 
was needed to ensure the quick responsiveness of wages to the fall 
in economic activity. The authorities and the mission staff 
discussed and agreed on a package of actions to be taken by the 
Government in the short term, which should contribute to reduce 
labour costs in the business sector by 15 percent over the 
programme horizon.” (ibid., 38) 
 
Further reform prescriptions reaffirming the flexibilisation paradigm in the 
second EAP were: 
“The measures decided by the government build on two pillars: 
an adjustment of wage floors and a revision of the collective 
bargaining system, with a view to spurring and easing contract 
renegotiation and promoting wage flexibility […] The downward 
wage flexibility helps viable companies to reduce their production 
costs, thus creating potential gains in external market shares, 
promote investment and thus, to accelerate the much needed 
change in the structure of the economy.” (ibid., 38) 
 
One specific area in which the Troika identified need for action concerned the 
newly privatised former state-owned enterprises, again with a distinctly 
deregulatory tone: 
“Privileged labour conditions in former state-owned firms will be 
better aligned with those in the rest of the private sector. 
Privatised former SOEs are not competitive if they are forced to 
inherit labour conditions from the public sector, which notably 
have included public-sector-like tenure and very generous 
automatic wage increases.” (ibid., 40) 
 
Based on both the Troika’s diagnosis of the ailments of the Greek labour 




not exclusively, for a core group of insiders – and the prescribed cures as laid 
out in the first and second EAPs for Greece, it is clear that the reform measures 
were aimed at reducing both coordination, and coverage, thus falling into the 
category of deregulation in the Varieties of Liberalisation framework. This is 
in line with both H1 and H2, since, firstly, it was expected that the Troika 
would (1) identify a need for action with regard to rigid and dualised labour 
markets, and (2) favour outright deregulatory reform measures over other types 
of reforms that would aim at either lowering coordination or coverage but not 
both. Secondly, the higher degree of control exercised by the Troika over the 
Greek reform process was expected to result in the Greek reforms reflecting 
this deregulation paradigm more closely. In order to test for the validity of the 
competing H1 and H2, the reform measures laid out in the Portuguese EAP 
need to be analysed according to the particular reform trajectory, and 
specifically, whether the reforms in Portugal mirrored those in Greece or were 
of a more dualising nature as a result of the higher degree of discretion retained 
by the Portuguese authorities. 
 
From the outset, the Portuguese EAP displayed remarkable similarities with 
the two Greek programmes analysed here in that rigid labour markets, and the 
policies pertaining to it such as strict employment protection legislation, were 
identified as a key problem for economic growth. More specifically, the 
Portuguese EAP reads: 
“Labour market reforms are key to improve growth prospects and 
recover competitiveness. The most critical are excessive 
employment protection of permanent contracts, generous 
unemployment benefits, rigid working-time arrangements and a 
wage bargaining system that has not been capable to keep wage 
growth aligned to developments in productivity and external 
competitiveness. The rules for individual dismissal of permanent 
workers are strict and the compensation upon dismissal high by 
international standards. The strong protection of workers on 
permanent contracts has led to a two-tier labour market. The 




for the very low labour turnover and very long duration of 
unemployment. Restrictive dismissal rules combined with 
generous severance payments may also have contributed to 
higher wage outcomes. Furthermore, the rigid working time 
regulations represent a burden on firms and hamper labour 
mobility and job creation.“ (European Commission 2011c, 12)  
 
In a departure from the diagnosis of the Greek labour market inefficiencies, the 
Troika addressed the issue of labour market dualisation more specifically. In 
that sense, the high degree of employment protection for some workers is 
specifically singled out as coming at the cost of other workers in atypical forms 
of employment, thus rendering the labour market overall less efficient and 
impeding growth prospects: “Employment protection legislation (EPL) will be 
revised to reduce labour market segmentation” (ibid., 25). For instance, while 
in the Greek programmes, the stronger use of temporary work was given out 
as a possible policy area to improve labour market efficiency, the opposite is 
the case in Portugal where the use of temporary work was deemed already 
excessive and thus creating inefficiencies in its own right: 
“The Programme foresees comprehensive labour market reforms 
to reduce duality, enhance incentives to work, and promote a 
better alignment of working arrangements and wages to specific 
firm conditions. Excessively strict employment protection reduces 
job creation, hinders mobility to dynamic sectors, and favours a 
disproportionate use of temporary contracts. The precarious and 
uncertain labour market status of most young workers dents their 
human capital potential and productivity prospects.” (ibid., 24) 
 
More specifically, the Troika regarded the asymmetry between open-ended and 
fixed-term contracts as one of the core issues pertaining to the dualisation of 
the labour market and therefore prescribed concrete reforms to balance the 
two:  
“In the current legal framework, two main elements make 
temporary contracts more attractive to the employer: The first is 




ended contracts. The second is the narrow definition of fair 
dismissals that increases the risk for employers to enter into open-
ended contracts.” (ibid., 26) 
 
The reforms envisioned by the Troika to address this were largely aimed at 
breaking the privileges of protected labour market insiders with open-ended 
work contracts by: 
“(i) aligning the severance payment regime of open-ended 
contracts to that of fixed-term contracts; (ii) bringing the level of 
severance payments closer to that of other EU countries; (iii) 
making the definition of fair dismissal for open-ended contracts 
less restrictive; (iv) easing job-to-job mobility by making part of 
the severance payments portable via the creation of a fund 
financing notional individual accounts (in analogy with the 
Austrian system).” (ibid., 25) 
 
Based on the reforms outlined in both the Greek and Portuguese EAPs, two 
findings stand out: (1) In both countries, the Troika aimed at implementing 
reforms following flexibilisation across the board in order to lower the rigidity 
of the Greek and Portuguese labour markets. Given that all workers, though 
to different degrees, were to be affected by these reforms, in other words they 
were aimed at lowering both coordination and coverage, the reform trajectory 
can be labelled as deregulatory in the Varieties of Liberalisation framework. 
To a certain degree, the Troika seemed to have used one blueprint of ideal 
labour market reforms for both countries. This is particularly obvious in the 
Greek case where the deeper-than-anticipated recession was met with a more-
of-the-same type of approach the reform effort.  
 
However, (2) while the issue of labour market dualisation is implicitly 
addressed in the Greek case, the Troika is more explicit about aiming to break 
insider privileged in order to bring about lower labour market segmentation in 




inefficient and therefore hindering economic recovery, the achievement of which 
remained the key goal of the Troika. 
 
These findings lend credence to H1 in that there seems to be a uniformly 
deregulatory reform trajectory outlined in the reform prescriptions of the 
Troika. This is, firstly, based on the Troika identifying rigid and dualised 
labour markets as having a negative impact on economic growth by creating 
inefficiencies. Secondly, this is facilitated by the Troika’s liberty to target 
labour market insider privileges, which is typically more difficult for office-
seeking governments as labour market insiders tend to represent a large and 
well-organised voter group whose support is often perceived as essential for a 
government’s re-election. 
 
However, as we know from Paper 2 of this thesis, there was substantial conflict 
between the Troika on the one hand and the domestic governments and 
institutions and the other hand, fuelled by large-scale protests against the 
reforms in both Greece and Portugal. These conflicts played out differently in 
the two countries, however, and pushback in the case of Greece was, firstly, 
less effective from the outset and, secondly, met with zero tolerance on the part 
of the Troika, while in the case of Portugal there were substantial revisions of 
the reform prescriptions in the implementation stage in the realm of fiscal 
policies. In order to assess the validity of H2 in particular, which assumed 
different reform trajectories in both countries (Troika-style deregulation in 
Greece, dualisation in Portugal) it is therefore necessary to evaluate not just 
the reform prescriptions but also the implemented reforms. 
 
For that purpose the remainder of this section presents evidence from the 
European Commission’s LABREF database which captures all labour market 




EAP and the first two Greek EAPs. Following Picot and Tassinari (2017) the 
most significant reforms in the realms of EPL, wage setting and working time 
are assessed according to whether they can be classified as lowering the degree 
of coordination but leaving the level of coverage intact (embedded 
flexibilisation), lowering both coordination and coverage (deregulation) or 
whether they leave coordination intact but limit the number of workers covered 
by the coordination mechanisms (dualisation). The three categories represented 
the three varieties of liberalisation presented by Thelen (2014). 
 
This analysis yields two interesting results that allow for a further evaluation 
of the two competing hypotheses H1 and H2. Firstly, the overall reform 
trajectory prominently features ‘embedded flexibilisation’ measures, which calls 
the specification formulated in H1 that the Troika reforms would follow 
deregulatory principles into question (see Table 6 and Table 7). It should be 
noted, however, that the general validity with regard to the second 
specification, i.e. the retrenchment of insider privileges is not infringed upon: 
Labour market reforms following the principle of embedded flexibilisation do, 
in fact, retrench insider privileges by lowering the degree of coordination that 
resulted in the establishment of these principles in the first place. 
 
Secondly, there are marked differences between the Greek and Portuguese 
reform trajectories: While in Greece, only one in five out of the 20 major labour 
market reforms assessed for the scope of this analyses can be labelled as 
dualising, in Portugal almost half of the 15 major labour market reforms had 
a dualising effect. These reforms are likely to further deteriorate the 
employment conditions of labour market outsiders such as young or temporary 
workers or newly hired workers. In light of this difference, the evidence lends 
credence to H2 rather H1. Again, it needs to be noted that the reform path in 
Greece, which was more strongly controlled by the Troika, resembled 




however, lower the degree of dualisation in the labour market as they retrench 
the privileges of insiders. 
 
To recapitulate, H2 stipulated that the reforms in Portugal are likely to have 
a more dualising effect than those in Greece, due to higher degree of discretion 
vis-à-vis the Troika retained by the Portuguese government. In order to 
conclusively validate H2, there would, therefore, have to be evidence of conflicts 
between the Troika and the Portuguese authorities, and of a lack of 
implementation of some of the reform measures outlined by the Troika, 
particularly with regard to those that were aimed at lowering the degree of 
dualisation of the Portuguese labour market. For that purpose, the following 
section provides an analysis of the ex-post evaluations of the first and second 
EAPs for Greece, whose duration corresponds with the data available from the 
LABREF database, and the EAP for Portugal, conducted individually by the 













Employment Protection Legislation 
2011 






 Reduction of notice periods by 1 month for 
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protection against dismissal beyond the common 
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 Possibility of undercutting wages set in collective 





 Reduction in salaries of special wage regimes 
(judges, army, universities, doctors and the like) 











 Implementation of single public sector wage grid 
to personnel of Legal entities of private law + 





 Reduction of survival period of expired collective 





 Introduction of caps for duration of collective 





 Reduction of legally-binding wage floors by 32% 























 Introduction of link between wages and 









 - Increase of maximum duration of periods of 
increased and reduced work from 4 to 6 
months during the reference period. 
- Elimination of wage top-up (of 30% and 75%) 
for work in excess of the reduced hours 
- Implementation possible without agreement 


















Employment Protection Legislation 
2011 
 Reduction in severance payments  
- for new hires from 30 to 20 days 
- abolishment of 3 month minimum severance 
payment 
- Introduction of maximum severance payment 











 Changes in the definition of fair dismissals 
- For redundancies - elimination of the need to 
follow a specific order of dismissal 
- For unsuitability - possibility of a fair 
dismissal based on unsuitability without 
previous changes to the job post being 
introduced 
- For both types of dismissals - end of the 
obligation for the employer to show that no 




 Extension of the duration of fixed-term 





 Reduction in severance payments for old and new 









 Further reduction in severance payments for new 
hires from 20 to 12 days of base salary per year of 





 Increase in maximum number of renewals of fixed-






 3.5-5% public sector pay cut for salaries higher 
than  1500 euros per month 
Deregulation / 





 Freezing of minimum wage for duration of EAPs Dualisation MoU 
2012 





 Reduction of firm threshold from 500 to 150 
workers for works councils be entitled to 






 Flexibilisation of collective bargaining agreements 
by: 
- Reducing survival period expired collective 
bargaining agreements 








 Reduction of overtime compensation for workers 
not covered by collective bargaining agreements: 
- Limitation of additional pay for overtime up 
to 50% 














Sources: Based on LABREF database (European Commission 2019) 
 
3.4.2 Evidence of reform compliance from the Troika’s ex-post 
evaluations of the EAPs 
A review of the ex-post evaluations yields the following. In their evaluation of 
the first EAP for Greece, the IMF states that the reform was initially 
satisfactory as well as targeting the right issues in terms of flexibilising the 
labour market: 
“The program initiated a comprehensive agenda of structural 
reforms that included reducing public sector wages; liberalizing 
wage-setting and loosening employment restrictions in the private 
sector; improving the business environment by cutting red tape; 
and reducing barriers to entry and market distortions in 
protected industries. The program began with some deregulation 
(fast-track investment and one-stop shop legislation), but labor 
market reforms were not initially deep enough to tackle 
entrenched labor market inflexibility.” (International Monetary 
Fund 2013, 36) 
 
By the time of the conclusion of the second EAP, however, reform progress 
had slowed down markedly. Specifically, the IMF attests: 
“Even though labor market reforms bore fruit early on—with a 
noticeable decline in unit labor costs—significant restrictions 
regarding collective dismissals, industrial actions, and the setting 
of minimum wages remained in place.” (International Monetary 
Fund 2017, 24) 
“A measure of progress toward the EFF objectives was achieved, 
but the program ultimately foundered in the face of adverse 





However, while the general reform progress slowed down as the recession 
deepened and political turmoil increased due to mounting opposition towards 
the reform prescriptions, which is in line with other accounts of the Greek 
reform efforts (see e.g. Matsaganis 2018), there is no evidence that the reform 
trajectory itself changed. Moreover, the IMF’s ex-post evaluations do not 
mention increases in labour market dualisation or even the persistence of 
dualisation due to the slowing reform progress. The main criticism of the IMF 
instead seems to have been that deregulation, despite some progress, did not 
go far enough. 
 
With regard to the labour market reforms in Portugal, the European 
Commission reiterates in its ex-post evaluation of the EAP the high degree of 
labour market dualisation in Portugal going into the crisis: 
“The biggest issues that Portugal faced prior to the programme 
were: excessive employment protection of permanent contracts, 
leading to dualism” (European Commission 2016, 72).  
“Strict rules for individual dismissal of permanent workers were 
both a chronic and an acute problem for the Portuguese economy. 
They hindered the creation of permanent jobs and had helped to 
create a dual labour market” (ibid., 75). 
 
In this regard, the Commission reports some progress in implementing reforms 
aimed at reducing the dualisation in the labour market. However, similar to 
the case of Greece, reform progress stalled after the initial stage due to the 
interference by the Constitutional Court, in addition to direct pushback from 
the government itself: 
“Important labour market reforms were adopted during the 
programme, and firms consider them to have had a significant 
impact, but the momentum of reform dropped over time. This 
has helped to make the labour market more flexible, and to an 
extent to reduce undue protection of insiders at the cost of 
outsiders. Labour market reforms were relatively front-loaded 




good progress at the start of the programme. However both legal 
rulings and government policy decisions set back the process of 
labour market reform towards the end of the programme and in 
its aftermath.” (ibid., 79f.) 
 
The Commission is specific in its assertion that, unlike in Greece, where the 
reforms went in the right direction but not far enough, the reform progress in 
Portugal is more disappointing with regard to the issue of labour market 
dualisation: 
“Unemployment in Portugal is high and the labour market is still 
segmented” (ibid., 132). [The reform] measures did not bring 
about the expected improvements in terms of employment and 
reduced segmentation” (ibid., 153). 
 
The IMF’s ex-post evaluation of the Portuguese EAP is similar in that it 
affirms some initial headways but an overall ambiguous degree of success in 
the reforms, particularly with respect to the dualised labour market. It 
specifically underlines the pushback from the Portuguese Constitutional Court 
and government: 
“In the public sector, wages were reduced at first, but later 
reconstituted following Constitutional Court rejection. And 
between July 2012 and September 2013, Labor Code revisions 
affecting working time and employment protection were reversed 
[…] Deeper reforms to lower unemployment benefits and the cost 
of dismissals, and address the generosity of severance payments, 
continue to face political resistance, job protection remains 
among the highest in the EU, and the new jobs are 
disproportionately in temporary contracts.” (International 
Monetary Fund 2016, 24) 
 
The evidence from the ex-post evaluations of the IMF and the Commission 
reaffirm that, despite the uniformly deregulatory reform prescriptions given to 
both Greece and Portugal, the reforms ultimately implemented in practice 




measures, labour market dualisation persisted, particularly in Portugal. This is 
reflected by the Portuguese authorities pushing back against the reform 
prescriptions more strongly than was case in Greece. Some reforms that were 
deregulatory in their prescription were reversed or changed, which mirrors the 
more heavily dualising nature of the reforms established by the LABREF data. 
Based on this evidence, H1, a uniformly deregulatory reform prescription and 
implementation in both Greece and Portugal, must be rejected in favour of H2, 
which accommodates different varieties of liberalising reforms in the two 
countries – deregulation and embedded flexibilisation in Greece, further 
dualisation in Portugal – due to the higher degree of discretion over the reform 
process retained by the Portuguese authorities. 
 
3.4.3 Quantitative measures of labour market dualisation – status-
based definition 
In addition to the analysis of both the reform prescriptions and the reforms 
ultimately implemented in Greece and Portugal, and their classification under 
the Varieties of Liberalisation framework, it is necessary to analyse the 
outcomes of these reforms. While there are of course difficulties in discerning 
the exact impact of the reform measures on the degree of dualisation in the 
domestic labour markets, there are a number of ways to approximate these 
effects, particularly with regard to the second set of hypotheses formulated in 
this paper. For that purpose, the paper first provides a bird’s-eye view of the 
differences of labour market groups with regard to their affiliation with either 
the protected core of insiders or the more vulnerable group of outsiders. This 
is done in particular in order to test whether developments in the labour 
markets of Greece and Portugal mirror the reform efforts described in the 
previous sections. To recapitulate, one feature of dualised labour markets is 
that during a recession, outsiders will become unemployed first, thus 




adverse effects of the recession. Under the deregulatory reforms in Greece we 
would expect this buffer-function to become gradually less pronounced over 
time. Conversely, while there was deregulation in Portugal, the substantial 
number of dualising reforms can be expected to uphold this buffer-function of 
labour market outsiders. Therefore, we would expect a relatively larger number 
of labour market outsiders to become unemployed vis-à-vis labour market 
insiders in Portugal as compared to Greece. 
 
Calculating the status-based measure of labour market groups (see section 
3.3.2) with cross-sectional EU-SILC data yields the following results (see Figure 
24): In Greece, the number of individuals classified as labour market insiders 
decreased from 32.6% of the working age population in 2008 to 26.8% by 2016. 
The number of individuals categorised as outsiders declined by a similar rate 
from 28.6% in 2008 to 22.9% in 2016. Furthermore, tracing the aggregates of 
labour market groups in the individual years of the recession and the ensuing 
reform process reveals that, while overall the number of labour market insiders 
has declined by a similar margin as outsiders, this has not happened at 
consistently the same pace: In fact, after 2011, i.e. the year when the first 
structural reforms of the EAPs were implemented, the share of labour market 
insiders shrank more quickly than the share of labour market outsiders, while 
in the years between the global financial crisis and 2011 it was predominantly 
the group of labour market outsiders that contracted in the face of growing 
unemployment. This suggests that either labour market insiders became 
increasingly unemployed after having been safeguarded somewhat in the first 
years of the crisis, or that labour market insiders transitioned in larger numbers 
to atypical forms of employment, i.e. joined the ranks of labour market 






This implies that, while in the early stages of the recession it was indeed labour 
market outsiders that were displaced, forming a buffer for labour market 
insiders, the evidence is less clear-cut in the later years of the Economic 
Adjustment Programmes and the structural reforms they entailed. There are 
two possible explanations: the first is that the sheer depth of the Greek 
recession after 2010 hit insiders as much as outsiders; the second is that the 
structural reforms of the EAPs targeted the privileges of labour market 
insiders, thus leaving them increasingly exposed to the effects of the recession.  
 
The evidence for Portugal is different in that it verifies more strongly the 
expectations derived from the dualisation literature, as well as the observed 
reform trajectory from the previous sections. The total proportion of 
individuals classified as labour market insiders was 44% of the working age 
population in 2008, falling to 41.9% by 2013 at the height of the employment 
crisis in Portugal. In the same period, the percentage of outsiders fell more 
sharply from 21% to 14.3%, suggesting that, indeed, insiders were shielded to 
some degree from the recession through the buffer made up of the atypically 
employed. More importantly, between 2014 and 2016, when the Economic 
Adjustment Programme for Portugal had ended, the share of insiders among 
the working age population had bounced back to 2008 levels, while the share 
of atypically employed people recovered more slowly against the backdrop of 
slowly falling levels of unemployment. This finding suggests that structural 
reforms in Portugal had a much smaller negative impact on labour market 





Figure 24: Labour market groups before, during, and after the 
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The findings presented above are corroborated through the analysis of labour 
market transitions with longitudinal EU-SILC data (see Figure 25): While the 
share of those classified as labour market outsiders in year t-1 who became 
unemployed in year t in Greece rose after 2008 and was in absolute terms 
higher than those of insiders in t-1 at all times, the share of insiders becoming 
unemployed rose by almost the same rate. This suggests that, particularly after 
2010, the vulnerability of insiders to the recession rose as fast as that of 
outsiders. Overall, the likelihood of outsiders becoming unemployed was 
between 1.6 and 2.0 times as high as that of insiders throughout the crisis. 
 
Similar to the findings presented previously, the evidence for Portugal is 
different from that for Greece, in that the likelihood of those classified as 
outsiders in t-1 becoming unemployed in t rose more rapidly than the likelihood 
of insiders becoming unemployed. Overall, outsiders were between 2.6 and 4.0 
times as likely to become unemployed as insiders throughout the crisis (see 
Figure 26). In other words, the vulnerability of labour market outsiders during 
the recession, as measured by the group-specific risk of becoming unemployed, 





Figure 25: Labour market transitions from insider/outsider status in 
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Figure 26: Ratio of group-specific risk of unemployment for labour 
market outsiders by group-specific risk of unemployment for insiders 
 
Source: Calculations with EU-SILC longitudinal data 
Notes: A value of e.g. 3.0 denotes that in the corresponding year labour market outsiders’ 
probability of becoming unemployed was three times as high as that of insiders. 
 
In light of this evidence, H3 clearly has to be rejected in favour of H4: Labour 
market outsiders continually constituted a buffer shielding insiders from 
unemployment in Portugal, as evidenced by outsiders’ conspicuously higher 
risk of becoming unemployed. Together with the evidence provided in the 
previous sections, this suggests that labour market dualisation persisted in 
Portugal due to a number of reforms taking on a distinctly dualising trajectory, 
thus leading to a further deterioration of employment conditions for outsiders, 
while doing relatively less to retrench the protected position of labour market 
insiders. Conversely, in Greece, labour market insiders displayed similar 
increases in group-specific unemployment risk to outsiders throughout the 
recession. This suggests that the buffer function of labour market outsiders was 
limited. The evidence from the LABREF data as well as the ex-post evaluations 

















this is at least in part due to the nature of the reform measures imposed by 
the Troika following patterns of deregulation and embedded flexibilisation. 
 
3.5 Conclusion and Avenues for Further Research 
This paper analysed different trajectories of labour market reforms in the 
Eurozone crisis, drawing on both Thelen’s Varieties of Liberalisation 
framework (2014) and insights from the dualisation literature (Rueda 2005; 
2006; 2007; 2014; Emmenegger et al. 2012; Schwander and Häusermann 2013), 
as well as explaining different outcomes for those classified as labour market 
insiders and outsiders. The analysis focused on the two cases of Greece and 
Portugal. The two countries were chosen in particular due to the fact that the 
reforms were not devised by domestic governments alone but by the 
supranational, technocratic policy-makers of the Troika. 
 
The central argument of the paper is: due to technocratic policy makers not 
being subjected to the same pressures as office-seeking politicians in the way 
they design policies, they follow a fundamentally different logic. Rather than 
being governed by considerations about which electoral groups they need to 
respond to, technocratic policy makers seem to follow what they deem good 
economic policy. In the particular case of the Troika with regard to labour 
market reforms, it is clear that all three institutions follow the liberalisation 
paradigm prominent in virtually all advanced capitalist democracies since the 
1980s (Streeck 2011) and the turn from Keynesianism to Monetarism (Hall 
1993). Given the stipulations of this paradigm, the key element of Troika-style 
labour market reforms was flexibilisation. 
 
In the particular cases of Greece and Portugal, this entailed an emphasis on 




to lower the degree of dualisation in these labour markets, which the Troika 
institutions diagnosed as an inefficiency and therefore a barrier to economic 
growth. The domestic governments in the countries on the other hand have in 
the past contributed to the cementation of labour market dualisation through 
concrete legislation which strengthened the protection of the core workforce 
while leaving employment conditions for those on the fringes, such as 
temporary workers, to deteriorate further. 
 
Taking one key insight from Paper 2 of this thesis, namely that the Troika 
maintained a tighter grip on the reform process in Greece than in Portugal, 
and that the Portuguese authorities pushed back more effectively against the 
Troika reform prescriptions, the paper juxtaposed the reform measures in the 
two countries at different stages. Firstly, an analysis of the EAPs yielded that 
the reform prescriptions at the onset of the adjustment process were largely 
similar in both countries. Focusing on both lowering coordination and coverage, 
the reform prescription can be labelled as deregulatory as stated by Thelen’s 
Varieties of Liberalisation framework. Secondly, the paper used evidence from 
the LABREF database to test whether the reform measures eventually 
implemented in practice in the two countries matched those of the EAP 
prescriptions. While both countries seem to have followed through with some 
of the deregulatory reform measures, there were some departures from the 
original reform prescriptions. A number of the reforms followed the pattern of 
embedded flexibilisation, i.e. lowering the degree of coordination but not 
coverage of labour market institutions. With regard to the dualisation of labour 
markets, embedded flexibilisation reforms can be expected to have an 
equalising effect given that labour market insiders ordinarily benefit more 
strongly from coordinating institutions than outsiders. Conversely, unlike the 
reforms in the more strongly controlled and micro-managed Greece, almost half 
of the flexibilising reforms in Portugal targeted labour market outsiders, thus 




reflected in the Troika institutions’ ex-post evaluations of the EAPs, which 
detailed that, despite a general slowdown of the reform progress in both 
countries, overall compliance with the course set by the Troika was higher in 
Greece than in Portugal, where labour market dualisation was found to have 
largely persisted. 
 
These differences in the implemented reforms are mirrored in labour market 
outcomes measured for both labour market insiders and outsiders. Using status-
based operationalisations following Rueda (2007), and drawing on both cross-
sectional data at individual points in time and longitudinal data tracing 
individuals across several years, the analysis has shown that, indeed, in the 
case of Greece, the degree of labour market dualisation fell. Similarly, the same 
was not found to be true in the case of Portugal, where labour market reforms 
followed a more dualising route. This is evidenced by a higher risk of 
unemployment for labour market insiders through the duration of the EAPs in 
Greece, while they remained largely shielded from unemployment throughout 
the crisis in Portugal. Conversely, labour market outsiders were hit 
disproportionately harder than insiders in Portugal, while they displayed the 
same increases in unemployment vulnerability as insiders in Greece. 
 
These findings allow for the conclusion that the same dynamics observed for 
fiscal reforms in the previous papers of this thesis also apply to the realm of 
labour market reforms: In the more strongly Troika-controlled EAPs for 
Greece, fiscal reforms had an equalising effect, resulting in larger income 
reductions for higher income groups, while shielding or even compensating 
lower income groups. This was found to be due to technocratic policy makers 
being able to implement politically thorny reforms that elected governments 
would otherwise skirt around for fear of retribution at the ballot box, such as 
lowering pensions for higher income households. Labour market reforms had a 




resulting in an equalisation of the labour market, although imbalances persisted 
in the Greek case, too. Conversely, fiscal reforms in Portugal were found to 
protect those in the middle of the income distribution, which constitute 
important groups of median voters around which powerful electoral coalitions 
can form. Portuguese labour market reforms followed a similar trajectory to a 
certain degree, with the domestic government attempting to steer some of the 
adjustment burden away from labour market insiders, which likewise comprise 
important voter groups following the dualisation literature. 
 
However, there is one important difference pertaining to the distinctive 
underlying dynamics governing the actions of unelected technocrats on the one 
hand and elected, office-seeking ones on the other hand: While fiscal reforms 
in Greece were found to be intentionally compensatory for lower income groups, 
there is no evidence whatsoever that similar reforms were implemented to 
improve employment conditions for labour market outsiders. In fact, labour 
market reforms in Greece were largely either deregulatory or following 
embedded flexibilisation, suggesting that while labour market insiders saw the 
largest reductions in the degree of protection from unemployment and a 
decrease in other beneficial employment conditions, labour market outsiders’ 
employment conditions deteriorated, too, albeit at a slower pace. Therefore, 
while overall labour market inequality decreased as a result of the reforms, this 
was clearly in an overall downward direction. In other words, greater equality 
was achieved by making everybody worse off, but insiders more so than 
outsiders. 
 
While this underscores that the reforms imposed by the Troika were painful, 
it also reaffirms the argument posited in the previous papers that technocratic 
policy makers are primarily governed by their ideas of what constitutes good 
economic policy. In that sense, as presented in Paper 1 of this thesis, there is 




institutions such as the IMF to advocate for policies that increase redistribution 
towards lower income groups as this is seen as a growth-enhancing tool. 
However, with regard to ideal-type labour market reforms, there is no evidence 
of such a shift having taken place. Instead, institutions like the IMF, but also 
the European Commission, continue to operate under Washington-Consensus-
style principles of flexibilisation as the dominant mantra of labour market 
reforms. Compensation for more vulnerable groups, such as increasing the level 
of protection for temporary workers or the otherwise atypically employed, is 
not part of this consensus. In fact, the same group of IMF-researchers that 
produced a number of reports pointing out the negative relationship between 
high inequality and long-term economic growth, and belying the existence of 
an equity-efficiency trade-off for the formulation of sensible redistributive fiscal 
policies, find in relation to structural reforms that such equity-efficiency trade-
offs are still at play (Ostry, Berg, and Kothari 2018). This highlights that the 
absence of electoral pressures for policy makers can have equalising outcomes, 
as shown for the case of fiscal policy reforms, but that this depends crucially 
on whether the set of economic ideas governing technocratic policy makers’ 
actions accommodate compensatory measures for more vulnerable groups. 
 
In future research, the paper’s findings can be tested further by tracing more 
closely the preferences of office-seeking policy makers with regard to labour 
market reforms using methods such as those devised by Bürgisser and Kurer 
(2019). This would allow more detailed inferences to be drawn as to how and 
why the reform prescriptions of the Troika were altered in the implementation 
stage, thus leading to a more dualising effect. Similarly, the paper’s key 
assumption that office-seeking politicians are more likely to implement reforms 
that guard labour market groups perceived as important to their re-election 
endeavours can be tested for other country-cases outside of the control of the 
Troika. There are, however, some first results pointing in the same direction, 




divergent trajectories despite large similarities between the two countries, likely 
stemming from the responsiveness of the respective governments in power to 




––––– Conclusion ––––– 
 
B.1 Overview 
The bailout agreements and accompanying economic adjustment packages 
loaned to the Eurozone’s debtor countries of the last decade’s Eurozone crisis 
presented a unique opportunity for the analysis of the consequences of such 
programmes along two key dimensions for borrowing economies: (i) income 
inequality, and (ii) labour market segmentation. Sweeping reform directives 
constituted the conditionality for financial assistance by the Troika of 
unelected, non-government bodies, namely the IMF, the European 
Commission, and the ECB. Nevertheless, the policy reforms that were brokered 
in exchange for the funds were to be implemented at the national-level by 
domestically elected government actors, marking the interplay between elected 
and unelected policy makers as a key issue to understand the various 
distributive effects of the reforms.  
 
Two of the bailout programme recipient countries requiring some of the most 
drastic restructuring during the Eurozone crisis were Greece and Portugal. The 
reforms’ effects on income inequality and job market segmentation in these two 
economies are a pertinent development to analyse, as they constitute “most 
similar systems” cases, giving rise to the expectation that inequality and labour 
market trends subsequent to the reforms should not be radically varied. 
Although in theory the reform policies were laid out and negotiated between 
the debtor member states (Greece and Portugal) and the three Troika 
institutions, in practice this was not honoured because of two variations 




administrative resources and implementation capabilities between these two 
countries, and secondly, as a result of the much more critical state of the public 
balance sheet in Greece, the Troika de facto assumed a much more proactive, 
zealous role in conditionality reform-implementation in Greece compared to 
Portugal. 
 
In this context, the thesis analysed in detail the distributive effects of the 
reforms prescribed through the economic adjustment programmes for Greece 
and Portugal, using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods. One of the 
most important contributions made in this thesis is shedding light on the issue 
of the interplay of democracy and technocracy with inequality in the face of 
austerity and labour market liberalisation. The thesis found stark differences 
in how unelected technocrats on the one hand and elected, office-seeking 
politicians on the other hand make decisions regarding redistributive policies. 
The former seem to be governed mainly by their ideas about what constitutes 
good economic policy and, importantly, are at liberty to implement policies 
accordingly without fear of retribution at the ballot box. This can have 
unexpected progressive effects as technocrats can for the most part ignore 
vested interests and for instance redistribute away from important voter groups 
towards those most in need of it, as is evidenced by the fiscal reforms in Greece. 
It can, however, also have rather brutal effects for even the most vulnerable, 
as is evidenced by the observed labour market reforms in Greece, which – 
although specifically targeting the privileges of labour market insiders, too – 
had almost unidirectionally deregulatory effects, thus further exacerbating dire 
employment conditions of labour market outsiders in the short run. 
 
Reversing this argument, the thesis also makes an important contribution to 
our understanding of democracy and inequality: Far from being rigged against 
everyone but the super-rich (as parts of the current public discourse suggest), 




middle class, as is evidenced by both fiscal and labour market reforms in 
Portugal. However, this also showcases that more vulnerable groups (be they 
lower income households or labour market outsiders) do not necessarily benefit 
from the alignment of policies with middle class preferences, as is illustrated 
by the reform effects in Portugal (see also Iversen and Soskice 2019). The 
following summarises the findings presented in the thesis, highlighting its key 
contributions. 
 
B.2 Main findings and contributions 
B.2.1 Paper I 
The first paper analysed the distributive effects of the EAP reforms in Greece 
and Portugal in aggregate terms, motivated by the idea of testing the 
predictions made in the economic literature stating that fiscal consolidation 
leads to higher inequality (Agnello and Sousa 2014; Ball et al. 2013; Woo et al. 
2013). Using first descriptive statistics and EU-SILC microdata, the paper 
shows that inequality stagnated rather than increasing throughout the entirety 
of the reform programmes. In the face of rising levels of market income 
inequality, this suggests that the redistributive capacities of the welfare state 
were left intact despite the cuts in social expenditure.  
 
Using microsimulations, the paper then showcased that the reforms of the 
EAPs were in fact directly responsible for these developments. Compared to a 
hypothetical, non-reform counterfactual scenario, the actually implemented 
reforms had an inequality-reducing effect. This constitutes a completely novel 
finding on the basis of so far unused data sources for the purposes of this thesis. 
Furthermore, the paper tested the literature’s assertions that the composition 




Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi 2019; Ball et al. 2013; Woo et al. 2013). Again, 
making use of microsimulation tools and decomposing the distributive effects 
of the reforms by policy classes, the paper finds that this is untrue. The most 
inequality-reducing reforms in Greece were expenditure-based, which is 
contrary to the findings in the economic literature. Moreover, the paper shows 
that the exact design of the reforms, rather than their composition is crucial 
for determining their distributive effects. For instance, reforms of the same 
class were found to be progressive in Greece and regressive in Portugal. 
 
On the basis of this empirical analysis, and to explain the somewhat unexpected 
findings, the paper outlines the preferences of the Troika policy makers 
regarding inequality and redistribution. In the past, technocratic institutions 
such as the IMF have been found to champion distinctly market liberal reforms 
with detrimental effects for income inequality. However, the paper shows based 
on the analysis of EAP-related documents, research publications by the IMF, 
speeches, and secondary interview data that the Fund has undergone an 
ideational shift. Inequality is increasingly seen as a problem for economic 
growth by the Fund, and, in a departure from the oft-cited equity-efficiency 
trade-off, policies to alleviate inequality are at the same time increasingly 
viewed as valid instruments. This is due to both the necessity to ensure public 
support in order to be able to successfully implement growth-enhancing 
reforms, and the view that redistributive policies are conducive to economic 
growth in their own right (Berg and Ostry 2011; Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides 
2014; Lipton 2013). This in turn is based on the Kaleckian view that lower 
income households have a higher marginal propensity to consume and that 
redistributing towards them therefore has higher multiplier effects in 
stimulating aggregate demand and thus economic growth. For the case of the 
European Commission, the paper presents evidence that the Commission is in 




policies in support of a European social model (Hooghe 2000; 2001; Ross 1995; 
2011). 
 
B.2.2 Paper II 
The second paper took up the findings from the first paper with the aim of 
explaining the differences between the distributive effects of the Greek and 
Portuguese EAPs which can be observed when zooming in on the income 
distribution and analysing income changes by decile rather than in aggregate 
terms. The paper provides a more detailed comparative case study of Greece 
and Portugal in order to identify independent variables that are able to explain 
this variation. Whilst both countries are found to be similar along all relevant 
variables, the major difference that emerges is the degree of control exercised 
by the Troika. 
 
The paper presents evidence that the Troika’s grip on the reform process was 
considerably tighter in the case of Greece than in the case of Portugal. The 
paper argues that this is due to the lower reform implementation capacity of 
the Greek state on the one hand, which required firmer Troika control, and the 
stronger veto points in the Portuguese case on the other hand, which made 
Troika interference on the specific reform design more difficult. This was 
exacerbated by Portugal’s early return to the long-term bond markets, ending 
the dependence on the Troika payments. The paper presents evidence that the 
observed reform effects are thus more in line with the preferences of the Troika 
in the case of Greece, and with the preferences of the elected government in 
the case of Portugal.  
 
The argument is confirmed by the observation that the reforms became 
appreciably more progressive in Greece from 2012 onwards, which is the point 




micromanage the Greek government, issuing specific reform prescriptions 
rather than more general fiscal targets. In the case of Portugal, the paper tests 
for different manifestations of the voter responsiveness argument, showcasing 
that the government sought to shield those voters in the middle of the income 
distribution, which is reflected by the reform effects. This is because powerful 
electoral coalitions form around the median voter (Downs 1957; Meltzer and 
Richard 1981; Iversen and Soskice 2006); responding to the median-voter 
preferences is thus in line with the interests of re-election seeking politicians. 
The findings of the paper contribute to the debate on the interplay of 
democracy and inequality, specifically with regard to the burgeoning literature 
on whether democratic capitalism is rigged and only serves the rich (e.g. Bartels 
2018), or whether it serves instead primarily the interests of the middle class 
(e.g. Iversen and Soskice 2019), a view which the findings of this paper support. 
 
B.2.3 Paper III 
In the third paper, the analysis turned to another manifestation of inequality, 
namely labour market dualisation. On the basis of the previous two papers, the 
thesis tested whether the impact of the different degrees of Troika involvement 
in the two countries would extend to the realm of labour market reforms and, 
if so, whether the effects were in a similar direction. For this purpose, the paper 
utilises insights from the labour market dualisation literature (see e.g. Rueda 
2005; 2006; 2007; Ebbinghaus 2006; Emmenegger 2009; Emmenegger et al. 
2012; Häusermann and Schwander 2012; Iversen and Soskice 2009). This 
literature postulates that labour market inequality, whilst intensified by 
structural pressures (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003; Autor, Katz, and 
Kearney 2006; Rodrik 1998; Iversen and Cusack 2000; Iversen and Wren 1998; 
Oesch 2006), is more often than not the product of concrete legislation. This 
in turn is due to the fact that labour market insiders, i.e. those in secure and 




of office-seeking politicians than labour market outsiders, whose preferences 
often diverge from those of insiders. 
 
Following this, the paper tested whether the same logic that led to more 
progressive fiscal policy reforms by eliminating the need for policy makers to 
cater to certain voter groups (see reform effects in Greece post-2012), also 
applies in the realm of labour market policies. Extending this logic, labour 
market reforms of the Troika-controlled Greek EAPs should be more equalising 
and less centred around the interests of insiders than the reforms in Portugal. 
Using evidence from the LABREF database and Thelen’s Varieties of 
Liberalisation (2014) framework, the paper finds that this is corroborated to a 
certain extent. Reforms in Portugal were indeed found to be more dualising 
than those in Greece, which were found to follow both trajectories of embedded 
flexibilisation and deregulation. This is reflected by the reform effects on labour 
market outcomes, with insiders becoming noticeably more vulnerable in Greece 
but not in Portugal. However, one important caveat is that in contrast to the 
fiscal reforms in Greece, labour market reforms did not incorporate any 
compensatory elements for the most vulnerable. Therefore, whilst technically 
equalising, the reforms made everybody worse off, although hitting insiders 
relatively harder. 
 
Whilst this constitutes an important difference vis-à-vis the fiscal reform logic, 
it confirms the argument made throughout the thesis that the technocratic 
policy makers are governed less by interests to cater to important voter groups 
(be that in terms of income groups, or labour market groups), but by their 
ideas of what constitutes good economic policy. In the realm of structural 
reforms, the dominant orthodoxy still centres around the wholesale 
liberalisation of labour markets, whilst subscribing to the view that more 




privileges, which constitute entry barriers for labour market outsiders from 
attaining more stable types of employment. 
 
B.3 Theoretical Discussion: A case for actor-centred 
institutionalism? 
The three papers of this thesis are all connected by two common themes: (1) 
Policies that are not ordinarily associated with progressive outcomes, such as 
austerity measures and labour market reforms, are shown to have progressive 
effects in the context of the Economic Adjustment Programmes in the 
Eurozone crisis; (2) Technocrats seem to have been able to implement such 
progressive reforms better than their elected counterparts in the domestic 
governments. This insight informs our debates on the politics of redistribution 
in a narrow sense, and the politics of advanced capitalism in a wider sense. In 
recent years, the fields of political science and political economy have been 
undergoing what Beramendi et al. (2015) call an ‘electoral turn’. Essentially, 
this stipulates that governments are primarily beholden to the interests of 
voters, although they are constrained by various elements of demand and 
supply side politics. 
 
This model of constrained partisanship is immensely intuitive and attractive 
in explaining the politics of advanced capitalism. However, most research since 
then seems to have focused exclusively on what voters want and how 
governments respond to that, leaving aside the role of institutions. This may 
be a mistake. In particular, as this thesis has shown, elected policy makers may 
not just be constrained by the direct will of the voters but especially by the 
will of voters expressed in past rounds of policy making and enshrined in 
institutions. These are, as we know for instance from the work of Paul Pierson 




an almost exclusive focus on electoral politics is suited in explaining change, 
which is, after all, one of the key enterprises in political science. As shown in 
this thesis, elected policy makers are often more constrained by either voters 
or by institutions (see e.g. the case of the Portuguese pension reform) than 
they are at liberty to enact progressive reforms as part of their accountability 
to the electorate. In the undoubtedly valuable effort to better understand the 
dynamics of electoral politics, political scientists should, therefore, not lose 
sight of the importance of institutions, as Pierson (2016) also points out in a 
review of Beramendi et al.’s work. 
 
In fact, this thesis has touched upon the notion of institutional change several 
times and will at this point elaborate further on the notion. On the one hand,  
the thesis has shown a number of important instances of institutional change 
with regard to the redistributive capacities of the welfare states of the two 
country cases analysed here. On the other hand, the thesis has argued 
repeatedly that the impact of the Troika in facilitating that change was in itself 
an expression of institutional change within the Troika bodies, and most 
notably the IMF and the European Commission. After all, neither the IMF nor 
the Commission have in the past been associated with being champions for 
more redistributive and progressive policies. In explaining this puzzle, the thesis 
at this point draws on important theories of institutional change (most notably 
Mahoney and Thelen 2010), as well as important applications of these theories 
such as the one provided by Ben Clift (2018) in the context of the IMF. On 
that basis, the thesis formulates a critique of puristic forms of historical 
institutionalism in favour of a revival of what Renate Mayntz and Fritz Scharp 
have called actor-centred institutionalism (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995; Scharpf 
1997). The thesis has presented evidence for two important arguments: Actors 
matter, and ideas matter. In fact, individual actors seem to have been the 
driving force behind the institutional change we have observed in the IMF, and 




shaped substantially by their ideas regarding what is good economic policy or 
how the economy should be structured in general. 
 
Fritz Scharpf summarises the essence of the argument developed in what 
follows in his work on actor-centred institutionalism originally formulated with 
Renate Mayntz: 
“We must remain aware of the fact that although institutions 
constitute composite actors, create and constrain option, and 
shape perceptions and preferences, they cannot influence choices 
and outcomes in a deterministic sense. Institutionalised rules, 
even if they are completely effective, will rarely prescribe one and 
only one course of action. Instead, by proscribing some and 
permitting other actions, they will define repertoires of more or 
less acceptable courses action that will leave considerable scope 
for the strategic and tactical choices of purposeful actors.” 
(Scharpf 1997, 42) 
 
To reiterate the example given in the thesis, what does this mean in terms of 
the change observed in the IMF’s position on inequality and redistribution? 
On the one hand, it is clear from the evidence presented above that agents 
played a central role in this shift: research carried out by senior IMF staff such 
as Jonathan Ostry, deputy director of the IMF Research Department, and 
colleagues laid the groundwork for the Fund’s shift in its views on inequality 
and redistribution. Moreover, as recent research by Clift (2018) who conducted 
numerous interviews with senior IMF staff shows, this was preceded and 
facilitated by changes in the IMF leadership: The tenure of Dominique Strauss-
Kahn as IMF Managing Director between 2008 and 2011 marked the inception 
of this gradual shift in the IMF’s view on inequality, the legacy of which was 
carried on by Strauss-Kahn’s successor Christine Lagarde. The promotion of 
Olivier Blanchard and Carlo Cottarelli, both proponents of New Keynesian 
economics and receptive to the notion of inequality being a central issue in 
economy policy making, to IMF Chief Economist and Director of the Fiscal 




institutional shift. Arguably, Maurice Obstfeld who succeeded Blanchard in 
2015 followed similar economic ideas, thus ensuring a continuation of the IMF’s 
gradual change. On the other hand, this also shows that ideas play a major 
role in informing institutional change as they structure the way in which 
change-agents view the world and ultimately define their interests (Blyth 2002; 
Hay 2002). In the case at hand, the specific ideas of key IMF figures on how 
the economy works formed the basis for the shift in the IMF’s position on 
inequality and redistribution. 
 
However, one of the key insights of the new institutionalist literature and a 
progression from overly agent-centred behaviouralist approaches is that the 
relationship between institutions and agents is at the very least a reciprocal 
one. Therefore, even though agents play a key role in shaping institutional 
change by interpreting their assigned roles in particular ways, their behaviour 
is in turn structured substantially by institutions. Our theory on non-
majoritarian institutions and inequality must strike a balance between the two 
and accommodate this reciprocal relationship of ideas, how they translate into 
interests, and shape actors’ behaviours with regard to institutional change, and 
vice versa, how institutional configurations shape actors’ interests as well as 
the ideas through which they make sense of the world (Hall 1989; Steinmo and 
Thelen 1992). Therefore, we need to first ask which ideas are most prevalent 
among agents within the institution and how the institution acts as a filter for 
certain ideas. Next, our analysis needs to look at how these ideas are ultimately 
translated into rules and thus shape the institution, taking into account the 
reciprocal relationship between agents and their institutional environment. 
Finally, how are these ideas enacted, or in other words, how do these 
institutionalised ideas translate into actual policies? 
 
In answering the first of these questions, the evidence shown in the thesis has 




beholden to a certain ideology when it comes to economic policy. The IMF, in 
particular, has been described as following neoliberal doctrine (Peet 2009), 
which in turn has been found to be reflected in the economic ideas of IMF staff 
and policies prescribed to creditor countries, most notably since the 1980s and 
into the 2000s (Nelson 2014). However, research on the politics of ideas and 
knowledge in international organisations shows that this is at the very least an 
oversimplification of a much more complex reality. The IMF’s self-conception 
in this regard is that of an apolitical, pragmatic institution (Clift 2018). 
Economic policy, through this lens, is not an exercise in promoting or following 
any particular ideology, but a purely technical one (Best 2005), a principle that 
has for decades been central in the IMF’s organisational culture (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004; Momani 2007). Of course, self-conception and organisational 
culture on the one hand and reality on the other are not necessarily congruent. 
However, the thesis has shown that analysing major IMF publications such as 
the World Economic Outlook reveals that rather than obeying doctrine, Fund 
staff simply follow the respective status quo in the economics profession at a 
given time. Economic ideas will be taken up by the Fund if they are legitimised 
through cutting-edge research at top economics departments, regardless of 
whether these ideas represent established schools of thought or challenge them 
(Ban and Patenaude 2018). 
 
A dispute between orthodox and revisionist understandings of economics is 
usually reflected in the IMF’s position on certain topics rather than promoting 
one or the other. The fact that economic policies advocated by the IMF 
overlapped with neoliberal principles for the better part of two decades since 
the 1980s is thus more of a reflection of the then consensus in the economics 
profession after the turn to neoclassical economics rather than a sign of 
ideological fealty in its own right. More specifically, the research shows that, 
aside from the fact that economics itself is never completely free from 




the basis for assumptions upon which theoretical models rest (e.g. Blaug 1996), 
IMF staff are not beholden to any one economic doctrine in particular due to 
their institutional affiliation. Similarly, whilst IMF economist are inevitably 
shaped by their academic, and potentially ideas-based, training, their role in 
day-to-day work dictates that they consider practical considerations much 
more than is the case in academic research in the field of economics. Rather 
than aligning with ideological doctrine, the IMF, particularly in its own self-
conception, seems to follow the principle of ‘sound economic policy’ as well as 
trying to shape how exactly this notion is interpreted (Clift 2018). 
  
Answering the second question, how ideas translate into rules shaping the 
institution, leads to a more in-depth discussion of both the IMF’s self-
conception and how this affects the way in which ideas prosper within the 
Fund. The self-defined concept of an apolitical, technocratic institution dictates 
a certain degree of open-mindedness when it comes to different economic ideas 
and promotes competition among them. In fact, the IMF is much less 
homogenous than previous accounts argued (Blyth 2003; Grabel 2003). Rather 
than uniformly advocating a particular set of ideas, the IMF is characterised 
by internal struggles among different ideas and subcultures that promote one 
or the other before (as well as after) they are formalised and ultimately find 
their way into actual policy prescriptions (Chwieroth 2009; Ban 2015). This is 
evidenced both in interviews with Fund staff (Clift 2018; Ban and Patenaude 
2018), official documents published by the IMF (Ban 2016), and public 
statements made by Fund officials. The notion of internal competition among 
different economic ideas is illustrated in the way Fund officials referred to the 
rules of the Washington Consensus – often incorrectly put forward as the IMF’s 
sole guiding principle – by the early 2000s, i.e. still before the change in the 
IMF’s position on interventionist economic policies and particularly 
redistribution had accelerated in the wake of the GFC and with the 




2004, then-Deputy Managing Director Anne Krueger in analysing economic 
challenges and policy failures in Latin America since the 1990s spoke of policy 
makers having “meant well, tried little, failed much” with regard to progress 
on Washington-Consensus-type reforms. Whilst Krueger was clearly 
advocating for ‘more of the same’ and pushing for further Washington-
Consensus-type reforms, even the IMF’s own Evaluation Office at the same 
time produced reports arguing the opposite with regard to the efficacy of such 
reforms, showing that even in the heyday of neoliberalism there was never 
really one particular set of economic policy ideas that the IMF promoted 
exclusively (Rodrik 2006). 
 
With regard to our understanding of gradual institutional change this further 
illustrates that, rather than acting as external shocks leading to abrupt change, 
the mechanism here lies in how events such as the GFC empower certain 
subcultures within institutions. This in turn allows some ideas to become more 
prevalent than others, which then forms the basis for institutional change. The 
key insight that is stressed here is that institutional change, whilst often 
facilitated by such events, is ultimately driven by change-agents within the 
institution. Such change-agents make use of ‘soft spots’ (Mahoney and Thelen 
2010) that allow them to exploit rule ambiguity or imprecision by interpreting 
reality in new ways, thus ultimately reshaping the institution. The argument I 
put forward here is that the way in which we should conceive of this process 
revolves around the concept of ‘situated agency’. As Hall and Taylor put it in 
their seminal work: “Not only do institutions provide strategically-useful 
information, they also affect the very identities, self-images and preferences of 
the actors” (1996). In that sense, change-agents, despite being the driving force 
of gradual institutional change, never operate in a vacuum and are always 
beholden to their own economic ideas. The concept of situated agency thus 
offers one possible solution to what Hall describes as the problem of ‘explaining 




the structuring of the political world’ (Hall 2016a). Acknowledging the central 
importance of agents, the appeal of this notion is the following: Instead of 
giving primacy to either the ideas that agents hold or the institutional context 
in which they operate (cf. Hay and Rosamond 2002), situated agency assumes 
dialectical interactions of agents and their ideas on the one hand and their 
institutional environment and how this shapes their ideas on the other hand 
(Bell 2011; Marsh 2009). Both ideas and institutions thus become somewhat 
fluid concepts that evolve and reshape each other dialectically through situated 
agency at its centre. 
 
The third question posed earlier, how institutional change is reflected in actual 
policy prescriptions, can be answered in the following way. Given the central 
role of situated agency and the dialectical relationship of ideas and institutional 
environments, it becomes clear that the rather novel-seeming policies 
advocated by the IMF regarding interventionist economic policies and 
redistribution, are otherwise in line with our understanding of how institutions 
like the IMF work: Once a newer set of ideas has taken hold within the 
institution, or indeed an older but less prevalent set of ideas has superseded 
previously dominant ideas, and is legitimised through research both from 
within and outside the IMF, they rather quickly translate into policy 
prescriptions. The IMF in particular is an extremely hierarchical institution 
(Copelovitch 2010; Momani 2007), and as such gives change agents in senior 
positions the power to facilitate the diffusion of these ideas so that they are 
reflected in the policy prescriptions given out by the Fund (Clift 2018). 
 
Therefore, the sequence of institutional change at the IMF that ultimately led 
to the prevention of excessive levels of inequality becoming a policy priority 
can be made sense of in the following way: Both the IMF’s self-conception as 
an apolitical institution and the central role of situated agency form the basis 




can in this regard indeed act as catalysts for some ideas to prevail over others 
particularly when they challenge the contemporaneous orthodoxy. Such ideas 
take hold only when they are legitimised through cutting-edge research by top 
economists both within and outside the institution. To illustrate this, we can 
see that at the time influential economists such as Alan Auerbach, Larry 
Summers, and others (see e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012; DeLong et 
al. 2012) moved away from their previous positions in their analysis of the GFC 
and towards more market scepticism and openness to interventionist policies. 
This break with the orthodoxy by some of the world’s top economists 
precipitated the IMF becoming more sensitive towards these issues (Clift 2018). 
At the same time, a growing body of research on the causes and levels of 
economic inequality spearheaded by scholars like Tony Atkinson, Thomas 
Piketty, Emmanuel Saez and collaborators gave more salience to the issue of 
economic inequality within the economics profession as a whole (e.g. Piketty 
and Saez 2003). Research from within the IMF mirrored this development both 
with regard to a generally more market sceptic view of economic policy 
(Cottarelli and Jaramillo 2012) and the issue of inequality as an impediment 
to sustainable long-term growth (Berg and Ostry 2011; Ostry, Berg, and 
Tsangarides 2014). Internally, this process was driven forward by change-
agents such as Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Olivier Blanchard, and others. Once 
this ideational shift was under way, concerted efforts by these powerful change-
agents saw to the diffusion of the new ideas within the Fund. Ultimately, the 
hierarchical, top-down organisational form of the IMF allowed these ideas to 
quickly translate into actual policy prescriptions, which was at the time for 
instance reflected in the Economic Adjustment Programmes in the Eurozone 
crisis. 
 
Through an institutionalist lens, we can make sense of this process of gradual 
institutional change as a combination of layering, i.e. the introduction of new 




Thelen 2005), and conversion, i.e. the process of agents interpreting existing 
rules in a new way (Thelen 2004). This is clear from the fact that, firstly, the 
issue of inequality was given a much higher priority on the IMF’s agenda and 
became the subject of closer investigation both with regard to past IMF policies 
and the likely impact that future IMF policies would have on inequality 
(layering). Secondly, the role of more interventionist policies, and in particular 
redistribution, was reinterpreted by agents within the Fund to reflect new 
advancements in the realm of academic economics (conversion). Similarly, 
some degree of conversion in this case is also the result of certain subcultures 
within the institution assuming a more dominant position, thus using existing 
rules in new ways (Selznick 1949). 
 
Other key authors in this field such as Clift (2018) have described this process 
as bricolage, which refers to actors crafting ‘new institutional solutions by 
recombining elements in their repertoire’ (Campbell 2004). This constructivist 
institutionalist (see Hay (2008, 2016), see also ‘Discursive Institutionalism’, 
Schmidt (2008, 2010)) approach to explaining institutional change is 
fundamentally similar in its analytical logic to the situated-agency-
accommodating historical institutionalist approach I put forward here. 
However, the former has been criticised by some authors precisely for 
underestimating the importance of institutional structures in favour of an 
overly agent-centred approach that ignores the dialectical relationship between 
agents and their institutional environment (Bell 2011), which is an advantage 
of the situated-agency-accommodating historical institutionalist approach I 
propose. Regardless of whether we take a historical or constructivist 
institutionalist view of this process of gradual institutional change, it is clear 
that this change is anything but a radical one, despite the fact that the policies 
now advocated by the IMF seem on the surface radically different from 
previous ones. Therefore, we do not need to substantially rethink the way we 




goal of achieving of economic recovery and sustainable long-term growth in 
creditor countries, not least because they are ultimately driven by the prospect 
of countries paying back loans. It is only the instruments to achieve this goal 
that have changed in their nature. 
 
The European Commission is somewhat different from the IMF in this regard 
in that it is more political but that there is also more evidence for Commission 
technocrats to have stronger opinions and ideas regarding inequality and 
redistribution. Beyond the general notion that policy-makers are motivated by 
more than just selfish reasons and can in fact have stronger predilections to 
altruism than persons in other professions (Chang 2002; Etzioni 1988), an 
important contribution by Hooghe (2001) finds that EU bureaucrats are 
generally in favour of a more regulated form of capitalism characterised by 
more extensive social services and higher levels of redistribution. Rejecting the 
more market-oriented model of liberal market economies (Hooghe 2000), they 
seek to preserve and promote the European social model (Hooghe 2001; Ross 
1995). Regressive cuts to the welfare state would seriously undermine this 
project.  
 
Further to this, there is evidence that EU bureaucrats have recognised that 
the European social model has come under pressure and that they would prefer 
a stronger orientation towards policies that ensure more equity through 
redistribution (Ross 2011). In this regard one can conceive of the austerity 
measures in the EAPs as examples of a 'soft spots' that open up further policy 
options for agents to choose from (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). As long as fiscal 
consolidation as the primary goal is achieved, bureaucrats as institutional 
agents can exploit this soft spot by enforcing to some degree their own will and 
thus shape the exact design of the austerity measures accordingly. This is one 
way of making sense of the dilemma that Commission technocrats found 




dimension – with the European Social Model, in fact, being enshrined in the 
Treaties, of which the Commission is the guardian – and on the other hand the 
strict austerity paradigm dictated primarily by Berlin. By adhering to the 
general austerity paradigm but ensuring that austerity measures were designed 
in a progressive fashion, Commission officials managed this balancing act. 
  
Overall, the thesis has shown that there is a need to reconceptualise – or revive 
– existing theories on what guides policy makers, and in particular those in 
technocratic, non-majoritarian institutions, and how these institutions change, 
guided by individual actors and their ideas regarding what constitutes good 
policy. 
  
B.4 Limitations and Further Research 
This section serves to discuss some limitations of the research presented in the 
thesis as well as avenues for further research emerging from it. The first of 
these limitations concerns the measurement of income inequality. As discussed 
in Paper 1, there are stark shortcomings of the approach currently dominant 
in the discipline, which includes (1) ignoring relative and absolute poverty, and 
(2) the omission of public goods and services. This also underscores the fact 
that while this thesis has presented ample evidence as to the inequality-
reducing nature of the analysed reforms, this does not provide a positive 
assessments of the reforms per se. Austerity in particular undoubtedly had 
vastly negative effects in Southern Europe, and particularly in Greece, 
especially because of the unwillingness of the creditor countries to lessen the 
austerity burden by expanding their own fiscal activity. The key question here 
is what the possible counterfactuals would have been and whether they would 
have produced better outcomes in the long run. The thesis remains agnostic 




A similar limitation of the analysis in this thesis is the omission of wealth 
inequality as an object of interest. Whilst undoubtedly important for the 
overall analysis of inequality, however, reliable data are difficult to obtain, 
although some improvements have been made in this regard recently, esepcially 
by the contributors to the World Inequality Database (World Inequality 
Database 2019; see also Alvaredo et al. 2018). 
 
With regard to the issue of labour market dualisation, the analysis presented 
in this thesis remained at aggregate levels and did not further decompose 
workers other than according to their labour market status. However, we know 
from the literature that labour market dualisation has a distinct gender and 
age dimension (Emmenegger et al. 2012). Further research should therefore 
look at disentangling the effects of labour market reforms for these groups 
specifically in order to create a more nuanced portrait allowing for further 
policy conclusions. 
 
Lastly, perhaps the most important avenue for further research relates to the 
long-term consequences of the reforms for the welfare state. A number of 
questions arise in this regard: Did the reforms transform domestic tax-benefit 
systems and labour markets sufficiently to restore competitiveness in the long-
run? Did the reforms labelled as progressive in the case of Greece bring about 
a stable equilibrium of a more equal welfare regime? Have the reforms been 
sufficient for the EAP countries to be able to confront future crises without 
the need for assistance from their international partners? Are the Southern 
European welfare states ready for the challenges of the knowledge economy 
and sufficiently modernised as a result of the reform programmes? Conversely, 
whilst progressive in the short-run, as evidenced in this thesis, do the reforms 
(such as a strong focus on means-testing for benefit payments, which excludes 
larger parts of the population from accessing such benefits) undermine support 




extensive retrenchment in the future? These questions and more should be 
explored in further research on the comparative political economy of inequality, 
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